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COMPETENCE, CULPABILITY, AND
PUNISHMENT:
IMPLICATIONS OF A TKINS FOR EXECUTING AND
SENTENCING ADOLESCENTS
Barry C. Feld*
ABSTRACT
The Supreme Court has explored the issues of culpability,
proportionality, and deserved punishment most fully in the context of
capital punishment. In death penalty decisions addressing developmental
impairments and culpability, the Court has considered the cases of
defendants with mental retardation and older adolescents, and has
created an anomalous inconsistency by reaching opposite conclusions
about the deserved punishment for each group of defendants. Recently,
in Atkins v. Virginia, the Court relied on both empirical and normative
justifications to categorically prohibit states from executing defendants
with mental retardation. Atkins reasoned that mentally retarded offenders
lacked the reasoning, judgment, and impulse control necessary to equate
their culpability with that of other death-eligible criminal defendants.
This Article contends that the same psychological and developmental
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characteristics that render mentally retarded offenders less blameworthy
than competent adult offenders also characterize the immaturity of
judgment and reduced culpability of adolescents and should likewise
prohibit their execution. Moreover, the diminished criminal
responsibility of adolescents has broader implications for proportionality
in sentencing young offenders. Because the generic culpability of
adolescents differs from that of responsible adults, penal proportionality
requires formal, categorical recognition of youthfulness as a mitigating
factor in sentencing.
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INTRODUCTION
Proportionality between the seriousness of the harm, the culpability
of the actor, and the severity of punishment constitutes the foundation of
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the criminal sanction.' In its noncapital proportionality analyses, the
Supreme Court has primarily emphasized the relationship between the
seriousness of the offense or recidivism and the sentence imposed, rather
than the culpability of the offender.2 By contrast, the Court's death
penalty jurisprudence has repeatedly emphasized that defendants must
receive an individualized culpability assessment before a state may
impose the ultimate penalty.3
The criminal law assumes that rational actors possess free will and
choose to violate the law based on their own preferences and values.
Because moral blameworthiness provides legitimacy to the criminal
sanction, the criminal law must account for the quality of choices made
by actors who deviate substantially from its model of personal
autonomy. Some nominally responsible actors are not as blameworthy as
other offenders, and the criminal law formally or informally mitigates
1. See, e.g., Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302, 343 (1989) (Brennan, J., concurring in part,
and dissenting in part) ("We gauge whether a punishment is disproportionate by comparing 'the
gravity of the offense,' understood to include not only the injury caused, but also the defendant's
moral culpability, with the 'harshness of the penalty."'); Weems v. United States, 217 U.S. 349, 367
(1910) ("[lI]t is a precept of justice that punishment for crime should be graduated and proportioned
to offense."); Elizabeth S. Scott & Laurence Steinberg, Blaming Youth, 81 TEX. L. REV. 799, 800
(2003) ("Proportionality holds that fair criminal punishment is measured not only by the amount of
harm caused or threatened by the actor, but also by his blameworthiness."); Franklin E. Zimring,
Penal Proportionality for the Young Offender: Notes on Immaturity, Capacity, and Diminished
Responsibility, in YOUTH ON TRIAL: A DEVELOPMENTAL PERSPECTIVE ON JUVENILE JUSTICE 271
(Thomas Grisso & Robert G. Schwartz eds., 2000) ("[T]he criminal law needs to make sense as a
language of moral desert, punishing only those who deserve condemnation, punishing the guilty
only to the extent of their individual moral desert, and punishing the range of variously guilty
offenders it apprehends in an order that reflects their relative blameworthiness.").
2. See, e.g., Harmelin v. Michigan, 501 U.S. 957, 995-96 (1991) (rejecting proportionality
analyses in non-death penalty cases and approving imposition of mandatory life without parole for
drug offense); Solem v. Helm, 463 U.S. 277, 290-91 (1983) (focusing on three factors to assess
disproportionality of penalty in noncapital cases: (1) severity of penalty in relation to gravity of
offense, (2) comparison with sentences imposed for other offenses in same jurisdiction, and (3)
comparison with sentence imposed for same crime in other jurisdictions). See also Ewing v.
California, 538 U.S. I1, 30 (2003) (approving sentence of twenty-five years to life for "three strike"
sentence for theft); Barry C. Feld, Abolish the Juvenile Court. Youthfulness, Criminal
Responsibility, and Sentencing Policy, 88 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 68, 116 n.124 (1997)
(describing the Solem Court's Eighth Amendment analysis in noncapital cases); Wayne A. Logan,
Proportionality and Punishment: Imposing Life Without Parole on Juveniles, 33 WAKE FOREST L.
REV. 681, 696-97 (1998). See infra notes 284-96 and accompanying text.
3. See, e.g., California v. Brown, 479 U.S. 538, 545 (1987) (O'Connor, J., concurring)
("[E]vidence about the defendant's background and character is relevant because of the belief, long
held by this society, that defendants who commit criminal acts that are attributable to a
disadvantaged background, or to emotional and mental problems, may be less culpable than
defendants who have no such excuse."); Eddings v. Oklahoma, 455 U.S. 104, 115-16 (1982)
(recognizing defendant's youthfulness as a mitigating factor); Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586, 604-
05, 607-08 (1978) (considering any aspect of defendant's character as a mitigating factor).
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the punishment of those with "diminished capacity." Because the idea of
deserved punishment emphasizes culpability and blameworthiness, the
criminal law confronts the special cases of those who are criminally
responsible and yet manifestly impaired, mentally ill, or
developmentally different from competent adult offenders.4 The criminal
law distinguishes doctrinally between the profound disabilities that fully
excuse actors from criminal liability, such as insanity,5 which the law
defines very narrowly, and doctrines of "diminished responsibility" or
"reduced culpability," which allow even seriously impaired actors to be
convicted and punished for their crimes.6 The relationship between
culpability and deserved punishment implicates interrelated notions of
blameworthiness, responsibility, and personal accountability. What types
of impairments mitigate or reduce criminal culpability? How much
impairment must be present to warrant a reduction in severity of
sanctions? How are impairments of judgment and culpability to be
defined and proved? Should the law assess and treat such impairments
individually or categorically?
The Supreme Court most thoroughly explored culpability,
proportionality, and deserved punishment in the context of the death
penalty because "death is different.",7  In decisions involving the
culpability of defendants with mental retardation and older adolescents,
4. See, e.g., COL. REV. STAT. ANN. § 16-8-103.5(5), -115(1) (West 1998) (requiring a court
to commit a defendant found not guilty by reason of mental impairment to the custody of a state
department which will send the defendant to a state facility for treatment); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN.
§ 17a-582 (West 1998) (requiring the court to commit an "acquittee" (by reason of mental illness)
into the custody of the state mental health commissioner, who will arrange for the defendant's
psychiatric treatment); see also, e.g., Zimring, supra note 1, at 271-72 (proposing that youthfulness
and immaturity mitigates the blameworthiness of juvenile offenders); Stephen J. Morse, Immaturity
and Irresponsibility, 88 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 15, 53, 55, 58-61 (1997) (recognizing that
other theories of criminal responsibility require reduction in severity of sanctions for youthful
offenders, while proposing that adolescent offenders are no less culpable than adults who have
similar psychological, developmental deficiencies).
5. See, e.g., COL. REV. STAT. ANN. § 16-8-105(4) (West 1998) (requiring a court to commit
a defendant found not guilty by reason of insanity to the custody of a state department which will
send the defendant to a state facility for treatment). But see, e.g., IDAHO CODE § 18-207(1) (Michie
1997) (barring a defendant from raising insanity as a defense to any criminal charges).
6. See Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 306 (2002).
7. See, e.g., Harmelin, 501 U.S. at 995 (asserting that there exists a "qualitative difference
between death and all other penalties"); Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280, 305 (1976)
("[Tjhe penalty of death is qualitatively different from a sentence of imprisonment, however long.
Death, in its finality, differs more from life imprisonment than a 100-year prison term differs from
one of only a year or two. Because of that qualitative difference, there is a corresponding difference
in the need for reliability in the determination that death is the appropriate punishment in a specific
case."); Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 287 (1972) (Brennan, J., concurring) (emphasizing that
the death penalty is "unusual in its pain, in its finality, and in its enormity").
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the Court has reached opposite conclusions about the deserved
punishments of each category and produced an anomalous
inconsistency.8 In 1989, the Court in Penry v. Lynaugh held that
mentally retarded defendants could be found as culpable as other
criminal offenders facing the death penalty.9 Although a plurality of
justices in Thompson v. Oklahoma ° had earlier concluded that fifteen-
year-old offenders lacked the culpability necessary to impose the death
penalty," the Court in Stanford v. Kentucky, decided at the same time as
Penry, upheld the death penalty for youths who were sixteen or
seventeen years of age at the time of their offenses.12 More recently, the
Court in Atkins v. Virginia overruled Penry and held that the Eight
Amendment barred states from executing mentally retarded
defendants. 13 Atkins found that mentally retarded defendants lacked the
reasoning, judgment, and impulse control necessary to equate their
moral culpability with that of ordinary adult criminal defendants. 14 In
addition, their mental impairments detracted from the fairness and
8. Compare Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302, 335 (1989) (upholding the constitutionality of
imposing the death penalty on mentally retarded defendants) and Stanford v. Kentucky, 492 U.S.
361, 380 (1989) (plurality opinion) (upholding the death penalty for sixteen- and seventeen-year-old
adolescents), with Atkins, 536 U.S. at 321 (2002) (holding that execution of mentally retarded
defendants violates the Eighth Amendment); In re Stanford, 537 U.S. 968, 968 (2002) (Stevens J.,
dissenting) (urging the Court to reconsider Stanford in light of its decision in Atkins).
Analysts have noted the inconsistency between the Court's earlier decision in Stanford
and its recent Atkins ruling. See, e.g., Jamie Hughes, For Mice or Men or Children? Will the
Expansion of the Eighth Amendment in Atkins v. Virginia Force the Supreme Court to Re-Examine
the Minimum Age for the Death Penalty?, 93 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 973, 994-98 (2003)
(analyzing changes in the way in which the Court finds a consensus against executing particular
categories of offenders); Victor L. Streib, Adolescence, Mental Retardation, and the Death Penalty.
The Siren Call ofAtkins v. Virginia, 33 N.M. L. REV. 183, 183 (2003) ("[T]he death penalty's
Siamese twins: juvenile offenders and mentally retarded offenders."); Amanda M. Raines, Note,
Prohibiting the Execution of the Mentally Retarded, 53 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 171, 172 (2002)
(arguing that the Court's analysis in Atkins should also support a categorical bar of the execution of
juveniles); John F. Romano, Note, Kinder, Gentler, and More Capricious: The Death Penalty After
Atkins v. Virginia, 77 ST. JOHN'S L. REV. 123, 125 (2003) (noting that the "Court's recent
jurisprudence regarding the death penalty as imposed on the mentally retarded and on juveniles...
is fundamentally inconsistent with its Eighth Amendment death penalty jurisprudence" (footnote
omitted)); Robin M. A. Weeks, Note, Comparing Children to the Mentally Retarded: How the
Decision in Atkins v. Virginia Will Affect the Execution of Juvenile Offenders, 17 BYU J. PuB. L.
451, 481 (2003) (noting a gradual process of exclusion from death eligibility "first for the type or
crime or because of complete incompetence, then because certain justices believed that group to be
less culpable than the rest").
9. See Penry, 492 U.S. at 335.
10. 487 U.S. 815 (1988) (plurality opinion).
11. See id. at 822-23.
12. See Stanford, 492 U.S. at 371-72.
13. See Atkins, 536 U.S. at 321.
14. See id. at 306.
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reliability of capital trials and increased the likelihood of erroneous
death sentences.
15
In this Article, I argue that the Court's culpability analyses in Atkins
apply equally to the execution of adolescents and should prohibit the
practice. Moreover, the rationale of diminished criminal responsibility of
adolescents has broader implications for proportionality in sentencing all
younger offenders in criminal courts. Part I analyzes the Atkins decision,
which relied on empirical and normative justifications to prohibit
executing mentally retarded offenders. Empirically, Atkins analyzed
state death penalty laws and jury practice and found a national consensus
that executing defendants with mental retardation violated "evolving
standards of decency." Normatively, the Court examined the
psychological and developmental characteristics of mentally retarded
offenders that render them less blameworthy than more competent adult
offenders. Part II reviews the Court's juvenile death penalty analyses in
Thompson and Stanford, follows the framework of Atkins' empirical
analysis, and assesses recent legislative and judicial activity regarding
execution of sixteen- and seventeen-year-old offenders. Part III builds on
Atkins' normative description of developmental characteristics of
mentally retarded offenders, compares them with the developmental,
psychological, and neuro-biological characteristics of adolescents, and
argues that their similar limitations of judgment reduce their culpability
as well. Adolescents' limitations in adjudicative competence also
increase their risks of erroneous convictions. Based on these empirical
and normative comparisons, I argue that Stanford is inconsistent with the
Court's more enlightened appraisal of culpability in Atkins and logical
consistency should preclude states from executing youths for crimes
they committed when sixteen or seventeen years of age. Part IV extends
the culpability and proportionality analyses to the sentencing of
noncapital young offenders as well. Because adolescents' competence
and culpability differ qualitatively from those of adults, courts and
legislatures should formally recognize youthfulness as a mitigating
factor. I argue for a bright-line, rather than an individualized
discretionary approach, because the generic culpability of adolescents
differs from that of adults and categorical treatment of penal
proportionality reduces the risks of error and injustice in sentencing.
15. Seeid. at306-07.
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1. CULPABILITY, MENTAL RETARDATION, AND ATKiNS
The Supreme Court has interpreted the Eighth Amendment's
6
prohibition on "cruel and unusual punishment" to bar sentences that are
"excessive, ,,07 that fail to contribute to the penal goals of retribution and
deterrence,' 8 and that violate "evolving standards of decency."' 19 For
more than a quarter of a century, the Court has required state death
penalty statutes to channel jury discretion and consider the
circumstances of the defendant.20 Trial courts must allow defendants to
present to the jury any evidence that humanizes them or mitigates their
culpability before the jury renders its verdict. 21 The Court endorses
16. The Eighth Amendment provides "Excessive bail shall not be required, nor excessive
fines imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishments inflicted." U.S. CONST. amend. VIII.
17. See, e.g., Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584, 592 (1977) (plurality opinion) (stating that a
"punishment is 'excessive' and unconstitutional if it (1) makes no measurable contribution to
acceptable goals of punishment and hence is nothing more than the purposeless and needless
imposition of pain and suffering; or (2) is grossly out of proportion to the severity of the crime.");
Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 173 (1976) (plurality opinion) (requiring that "the punishment
must not involve the unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain" and "must not be grossly out of
proportion to the severity of the crime.").
18. See Gregg, 428 U.S. at 183-86 (finding that retribution and deterrence comprise the two
legitimate penal goals advanced by the death penalty); Enmund v. Florida, 458 U.S. 782, 798-99
(1982) (finding that execution of felony-murder accomplice who did not take or intend to take life
would not advance legitimate goals of retribution and deterrence).
19. Ford v.Wainwright, 477 U.S. 399, 409-10 (1986) (prohibiting execution of a defendant
who is insane at the time of his or her execution). In assessing "evolving standards of decency," the
Court looks to the existence of a national consensus against a particular practice as reflected in
statutes passed by legislatures, jury practices, and the like. See, e.g., Stanford v. Kentucky, 492 U.S.
361, 369-70 (1989); Hughes, supra note 8, at 994-1003 (analyzing Court's "numerology" and the
disputes between majority and dissenting opinions in death penalty cases about which states to
include in the numerator and denominator when calculating existence of national consensus).
20. See Gregg, 428 U.S. at 197 ("[T]he jury's attention is focused on the characteristics of the
person who committed the crime: Does he have a record of prior convictions for capital offenses?
Are there any special facts about this defendant that mitigate against imposing capital punishment
.... [sic]"); Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280, 303 (1976) (plurality opinion) (requiring
provision to sentencer of information about the defendant adequate "to allow the particularized
consideration of relevant aspects of the character and record of each convicted defendant before the
imposition upon him of a sentence of death"). See generally, Carol S. Steiker & Jordan M. Steiker,
Sober Second Thoughts: Reflections on Two Decades of Constitutional Regulation of Capital
Punishment, 109 HARV. L. REv. 355 (1995) (discussing the evolution of capital punishment law by
analyzing landmark cases, state regulations, and the legal processes that influence sentencing
decisions).
21. See, e.g., Jurek v. Texas, 428 U.S. 262, 271 (1976) (plurality opinion) ("A jury must be
allowed to consider on the basis of all relevant evidence not only why a death sentence should be
imposed, but also why it should not be imposed."); Woodson, 428 U.S. at 303-04; Romano, supra
note 8, at 131-32 (summarizing the requirements of individualized capital sentencing to allow
defendants to present all evidence that could mitigate culpability and to enable jury to give effect to
the mitigating evidence).
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structured, individualized discretion in capital sentencing and only rarely
has excluded whole classes of offenders from death eligibility.22
The Supreme Court in Penry v. Lynaugh23 held that the Eighth
Amendment did not categorically bar executing mentally retarded
criminal defendants.24 The Court looked to state statutes as "objective
evidence of how our society views a particular punishment today" and
found that only two states and the federal government prohibited
execution of mentally retarded offenders.25 Even when coupled with the
fourteen states that rejected capital punishment, the Court concluded that
Penry had failed to "provide sufficient evidence at present of a national
consensus" opposed to executing mentally retarded defendants.26
Although the Court rejected Penry's plea for a categorical ban on
executing defendants with mental retardation, it remanded his case for
individualized reconsideration of his death sentence. 27 "[I]t is precisely
22. See, e.g., Enmund, 458 U.S. at 796, 801 (holding that the death penalty is an excessive
punishment for a defendant convicted of felony murder who personally did not take, attempt to take,
or intend to take life of the victim); Coker, 433 U.S. at 592 (conducting proportionality analysis,
categorically prohibiting execution of defendant convicted of rape of adult woman, and concluding
that "a sentence of death is grossly disproportionate and excessive punishment for the crime of rape
and is therefore forbidden by the Eighth Amendment as cruel and unusual punishment").
23. 492 U.S. 302 (1989).
24. Penry argued that executing mentally retarded defendants categorically violated the
Eighth Amendment because their disability precluded the moral culpability necessary to justify
capital punishment. See id. at 328-29. In order to ascertain whether executing the mentally retarded
offended "evolving standards of decency," the Court reviewed the states' death penalty legislation
and sentencing juries' practices to obtain objective evidence of the existence of a national consensus
rejecting the practice. See id. at 331. Unlike the common law and statutory prohibition on executing
the insane and incompetent, see id. at 332-34, the Court found only two states, Georgia and
Maryland, that barred execution of a competent, mentally retarded defendant. See id at 334. "[A]t
present, there is insufficient evidence of a national consensus against executing mentally retarded
people convicted of capital offenses for us to conclude that it is categorically prohibited by the
Eighth Amendment." Id. at 335. Justices Brennan and Marshall dissented from this portion of the
Court's decision and concluded that the Eighth Amendment categorically barred execution of the
mentally retarded because "[tihe impairment of a mentally retarded offender's reasoning abilities,
control over impulsive behavior, and moral development. . . limits his or her culpability" and thus
renders capital punishment disproportionate to the crime. Id. at 346.
25. ld.at331,334.
26. Id. at 334.
27. See id. at 340. Despite Penry's moderate mental retardation-organic brain damage and
child abuse, IQ of fifty-four, mental age of a six-and-a-half-year-old, and social maturity and ability
to function of a nine- or ten-year-old-the trial court found him competent to stand trial, the jury
rejected his insanity defense, and it sentenced him to death for a brutal rape and murder. See id. at
307-08, 310. At the death penalty phase of his trial, the jury affirmatively answered four "special
issues"-whether the defendant's conduct that caused the victim's death was deliberate, whether the
victim's death was reasonably foreseeable, whether the defendant posed a future danger to society,
and whether the defendant's conduct was an unreasonable response to the victim's provocation, if
any. See id. at 310. The defendant alleged that the instructions lacked adequate definition of key
470 [Vol. 32:463
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because the punishment should be directly related to the personal
culpability of the defendant that the jury must be allowed to consider and
give effect to mitigating evidence relevant to a defendant's character or
record or the circumstances of the offense., 28 However, the Penry Court
acknowledged that "a national consensus against execution of the
mentally retarded may someday emerge. 29
Thirteen years later, the Court in Atkins v. Virginia ° reconsidered
its decision in Penry, found that a national consensus had emerged, and
held that executing mentally retarded defendants categorically violated
the Eighth Amendment. 31 The Court used both empirical evidence and
normative judgments to support its conclusion that executing mentally
retarded offenders violated "evolving standards of decency." It relied on
objective indicators of a national consensus, such as state laws and jury
practices.32 The justices also relied on their own judgments about
terms, such as "deliberately," and failed to allow the jury to exercise mercy if it found mitigating
evidence such as Penry's mental retardation and history of abuse. See id. at 312.
The Court reversed Penry's death sentence and remanded for resentencing because the
instructions did not adequately allow the jury to give effect to his mitigating evidence of retardation
and abuse in answering the special questions. See id at 328. The Court emphasized that apart from
the evidence's relevance to answer the four special questions, the jury also must be able to consider
his overall personal and moral culpability as a mitigating factor. See id at 322-25.
28. Id. at 327-328.
29. Id. at 340.
30. 536 U.S. 304 (2002). The Court granted certiorari in McCarver v. North Carolina to
reconsider its holding in Penry. 532 U.S. 941 (2001). However, after North Carolina adopted a law
prohibiting executing mentally retarded offenders, McCarver became moot, and the Court dismissed
the case. 533 U.S. 975 (2001). It granted certiorari in Atkins to reconsider whether the Eighth
Amendment required a categorical ban on executing mentally retarded offenders. 534 U.S. 809
(2001).
31. See Atkins, 536 U.S. at 321. The Court's Eighth Amendment proportionality analyses
focus on whether a particular punishment is "excessive" or offends "the evolving standards of
decency that mark the progress of a maturing society." Id. at 311-12 (internal quotations omitted).
The Eighth Amendment's prohibition includes both those sanctions that were considered "cruel and
unusual punishment" at the time of the adoption of the Bill of Rights as well as those that violate
contemporary society's standards of decency. See Ford v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 399, 405 (1986)
("[T]here is now little room for doubt that the Eighth Amendment's ban on cruel and unusual
punishment embraces, at a minimum, those modes or acts of punishment that had been considered
cruel and unusual at the time that the Bill of Rights was adopted."); Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86,
101 (1958) ("[Tlhe [Eighth] Amendment must draw its meaning from the evolving standards of
decency that mark the progress of a maturing society.").
For further commentary on Atkins, see generally Lyn Entzeroth, Constitutional
Prohibition on the Execution of the Mentally Retarded Criminal Defendant, 38 TULSA L. REV. 299
(2002); Jaime L. Henshaw, Comment, Atkins v. Virginia: The Court's Failure to Recognize What
Lies Beneath, 37 U. RICH. L. REv. 1185 (2003); and Jennifer J. van Dulmen-Krantz, Comment, The
Changing Face of the Death Penalty in America: The Strengths and Weaknesses of Atkins v.
Virginia and Policy Consideration for States Reacting to the Supreme Court's Eighth Amendment
Interpretation, 24 HAMLINE J. PUB. L. & POL'Y 185 (2002).
32. See Atkins, 536 U.S. at 313-16.
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diminished culpability and deserved punishment to support their
proportionality determination. 33 In its empirical analysis, the Court
surveyed the trend of states' laws on the execution of retarded
offenders.34 In its normative assessment, the Court drew on several
clinical definitions of mental retardation to identify the characteristics of
mentally impaired offenders that rendered them qualitatively less
culpable than ordinary adult offenders and thus justified the blanket
prohibition against executing the mentally retarded.35
First, the Court analyzed death penalty laws regarding the execution
of the mentally retarded. While only two states and the Federal
government prohibited executing mentally retarded defendants when the
Court decided Penry,36 by the time the Court reconsidered its holding in
Atkins, sixteen additional states had prohibited the practice, and
prohibition bills had passed at least one house in several other states.
37
33. See id. at 313; Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584, 597 (1977) ("[l]n the end our own
judgment will be brought to bear on the question of the acceptability of the death penalty under the
Eighth Amendment."). But see Harmelin v. Michigan, 501 U.S. 957, 1000 (1991) (proportionality
analysis relies on "objective factors to the maximum possible extent"); Penry, 492 U.S. at 331
("[T]he clearest and most reliable objective evidence of contemporary values is the legislation
enacted by the country's legislatures.").
34. See Atkins, 536 U.S. at 313-16.
35. See id. at 308, n.3. The American Association on Mental Retardation ("AAMR") defines
mental retardation as follows:
Mental retardation refers to substantial limitations in present functioning. It is
characterized by significantly subaverage intellectual functioning, existing concurrently
with related limitations in two or more of the following applicable adaptive skill areas:
communication, self-care, home living, social skills, community use, self-direction,
health and safety, functional academics, leisure, and work. Mental retardation manifests
before age 18.
AM. ASS'N ON MENTAL RETARDATION, MENTAL RETARDATION: DEFINITION, CLASSIFICATION,
AND SYSTEMS OF SUPPORTS 5 (9th ed. 1992). The American Psychiatric Association uses a similar
definition:
The essential feature of Mental Retardation is significantly subaverage general
intellectual functioning (Criterion A) that is accompanied by significant limitations in
adaptive functioning in at least two of the following skill areas: communication, self-
care, home living, social/interpersonal skills, use of community resources, self-direction,
functional academic skills, work, leisure, health, and safety (Criterion B). The onset must
occur before age 18 years (Criterion C). Mental Retardation has many different
etiologies and may be seen as a final common pathway of various pathological processes
that affect the functioning of the central nervous system.
AM. PSYCHIATRIC ASS'N, DIAGNOSTIC AND STATISTICAL MANUAL OF MENTAL DISORDERS 41 (4th
ed. 2000).
36. See Penry, 492 U.S. at 334.
37. See Atkins, 536 U.S. at 314-15 (noting that in addition to Georgia's and Maryland's earlier
enactments, the legislative trend in the aftermath of Penry included Kentucky (1990), Tennessee
(1990), New Mexico (1991); Arkansas (1993), Colorado (1993), Washington (1993), Indiana
(1994), Kansas (1994), New York (1995), Nebraska (1998), South Dakota (2000), Arizona (2001),
Connecticut (2001), Florida (2001), Missouri (2001), and North Carolina (2001)); Entzeroth, supra
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The Court suggested that several other states had not adopted explicit
legislation because they had not executed a mentally retarded defendant
in decades.38
It is not so much the number of these States that is significant, but the
consistency of the direction of change. Given the well-known fact that
anticrime legislation is far more popular than legislation providing
protections for persons guilty of violent crime, the large number of
States prohibiting the execution of mentally retarded persons (and the
complete absence of States passing legislation reinstating the power to
conduct such executions) provides powerful evidence that today our
society views mentally retarded offenders as categorically less culpable
than the average criminal.
39
The Court attributed the states' emerging legislative consensus to
the normative recognition that mentally retarded defendants are less
culpable or deserving of retributive punishment and less susceptible to
the deterrent threat of execution than ordinary offenders.40 Atkins
examined the penal functions presumably served by the death penalty-
retribution and deterrence-and concluded that executing a mentally
note 31, at 316-18 (summarizing legislative activity proscribing execution of mentally retarded
defendants in response to Penry); Alexis Krulish Dowling, Comment, Post-Atkins Problems with
Enforcing the Supreme Court's Ban on Executing the Mentally Retarded, 33 SETON HALL L. REV.
773, 784 (2003) (summarizing legislative trend in prohibiting execution of mentally retarded
offenders). See also statutory table infra following text accompanying note 121.
38. See Atkins, 536 U.S. at 316 ("The practice... has become truly unusual, and it is fair to
say that a national consensus has developed against it." (footnote omitted)). In the thirteen years
following Penry, states had executed only five defendants know to have an IQ of less than 70. See
id.
39. Id. at 315-16. The Court also noted that in the states that had adopted prohibition statutes,
"the legislatures that have addressed the issue have voted overwhelmingly in favor of the
prohibition." Id.
40. See id. at 317 (noting that legislative consensus reflects "widespread judgment about the
relative culpability of mentally retarded offenders, and the relationship between mental retardation
and the penological purposes served by the death penalty."). The Court noted that retribution and
deterrence constitute the primary penal justifications for imposing the death penalty. See id at 319.
The severity of the retributive response "necessarily depends on the culpability of the offender" and
an exclusion of the mentally retarded appropriately reflects their lesser culpability. Id. Similarly, the
deterrence theory of capital punishment assumes that rational actors will include the severity of the
sanction in their criminal calculus.
Yet it is the same cognitive and behavioral impairments that make these defendants less
morally culpable-for example, the diminished ability to understand and process
information, to learn from experience, to engage in logical reasoning, or to control
impulses-that also make it less likely that they can process the information of the
possibility of execution as a penalty and, as a result, control their conduct based upon that
information. Nor will exempting the mentally retarded from execution lessen the deterrent
effect of the death penalty with respect to offenders who are not mentally retarded.
Id. at 320.
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retarded defendant accomplished neither goal. Even though states could
find mentally retarded offenders competent and punish them for their
crimes, they lacked the culpability necessary to justify the ultimate
penalty. 4' Similarly, they lacked the deliberative capacity that would
respond to the deterrent threat of execution. Moreover, their
developmental limitations substantially increased the likelihood that they
erroneously might receive the death penalty.43 Thus, mental retardation
simultaneously reduced offenders' culpability and adversely affected
their adjudicative competence.
The Court relied on several professional definitions of mental
retardation to identify the clinical characteristics that reduced the
criminal responsibility and hampered the adjudicative competence of
defendants with mental retardation.44 Findings of
mental retardation require not only subaverage intellectual functioning,
but also significant limitations in adaptive skills such as
communication, self-care, and self-direction that became manifest
before age 18. . . . Because of their impairments ... they have
diminished capacities to understand and process information, to
communicate, to abstract from mistakes and learn from experience, to
engage in logical reasoning, to control impulses, and to understand the
reactions of others .... [Tlhey often act on impulse rather than
pursuant to a premeditated plan, and.., in group settings they are
followers rather than leaders. Their deficiencies do not warrant an
exemption from criminal sanctions, but they do diminish their personal
culpability.
45
41. See id. at 319 ("If the culpability of the average murderer is insufficient to justify the most
extreme sanction available to the State, the lesser culpability of the mentally retarded offender
surely does not merit that form of retribution."). Some commentators criticized Atkins' categorical
exclusion of the mentally retarded from death eligibility as producing arbitrary outcomes and argued
that it effectively makes normal intelligence an "aggravating factor" for purposes of capital
punishment. See, e.g., Romano, supra note 8, at 145 ("By requiring that a defendant belong to the
class of non-mentally retarded individuals before a death sentence may be imposed, the Court, in
effect, made that status an aggravating factor.").
42. See Atkins, 536 U.S. at 320.
43. See id. at 320-21. "Because of their disabilities in areas of reasoning, judgment, and
control of their impulses, however, they do not act with the level of moral culpability that
characterizes the most serious adult criminal conduct. Moreover, their impairments can jeopardize
the reliability and fairness of capital proceedings against mentally retarded defendants." Id. at 306-
07. The Court in Atkins found that mental retardation increased the risk of false confession, limited
the ability of defendants to assist counsel, rendered them less effective witnesses on their own
behalf, and increased the likelihood that a jury would find they posed a danger in the future. See id.
at 320-21. See also infra notes 51-52 and accompanying text.
44. See supra note 35 and accompanying text.
45. Atkins, 536 U.S. at 318 (emphasis added) (footnotes omitted).
[Vol. 32:463
IMPLICATIONS OF ATKINS
In addition to Significant subaverage intellectual functioning,46 a
retarded individual also demonstrates actual disability in "adaptive skill
areas" that affect every day life, such as the capacity to use and process
information, to reason logically, to control impulses, and to resist peer
pressure.47 While a low IQ provides one indicator of mental retardation,
Atkins emphasized a broader range of social, psychological, and mental
skills deficits to justify its conclusion that such offenders lacked the
requisite culpability. 48 The features that Atkins found to reduce
culpability of mentally retarded defendants-possessing, understanding,
and using information; exercising impulse control; and responding to
negative peer influences 49-are normal developmental characteristics of
ordinary adolescent offenders as well.50
In addition to reducing culpability, mental retardation also
adversely affects defendants' adjudicative competence and increases the
likelihood that they erroneously might receive the death penalty.5I
46. At the time the Court decided Atkins, the AAMR defined "significantly sub-average
intellectual functioning" as measured with IQ tests as a score below 70 on a normed mean of 100,
which includes only the lowest 2.5 % of the population. See id. at 308 n.3; see also AM.
PSYCHIATRIC ASS'N, supra note 35, at 41. Since Atkins, the AAMR has redefined mental
retardation as "a disability characterized by significant limitations both in intellectual functioning
and in adaptive behavior as expressed in conceptual, social, and practical adaptive skills. This
disability originates before age 18." AAMR: DEFINITION, CLASSIFICATION, AND SYSTEMS OF
SUPPORTS 1 (10th ed. 2002). The new definition eliminates specific IQ scores and instead describes
a more flexible score that is "approximately two standard deviations below the mean, considering
the standard error of measurement for the specific assessment instruments used and the instruments'
strengths and limitations." Id. at 13.
47. See Atkins, 536 U.S. at 318.
48. See id. at 306; Entzeroth, supra note 31, at 310 (describing the impact of mental
retardation on defendant's dealings with the criminal justice system and noting that "one attribute of
mental retardation is an incomplete or immature concept of blame and/or causation. This
characteristic can distort the mentally retarded criminal defendant's understanding of his or her
participation in a criminal act." (footnote omitted)); Jeffrey Fagan, Atkins, Adolescence, and the
Maturity Heuristic: Rationales for a Categorical Exemption for Juveniles from Capital Punishment,
33 N.M. L. REV. 207, 214 (2003) (arguing that Atkins' reasoning presupposes that "mentally
retarded individuals are not as psychologically, mentally, and socially developed as normal adults
and, therefore, do not display the same abilities of reason or culpability.").
49. See Atkins, 536 U.S. at 318.
50. See infra notes 237-78 and accompanying text; see also Fagan, supra note 48, at 215
(suggesting that "Atkins specifically referenced characteristics common to both the mentally
retarded and juveniles: a susceptibility to influence, a lack of maturity and perspective, and a lower
degree of moral culpability.").
51. See Atkins, 536 U.S. at 317-18, 320. Entzeroth notes that defendants with mental
retardation have
limited communication skills, a desire to answer questions so as to please the questioner,
a desire to hide one's mental retardation, the tendency to be easily led, a poor
understanding of the consequences of one's actions, poor impulse control, and a tendency
to be submissive.... These characteristics... may lead a mentally retarded defendant to
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Mentally retardation increased defendants' susceptibility to interrogation
and proclivity to give false confessions, reduced the assistance they
could provide to their lawyers, and adversely affected their demeanor
and effectiveness as witnesses.52 Because the Court recognized that
mental retardation and diminished culpability are matters of degree on a
continuum, it left the task to the states to develop legislative definitions
and criteria, procedures, and clinical indicators to identify which
defendants its categorical ban protected.53
confess to an act he or she did not commit, or to accept greater blame or responsibility for
criminal activity than he or she realistically should.
Entzeroth, supra note 31, at 310-11 (footnotes omitted). See also Note, Implementing Atkins,
116 HARV. L. REv. 2565, 2569 (2003) ("[llntellectual limitations of the mentally retarded
suggest that they face a 'special risk of wrongful execution,' because they are less able to
participate in their own defense, have a reduced capacity to assist counsel, make for poor
witnesses, and may perplex the jury with a demeanor that 'may create an unwarranted
impression of lack of remorse for their crimes."').
52. See Atkins, 536 U.S. at 320-21 (finding categorical prohibition against executing mentally
retarded defendants because of "the possibility of false confessions,.... the lesser ability of mentally
retarded defendants to make a persuasive showing of mitigation, [and because m]entally retarded
defendants may be less able to give meaningful assistance to their counsel and are typically poor
witnesses, and their demeanor may create an unwarranted impression of lack of remorse for their
crimes." (footnote omitted)).
Atkins provides a graphic example of how these disabilities affect the conduct of a trial
and the imposition of the death penalty. Atkins and Jones abducted, robbed, and murdered their
victim. See id. at 307. When the police arrested them, Atkins made a statement, while Jones
declined. See id. at 307 n.2. The prosecution permitted Jones to plead guilty and avoid the death
penalty in exchange for his testimony against Atkins. See id at 307 n. 1. At trial, both Jones and
Atkins testified, each confirmed the details of the incident, except that each asserted that the other
killed the victim. See id. at 307. "Jones' testimony, which was both more coherent and credible than
Atkins', was obviously credited by the jury and was sufficient to establish Atkins' guilt." Id. Given
a choice between Atkins, who gave an incriminating statement and "bumbled on the witness stand"
and Jones, who knew enough not to confess initially and to plea bargain with the prosecution, the
jury chose Atkins. See Dowling, supra note 37, at 785 n.l 14 (internal quotes omitted).
53. See Atkins, 536 U.S. at 317 ("To the extent that there is serious disagreement about the
execution of mentally retarded offenders, it is in determining which offenders are in fact
retarded.... Not all people who claim to be mentally retarded will be so impaired as to fall within
the range of mentally retarded offenders about whom there is a national consensus .... '[W]e leave
to the State[s] the task of developing appropriate ways to enforce the constitutional restriction upon
its execution of sentences."'). Courts ordinarily would find the most severely and profoundly
retarded defendants incompetent to stand trial. See Entzeroth, supra note 31, at 309 (noting that
"mental retardation is a permanent disability that cannot be ameliorated with medication, and a
mentally retarded defendant who is incompetent to stand trial due to his retardation will not be
amenable to medical treatment so as to be rendered competent."). Identifying which offenders are
mildly or moderately mentally retarded and immune from the death penalty may be the most
difficult aspects of the decision. See, e.g., Dowling, supra note 37, at 776 (2003) ("Currently,
numerous statutory and organizational definitions for mental retardation exist. Although most
definitions have similar features, variability among statutory definitions is so great that it can result
in one state classifying a defendant as mentally retarded while others do not. Further, while the use
of valid and reliable psychological testing measures is a central feature of the professional
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In separate dissenting opinions, Justices Rehnquist and Scalia, each
joined by the other and by Justice Thomas, criticized the Court's
categorical ban on executing mentally retarded defendants. Justice
Rehnquist objected to the proportionality analysis the majority used to
find a national consensus against executing mentally retarded
offenders.54 He insisted that state laws provide the most objective and
reliable basis on which to ascertain the existence of a national consensus
and to avoid the Justices imposing their own subjective preferences on
the states' power to legislate.55 He decried the majority's reliance on
foreign laws, opinion polls, and the positions of professional and
religious groups reported in amici briefs as "a post hoc rationalization
for the majority's subjectively preferred result rather than any objective
effort to ascertain the content of an evolving standard of decency."
56
Justice Scalia derided the majority's conclusion as "nothing but the
personal views of its [m]embers. ' '57 He insisted that legislation provides
the only objective basis for identifying a national consensus and disputed
the mathematical calculations that the majority used to find a consensus
against executing the mentally retarded.58
organizational definitions of mental retardation, few statutory definitions mandate the use of these
readily available testing methods." (footnote omitted)); Implementing Atkins, supra note 5 1, at 2587
("[L]egislators who wish to respond seriously to the consensus the Supreme Court discerned cannot
take lightly their responsibility to guide courts and juries in determining which defendants possess
the culpability and mental capacity to face execution for their crimes."). Statutory definitions of
mental retardation differ considerably, but many include IQ scores below 65 or 70 in addition to
significant subaverage intellectual and adaptive functioning. See Dowling, supra note 37, at 789-93.
54. See Atkins, 536 U.S. at 322.
55. See id. at 322-23. ("[L]egislation is the 'clearest and most reliable objective evidence of
contemporary values.' ... [D]ata concerning the actions of sentencing juries, though entitled to less
weight than legislative judgments, 'is a significant and reliable objective index of contemporary
values,' because of the jury's intimate involvement in the case and its function of 'maintain[ing] a
link between contemporary community values and the penal system."' (citations omitted)).
56. Id. at 322. In contrast to the data of public opinion polls, the laws of foreign nations, or
the position of professional groups, Justice Rehnquist insisted that "these two sources-the work
product of legislatures and sentencing jury determinations-ought to be the sole indicators by which
courts ascertain the contemporary American conceptions of decency for purposes of the Eighth
Amendment." Id. at 324. Because the constitutional inquiry is a quest for an American national
consensus, "we have since explicitly rejected the idea that the sentencing practices of other
countries could 'serve to establish the first Eighth Amendment prerequisite, that [a] practice is
accepted among our people."' Id. at 325 (citation omitted). Similarly, Rehnquist noted that opinion
polls may suffer from a variety of methodological deficiencies and do not provide an adequate basis
for constitutional adjudication. See id. at 326.
57. Id. at 338.
58. See id. at 341-43. According to Scalia, fewer than half of the states--eighteen of thirty-
eight-that practice capital punishment execution have barred execution of the mentally retarded:
"How is it possible that agreement among 47 % of the death penalty jurisdictions amounts to
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II. CULPABILITY, ADOLESCENCE, AND THE RATIONALE OF THOMPSON
AND STANFORD
Characteristics that reduce the culpability of mentally retarded
offenders-susceptibility to peer influences, a propensity to act
impulsively without thinking about consequences, and immaturity of
judgment-have relevance to the criminal responsibility of
adolescents. 59 Although earlier decisions adverted to youthfulness as a
mitigating factor in capital sentencing,60 the Court in Thompson v.
Oklahoma6 1 analyzed the criminal responsibility of youths older than the
common law infancy threshold of age fourteen. Thompson presented the
issue of whether executing a fifteen-year-old offender for a heinous
murder in which he actively participated violated the prohibition on
"cruel and unusual punishments.,, 62 A four-justice plurality held that the
Eighth Amendment categorically precluded executing youths who were
fifteen years of age or younger at the time they committed their
offense.63 Justice O'Connor wrote a separate concurrence on the grounds
that the Oklahoma legislature may not specifically have considered that
fifteen-year-old youths would be death eligible.
64
As the Court would later in Atkins, the Thompson plurality looked
both to objective indicators of "evolving standards of decency," such as
state statutes and jury practices and the views of national and
international organizations, and to the justices' own subjective sense of
"civilized standards of decency" when it conducted its proportionality
analysis.6 5 Of the states that explicitly had considered a minimum age
for death penalty eligibility, all had established it at sixteen, seventeen,
or eighteen years of age.66 Similarly, the Court found that juries rarely
'consensus'? Our prior cases have generally required a much higher degree of agreement before
finding a punishment cruel and unusual on 'evolving standards' grounds." Id at 342-43.
59. See id. at 318, 320.
60. See, e.g., Eddings v. Oklahoma, 455 U.S. 104, 115-16 (1982) (remanding sixteen-year-old
defendant for resentencing after trial court's failure properly to consider youthfulness as a
mitigating factor and noting that "[y]outh is more than a chronological fact.... [M]inors, especially
in their earlier years, generally are less mature and responsible than adults."); Lockett v. Ohio, 438
U.S. 586, 608-09 (1978) (requiring sentencing jury to consider all relevant mitigating factors
including age of defendant); Roberts v. Louisiana, 431 U.S. 633, 637 (1977) (per curiam).
61. 487 U.S. 815 (1988) (plurality opinion).
62. Seeid. at818-19.
63. See id. at 822-23.
64. See id at 857.
65. See id. at 830.
66. See id. at 829. The Court found that fourteen state legislatures barred capital punishment
altogether. See id. at 826. Eighteen states had established a minimum age for execution of sixteen,
seventeen, or eighteen years of age. See id at 829. The remaining nineteen state statutes did not
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imposed the death penalty on juveniles.67 Thompson noted that legal,
professional, religious, and social organizations-nationally and
internationally-opposed executing young people.68  Moreover,
international law and treaties also condemned the practice. 69 Based on
these objective indicators, the Court concluded that executing offenders
who committed their crimes before they turned sixteen-years-old was
generally abhorrent to the conscience of the community. 70
In addition to the objective factors, the plurality concluded that "a
young person is not capable of acting with the degree of culpability that
can justify the ultimate penalty," and vacated Thompson's capital
sentence.71 The justices asserted that
[L]ess culpability should attach to a crime committed by a juvenile
than to a comparable crime committed by an adult.... Inexperience,
less education, and less intelligence make the teenager less able to
evaluate the consequences of his or her conduct while at the same time
expressly set a minimum age, but no jurisdiction explicitly approved the execution of youths below
age sixteen. See id. at 826-27.
67. See id. at 832-33 (noting that in the twentieth century, states had conducted only eighteen
to twenty executions of offenders for crimes committed when they were less than sixteen years of
age and more recently, juries had sentenced only five young people to death between 1982 and
1986).
68. See id. at 830 (noting that "the American Bar Association and the American Law Institute
have formally expressed their opposition to the death penalty for juveniles").
69. See id. at 830-31. (observing that other countries of Anglo-American heritage and
"leading members of the Western European community" shared the Court's view that executing
youths under the age of sixteen "would offend civilized standards of decency"); see also Rachel J.
Avery, "Killing Kids Who Kill'" - An International Perspective on the Juvenile Death Penalty in the
United States, 7 UCLA J. INT'L L. & FOREIGN AFF. 303, 304-05 (2002) ("The United States is one
of the few countries left in the world that continues to execute juvenile offenders.... [I]n so doing,
the United States is not only in breach of its obligations under international treaties such as the
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) and the UN Convention on the Rights
of the Child, but is also in breach of a rule of customary international law which has attained the
status of a jus cogens norm." (footnotes omitted)); Curtis A. Bradley, The Juvenile Death Penalty
and International Law, 52 DuKE L.J. 486, 489 (2002) ("Of the approximately 193 nations in the
world, only seven (including the United States) have executed juvenile offenders since 1990, and
even some of these nations have recently moved to eliminate the practice. Moreover, the other six
countries-the Democratic Republic of Congo, Iran, Nigeria, Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, and Yemen-
are not necessarily the best of company with respect to human rights issues." (footnotes omitted)).
70. Thompson, 487 U.S. at 832.
71. Id. at 823, 833-34. The Thompson Court emphasized that deserved punishment must
reflect individual culpability and concluded that "[t]here is also broad agreement on the proposition
that adolescents as a class are less mature and responsible than adults." Id. at 834. Earlier juvenile
death penalty decisions also emphasized the youthfulness of an offender as a mitigating factor at
sentencing. In Eddings v. Oklahoma, the Court noted that "just as the chronological age of a minor
is itself a relevant mitigating factor of great weight, so must the background and mental and
emotional development of a youthful defendant be duly considered in sentencing." 455 U.S. 104,
116(1982).
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he or she is much more apt to be motivated by mere emotion or peer
pressure than is an adult. The reasons why juveniles are not trusted
with the privileges and responsibilities of an adult also explain why
their irresponsible conduct is not as morally reprehensible as that of an
adult.
72
Even though Thompson could be found criminally responsible for
his crime, he could not be punished as severely as an adult simply
because of his age-"adolescents as a class are less mature and
responsible than adults. 73 Even though youths may inflict blameworthy
harms, their choices evidence less culpability than do those of adults.74
The legal system treats adolescents differently from adults in numerous
areas of life-for example, serving on a jury, voting, marrying, driving,
and drinking-because of youths' inexperience and immature
judgment.7 5 In all these instances, the state acts paternalistically and
imposes legal disabilities because of youths' presumptive incapacity to
"exercise choice freely and rationally., 76 It would be inconsistent and
cruelly ironic to find juveniles' culpability and criminal capacity
equivalent to that of adults for purposes of capital punishment.77 The
72. Thompson, 487 U.S. at 835.
73. Id. at 834. The Court asserted that "less culpability should attach to a crime committed by
ajuvenile than to a comparable crime committed by an adult." Id. at 835.
74. See id. at 835.
75. See id. at 835, 839-48 (detailing a wide variety of state statutes on the rights to vote, to
serve on a jury, to drive, to marry, to purchase pornography, and to gamble).
76. Id. at 823-25 & n.23; see also Bellotti v. Baird, 443 U.S. 622, 635 (1979) ("[D]uring the
formative years of childhood and adolescence, minors often lack the experience, perspective, and
judgment to recognize and avoid choices that could be detrimental to them"); Parham v. J.R., 442
U.S. 584, 602-03 (1979) (noting that children lack the "maturity, experience, and capacity for
judgment required for making life's difficult decisions .... Most children, even in adolescence,
simply are not able to make sound judgments concerning many decisions, including their need for
medical care or treatment."); Elizabeth S. Scott, The Legal Construction of Adolescence, 29
HOFSTRA L. REv. 547, 552 (2000) (noting that the law restricts children's rights and privileges
"[b]ecause they are assumed to lack the capacity for reasoning, understanding, and mature judgment
.... [As such,] children cannot vote, make most medical decisions, drink alcohol, or drive motor
vehicles.").
77. See Thompson, 487 U.S. at 825 n.23. The Court noted that "the very assumptions we
make about our children when we legislate on their behalf tells us that it is likely cruel, and certainly
unusual, to impose on a child a punishment that takes as its predicate the existence of a fully
rational, choosing agent." Id. Later in the opinion, Justice Stevens, writing for the plurality reasoned
that
[t]he likelihood that the teenage offender has made the kind of cost-benefit analysis that
attaches any weight to the possibility of execution is so remote as to be virtually
nonexistent. And, even if one posits such a cold-blooded calculation by a 15-year-old, it
is fanciful to believe that he would be deterred by the knowledge that a small number of
persons his age have been executed during the 20th century.
Id. at 837-38.
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plurality concluded that categorically exempting younger adolescents
from the death penalty would not erode the retributive and deterrent
justifications for capital punishment.78 Some commentators criticized the
Court's categorical ban on executing children as contrary to its
insistence on individualized consideration of the culpability of
offenders.79
Justice O'Connor concurred in the reversal of Thompson's capital
sentence. 80 She acknowledged the likelihood of the existence of a
national consensus that persons who commit crimes before the age of
sixteen should not be executed, but questioned the sufficiency of the
evidence to support that conclusion. 81 She noted that every state that had
established a minimum age for the death penalty had set it at sixteen
years of age or older.82 She joined the plurality on the narrower grounds
78. See id. at 836-38 (concluding that the lesser culpability of adolescents reduced the
retributive justification for execution and their immaturity rendered them less likely to consider the
possibility of execution for their criminal behavior and hence less likely to be deterred). The Court
reasoned that most other areas of the law treated children differently than adults because they were
not fully rational or capable of controlling their own lives. See id. at 825 n.23. The plurality
concluded that "it is likely cruel, and certainly unusual, to impose on a child a punishment that takes
as its predicate the existence of a fully rational, choosing agent, who may be deterred by the
harshest of sanctions and toward whom society may legitimately take a retributive stance." Id.
Most commentators applauded the Court's categorical ban on executing juveniles younger
than sixteen years of age. See, e.g., Elisabeth Gasparini, Juvenile Capital Punishment: A Spectacle
of a Child's Injustice, 49 S.C. L. REV. 1073, 1090 (1998) (arguing that the culpability of adolescents
is not equivalent to that of adults); Sherri Jackson, Note, Too Young to Die - Juveniles and the
Death Penalty - A Better Alternative to Killing Our Children: Youth Empowerment, 22 NEW ENG. J.
ON CRIM. & CIV. CONFINEMENT 391, 416 (1996) ("Juveniles lack the degree of blameworthiness
that is a constitutional prerequisite for the imposition of the death penalty under the Eighth
Amendment proportionality analysis."); cf Mike Farrell, On the Juvenile Death Penalty, 21
WHITTIER L. REV. 207, 209-10, 212 (1999) (advocating that American politics should look to
international standards banning the death penalty against a "protected person who was under 18
years of age at the time of the offense.").
79. See, e.g., Joseph L. Hoffman, On the Perils of Line-Drawing: Juveniles and the Death
Penalty, 40 HASTINGS L.J. 229, 274-75 (1989) (arguing that age is an indirect and imperfect
indicator of the poor judgment, lack of maturity, and reduced criminal responsibility that make the
death penalty inappropriate in a particular case); Romano, supra note 8, at 150-51 ("[A] system that
exempts juveniles and the mentally retarded from the death penalty suffers from the same
deficiencies as the mandatory death penalty .... [T]he jury is given no discretion to decide, based
on the particular circumstances of the case, whether the death penalty is an appropriate
punishment." (footnote omitted)); Sherri Ann Carver, Note, Retribution - A Justification for the
Execution of Mentally Retarded and Juvenile Murderers, 16 OKLA. CITY U. L. REV. 155, 224
(prohibiting execution based on age constitutes arbitrary line drawing).
80. See Thompson, 487 U.S. at 859 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
81. See id. at 853 (citing the plurality's failure to demonstrate how many death-eligible
juveniles were spared due to prosecutorial or jury discretion).
82. See id. at 849 ("The most salient statistic that bears on this case is that every single
American legislature that has expressly set a minimum age for capital punishment has set that age at
16 or above.").
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that states with no minimum age for death-eligibility may not have
adequately considered the interaction of provisions that waive juveniles
of any age for adult criminal prosecution and statutes that permit the
state to execute any youth convicted as an adult 3 As a result, Oklahoma
may not have affirmatively decided to execute very young offenders.84
The following year, in Stanford v. Kentucky,85 the three justices
who dissented in Thompson, 6 joined by Justices O'Connor and
Kennedy, mustered a majority to uphold the death penalty for youths
who were sixteen or seventeen at the time of their offenses.8" While
Stanford recognized that juveniles as a class possess less culpability than
do adult offenders, the Court's decision rested on the narrow grounds
that no clear national consensus existed that such executions violated
"evolving standards of decency., 88 According to Justice Scalia, "statutes
passed by society's elected representatives" provide the only reliable
indicator of a national consensus and the majority of states that employ
capital punishment approve it for youths who were sixteen or seventeen
years of age at the time of their offense. 89 The Court rejected a
83. See id. at 857-59. O'Connor rejected the plurality's proportionality analysis, which
concluded that juveniles' lesser culpability exempted them from execution. Adolescents' reduced
criminal responsibility does not lead to the conclusion "that all 15-year-olds are incapable of the
moral culpability that would justify the imposition of capital punishment." Id. at 853. Rather,
O'Connor feared that Oklahoma and other states with no minimum age had not "give[n] the
question the serious consideration that would have been reflected in the explicit choice of some
minimum age for death eligibility." Id at 857.
84. See id. at 852 ("[T]here is no indication that any legislative body in this country has
rendered a considered judgment approving the imposition of capital punishment on juveniles who
were below the age of 16 at the time of the offense.").
85. 492 U.S. 361 (1989).
86. 487 U.S. at 859 (Scalia, Rehnquist, and White, JJ., dissenting). The Thompson dissent
argued that the general state legislative trend was to lower, rather than to raise, the age of eligibility
for criminal prosecution. See id. at 867. It also argued that states with no minimum age for death
eligibility should be included among those that approved of executing youths for crimes committed
at fifteen years of age and that a proper evaluation of state legislation precluded finding the
existence of a national consensus against executing juveniles. See id. at 868.
87. See Stanford, 492 U.S. at 371. The Court decided Stanford the same day it decided Penry,
maintained a macabre symmetry in its treatment of the culpability of adolescents and of mentally
retarded offenders, and required an individualized assessment of eligibility for execution in both
instances. See supra notes 23-29 and accompanying text.
88. Stanford, 492 U.S. at 361-80.
89. Id. at 370. The Court rejected the relevance of international law to answer questions about
the constitutional propriety of executing juveniles. When assessing evolving standards of decency, it
is "American conceptions of decency that are dispositive .... [T]he practices of other nations ....
cannot serve to establish the first Eighth Amendment prerequisite, that the practice is accepted
among our people." Id. at 369 n. 1 (citations omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted). For Justice
Scalia, the only relevant statistics were those related to state legislation, and of the thirty-seven
states that impose the death penalty, only twelve (32 %) declined to execute offenders younger than
age eighteen and an additional three (for a total of 15 or 40.5 %) declined to execute those younger
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categorical ban on all such executions because it regarded at least some
older adolescents as capable of acting with the culpability necessary to
justify the death penalty.90 The Court distinguished other types of bright-
line classifications of youths, for example, the right to vote, drink, or
drive, because the criminal justice system provided youths with an
individualized culpability assessment prior to imposing the death
penalty.9' Indeed, Justice Scalia erroneously asserted that juvenile court
judges made an initial culpability determination prior to transferring
youths to criminal court for prosecution as adults.92 Because most states
than seventeen. See id. at 369-70 & n.2. Such rigid deference to legislative enactments may
inappropriately delegate the Court's power to interpret the Eighth Amendment to state legislatures.
See Jennifer L. Whitney, Note, When Something Wicked This Way Comes: Evolving Standards of
Indecency - Thompson and Stanford Revisited, 46 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 801, 802-03 (1998).
90. See Stanford, 492 U.S. at 375-76 (arguing that juvenile waiver and capital sentencing
procedures were adequate to determine individual culpability unless there was a national consensus
"not that 17 or 18 is the age at which most persons, or even almost all persons, achieve sufficient
maturity to be held fully responsible for murder; but that 17 or 18 is the age before which no one
can reasonably be held fully responsible").
91. According to the Court
[i]t is, to begin with, absurd to think that one must be mature enough to drive carefully,
to drink responsibly, or to vote intelligently, in order to be mature enough to understand
that murdering another human being is profoundly wrong. ... These laws set the
appropriate ages for the operation of a system that makes its determinations in gross, and
that does not conduct individualized maturity tests for each driver, drinker, or voter. The
criminal justice system, however, does provide individualized testing. In the realm of
capital punishment in particular, "individualized consideration [is] a constitutional
requirement."
Id. at 374-75 (citation omitted).
92. Stanford suggested that juveniles received a "double" culpability determination because a
juvenile court judge made an individualized evaluation prior to transfer for criminal prosecution.
"[T]he determinations required by juvenile transfer statutes to certify a juvenile for trial as an adult
ensure individualized consideration of the maturity and moral responsibility of 16- and 17-year-old
offenders before they are even held to stand trial as adults." Id. at 375. The Stanford dissent
questioned whether individualized assessments, either in waiver hearings or capital sentencing,
could adequately discern the heightened culpability of some young murderers. See id. at 396-402
(Brennan, J. dissenting). "The individualized consideration of an offender's youth and culpability at
the transfer stage and at sentencing has not operated to ensure that the only offenders under 18
singled out for the ultimate penalty are exceptional individuals whose level of responsibility is more
developed than that of their peers." Id. at 403.
Justice Scalia's assertion that juveniles received an individualized culpability assessment
prior to transfer was factually incorrect at the time he made it and even more erroneous today.
Jurisdictions long have excluded the most serious offenses committed by older youths from the
jurisdiction of juvenile courts. See, e.g., PATRICIA TORBET ET AL., NAT'L CTR. FOR JUv. JUST.,
STATE RESPONSES TO SERIOUS AND VIOLENT JUVENILE CRIME: RESEARCH REPORT, at xii (1996)
(describing trend in early 1990s for more states to exclude serious offenses from juvenile court
jurisdiction); Barry C. Feld, Legislative Exclusion of Offenses from Juvenile Court Jurisdiction: A
History and Critique, in THE CHANGING BORDERS OF JUVENILE JUSTICE: TRANSFER OF
ADOLESCENTS TO THE CRIMINAL COURT 85-86 & app. 3.1 (Jeffrey Fagan & Franklin E. Zimring
eds., 2000) [hereinafter Feld, Legislative Exclusion] (analyzing legislative trends and providing
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now "automatically" prosecute older juveniles charged with capital
crimes as adults, courts have relied on Justice Scalia's assertion to
invalidate death sentences imposed on youths who did not receive an
individualized assessment of their maturity and culpability prior to
trial.93 Justice O'Connor concurred to uphold the death penalty for
statutory table of offenses excluded from juvenile court jurisdiction); Katherine Hunt Federle,
Emancipation and Execution: Transferring Children to Criminal Court in Capital Cases, 1996 WIS.
L. REV. 447, 487-94 (1996) (questioning adequacy of waiver procedures to conduct individualized
culpability assessment). Moreover, waiver statutes typically focus on "amenability to treatment" or
"public safety" rather than maturity or culpability. See Kent v. United States, 383 U.S. 541, 566-67
(1966) (appendix); Barry C. Feld, Violent Youth and Public Policy: A Case Study of Juvenile Justice
Law Reform, 79 MINN. L. REV. 965, 1029-34 (1995) [hereinafter Feld, Violent Youth and Public
Policy] (analyzing changes in statutory waiver criteria from "amenability to treatment" to "public
safety").
At the time that the Court decided Stanford, the majority of states that executed sixteen-
and seventeen-year-old youths automatically excluded those charged with murder without any
individualized evaluation, and only seven states conducted a waiver hearing prior to transfer. See,
e.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. §§ 13-501(A)(1)-(2), -1105(C) (West 2001); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 10
§ 1010(a)(l), (b) (1999); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 635.020(2), 640.010 (Michie 1987); OKLA. STAT.
ANN. tit. 21, § 701.9 (West 2002); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 10, § 7306-1.1(A) (West 1998); 42 PA.
CONS. STAT. Ann. §§ 6302, 6355(a) (West 2000 & Supp. 2003); UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-3a-
601(1)(a) (2002). Moreover, several states that gave juveniles a hearing at the time of Stanford
subsequently amended their codes to exclude death-eligible offenses from juvenile court jurisdiction
without any judicial waiver hearing. See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 12-15-34.1(a)(1) (1995); IDAHO CODE
§ 20-509 (Michie Supp. 2003); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. art. 305(A) (1995); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 26-
11-3.1 (Michie 1999).
Currently only four states that execute juveniles conduct an individualized waiver hearing
prior to transfer to criminal court, and death-eligibility and "culpability" are not explicit criteria that
judges must consider. See, e.g., ARK. CODE ANN. § 9-27-318 (Michie 2003); S.C. CODE ANN. § 20-
7-7605(5) (Law Co-op 2003); VA. CODE ANN. § 16.1-269.1 (A) (Michie 2003); WYO. STAT. ANN.
§ 14-6-237(b) (Michie 2003). Nevada, which previously excluded capital murder, has bucked the
legislative trend and adopted legislation to provide an individualized waiver hearing. NEV. REV.
STAT. § 62.040 (Michie 2002), repealed by S. 197, 72d Reg. Sess. (Nev. 2003). Contrary to the
legislative trend, which clearly belies Justice Scalia's confident claims, commentators advocate
strengthening the waiver process to assure that juvenile courts transfer only those older juveniles
whose culpability deserves imposition of the death penalty. Romano, supra note 8, at 154
(encouraging the Court to require "that every juvenile defendant be screened on the basis of his
individual culpability alone before waiving him into criminal court").
93. In State v. Davolt, 84 P.3d 456 (Ariz. 2004), the Arizona Supreme Court analyzed the
effect of changes in the state's waiver law on the validity of a subsequent death penalty imposed on
a sixteen-year-old convicted of capital murder. See id. at 478-81. Justice Scalia had previously cited
Arizona as an example of a state that conducted an individualized waiver hearing prior to adult
prosecution. See supra note 92. However, after Arizona voters passed Proposition 102 in 1996,
constitutional and legislative amendments required county attorneys automatically to prosecute as
adults all juveniles aged fifteen, sixteen, or seventeen years and charged with first degree murder.
See Davolt, 84 P.3d at 479; see also ARIZ. CONST. art. IV, pt. 2, § 22; ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. §
13-501 (2001). As a result of the Automatic Filing Law, a sixteen- or seventeen-year-old juvenile
tried as an adult for first degree murder could receive the death penalty without any waiver hearing
or individualized culpability assessment other than in the capital proceeding. Davolt argued that the
"automatic filing" procedures violated the Eighth Amendment because "the statute fails to provide
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sixteen- and seventeen-year-old offenders because the majority of states
that endorsed capital punishment authorized it for those below the age of
eighteen.94
for individualized consideration of a juvenile defendant's maturity and moral responsibility before
subjecting the juvenile to trial as an adult for capital murder." Davolt, 84 P.3d at 479.
The Arizona Supreme Court relied on Atkins and Stanford to require a judge to make an
individualized determination of a juvenile's culpability prior to the trial to decide the youth's guilt
and ultimate penalty. See id. at 479-81. Although Davolt acknowledged that Stanford did not
categorically ban execution of juveniles who were aged sixteen or seventeen years at the time of
their crimes, it noted that
[i]n upholding death sentences imposed under the Missouri and Kentucky juvenile death
penalty statutes, the Court emphasized that these states provided the individualized
consideration that is constitutionally required in the "realm of capital punishment."
The Court reasoned that the constitutionality of the imposition of the death penalty
on a juvenile depends not on general state laws defining ages of legal disability, but on
individualized consideration applied to the circumstances of each juvenile defendant.
The Court noted that the statutory schemes at issue in Stanford satisfied the
constitutional mandate for individualized consideration because 1) both schemes
specifically designated age as a statutory mitigating factor and 2) both required a
juvenile transfer hearing that provided for a consideration of that individual's maturity
and moral responsibility as a pre-condition to transfer for trial as an adult.
Id. at 480 (citations omitted). The court in Davolt distinguished between allowing a sentencing jury
to consider youthfulness as a mitigating factor for leniency in capital sentencing, and an
individualized judicial determination prior to trial that the
juvenile defendant has the requisite moral responsibility and culpability to be held
accountable to the same degree as an adult. We therefore conclude that, in the context of
our capital sentencing scheme, the consideration of a juvenile defendant's age as a
statutory mitigating factor, standing alone, is insufficient to provide the individualized
consideration required by the Stanford decision.
Id. at 480-81. Although it upheld his conviction, the Court remanded Davolt to the trial judge to
determine whether "he possessed the requisite responsibility and culpability to be constitutionally
eligible for the death penalty" at the time he committed the murders. Id. at 481. If the trial judge is
unable to make this determination or concludes that Davolt lacked the moral responsibility and
culpability necessary for the death penalty, then it must vacate his death sentence.
[B]ecause we find that the consideration of age alone as a statutory mitigating factor is
insufficient in the context of our capital sentencing scheme to provide juvenile
defendants with the individualized consideration mandated by the Eighth Amendment,
we hold that the State may not seek the death penalty against a juvenile pursuant to
Arizona's Automatic Filing Statute without an individual assessment of the juvenile's
maturity and moral responsibility at the time of the offense.
Id. (citation omitted).
94. See Stanford, 492 U.S. at 381 ("[T]here is no national consensus forbidding the
imposition of capital punishment for crimes committed at the age of 16 and older. As the Court
indicates, 'a majority of the States that permit capital punishment authorize it for crimes committed
at age 16 or above."' (citations omitted)). Unlike the majority, however, Justice O'Connor insisted
that the Court also had a responsibility to conduct proportionality analyses and to assess the "'nexus
between the punishment imposed and the defendant's blameworthiness."' Id. at 382 (O'Connor, J.
dissenting) (citation omitted).
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The four Stanford dissenters reviewed the evidence relied on in
Thompson to argue for a national consensus against executing children.95
In its calculus, the dissent counted both those states that did not
authorize the death penalty for any offender as well as those which
restricted it only to those eighteen years of age or older, and found that
"the governments in fully 27 of the States have concluded that no one
under 18 should face the death penalty" and that "a total of 30 States...
would not tolerate the execution" of the sixteen-year-old petitioner in
Stanford's companion case. 96 Unlike the majority, the dissent would
consider other "indicators of contemporary standards of decency"
besides state laws and jury practices.97 The Eighth Amendment requires
the Court to conduct an independent proportionality analysis to
determine whether a punishment was disproportionate or served the
goals of punishment.98 Such a proportionality analysis precludes
"punishment that is wholly disproportionate to the blameworthiness of
the offender," 99 and juveniles categorically lacked the requisite
culpability for capital punishment. 100  Moreover, the procedural
safeguards on which the Stanford majority relied did not adequately
address the substantive questions of whether any youth can possess the
requisite culpability for execution or whether states accurately can
distinguish them from less blameworthy offenders. 1t
95. See id. at 383-405 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
96. Id. at 384-85. Stanford was heard by the Supreme Court together with Wilkins v. Missouri.
The dissent in Stanford regarded state laws and jury decisions as informative, but not determinative,
of the Eighth Amendment question of "evolving standards of decency." See id. at 383 (describing
how they must "begin the task of deciding whether a punishment is unconstitutional by reviewing
legislative enactments and the work of sentencing juries .... Our judgment about the
constitutionality of a punishment under the Eighth Amendment is informed, though not determined,
by an examination of contemporary attitudes toward the punishment, as evidenced in the actions of
legislatures and of juries." (citation omitted)).
97. Id. at 388. The dissent proposed that the views of professional organizations and
international law also affect the Court's assessments. See id. at 388-89.
98. See id. at 390-91.
99. Id. at 393 (noting that proportionality principle "takes account not only of the 'injury to
the person and to the public' caused by a crime, but also of the 'moral depravity' of the offender")
(citations omitted).
100. See id. at 394 ("Proportionality analysis requires that we compare 'the gravity of the
offense,' understood to include not only the injury caused, but also the defendant's culpability, with
'the harshness of the penalty.' In my view, juveniles so generally lack the degree of responsibility
for their crimes that is a predicate for the constitutional imposition of the death penalty.").
101. See, e.g., Fagan, supra note 48, at 234 (arguing that "[t]he danger in this approach is that
the role of procedural due process is conflated with the deliberation required for substantive factual
determination such as maturity or culpability, and the result would be an incomplete examination of
the substantive constitutional issues underlying the application of the death penalty on juveniles.").
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Atkins has revived questions about the constitutionality of
executing adolescents. In Patterson v. Texas, the dissent to a denial of a
stay of execution of a juvenile urged the Court to reconsider Stanford in
light of the "apparent [national] consensus that exists among the
States... against the execution of a capital sentence imposed on a
juvenile offender."' 0 2 Two months after Patterson, Stanford exhausted
his state and federal remedies and filed a final writ of habeas corpus,
which the Court denied. 10 3 The four justices, who dissented from the
denial of the writ, argued that a national consensus had emerged against
executing juveniles, and urged the Court to reconsider the issue in light
of Atkins.l 4 Justice Stevens noted that nearly the same number of states
prohibited executing adolescents as proscribed the death penalty for
defendants with mental retardation. 10 5 Justice Stevens also cited recent
neurobiological research that indicates that the immature adolescent
brain lacked the reasoning abilities of adults. 10 6 On January 5, 2004, the
Supreme Court granted certiorari in Roper v. Simmons to consider again
102. Patterson v. Texas, 536 U.S. 984, 984 (2002) (Stevens, J., dissenting).
103. See In re Stanford, 537 U.S. 968, 968 (2002); see also Jeffrey M. Banks, Comment, In re
Stanford: Do Evolving Standards of Decency Under Eighth Amendment Jurisprudence Render
Capital Punishment Inapposite for Juvenile Offenders?, 48 S.D. L. REV. 327, 328 (2003) (approving
Court's denial of habeas petition and arguing that the applicable "standards of decency" were those
the Court originally employed in 1989 and not those subsequently developed in Atkins). Following
In re Stanford, the Supreme Court denied a third petition from a juvenile for habeas corpus relief.
See Hain v. Mullin, 537 U.S. 1173 (2003). After the Court rejected Stanford's habeas petition,
outgoing Kentucky Governor Paul Patton, as one of his final acts in office, commuted Stanford's
death sentence because he "believed sentencing a juvenile to death is an excessive punishment."
Tom Loftus, Patton Has Short, Quiet Last Day as Governor, LOUISVILLE COURIER-J., Dec. 9, 2003,
at lB.
104. See In re Stanford, 537 U.S. at 968 (Stevens, J., dissenting). Justice Stevens, with whom
Justices Souter, Ginsberg and Breyer joined, quoted from Justice Brennan's dissenting opinion in
Stanford v. Kentucky, emphasizing that:
Proportionality analysis requires that we compare "the gravity of the offense,"
understood to include not only the injury caused, but also the defendant's culpability,
with the "harshness of the penalty.". .. [J]uveniles so generally lack the degree of
responsibility for their crimes that is a predicate for the constitutional imposition of the
death penalty that the Eighth Amendment forbids that they receive that punishment.
Id. at 969 (quoting Stanford, 492 U.S. at 394-96).
Justice Stevens emphasized the implications of Atkins for executing juveniles by noting
that in the thirteen years since the Court's Stanford decision, "a national consensus has developed
that juvenile offenders should not be executed. No State has lowered the age of eligibility to either
16 or 17 since our decision in 1989 [and] the movement is in exactly the opposite direction." Id. at
971-72.
105. See id at 968 (incorporating Justice Brennan's dissent in Stanford and noting that "the
number of States expressly forbidding the execution ofjuvenile offenders (28) is slightly fewer than
the number forbidding the execution of the mentally retarded (30)").
106. See id. at 971; see also infra notes 201-25 and accompanying text.
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whether the Eighth Amendment bars the execution of offenders for
crimes they committed prior to age eighteen.1
0 7
A. The Empirical Foundation of Stanford
Atkins relied on legislative changes and jury behavior as empirical
evidence to prohibit states from executing mentally retarded
defendants.10 8 In the decade and a half since Stanford, several state
supreme courts have barred the execution of youths under eighteen,'0 9 or
at least under seventeen years of age."0 In Simmons v. Roper,"' the
Missouri Supreme Court applied the Supreme Court's Atkins analysis to
prohibit execution of a youth for a crime committed at seventeen years
of age:
Applying the approach taken in Atkins, this Court finds that, in the
fourteen years since Stanford was decided, a national consensus has
developed against the execution of juvenile offenders, as demonstrated
by the fact that eighteen states now bar such executions for juveniles,
that twelve other states bar executions altogether, that no state has
lowered its age of execution below 18 since Stanford, that five states
have legislatively or by case law raised or established the minimum
107. 124 S. Ct. 1171 (2004); see also infra notes 111-21 and accompanying text (discussing
the Missouri Supreme Court's decision in Simmons v. Roper).
108. See Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 321 (2002).
109. See, e.g., State v. Furman, 858 P.2d 1092, 1103 (Wash. 1993) (holding that although the
waiver statute allowed judges to try juveniles of any age as adults, and the death penalty authorized
capital punishment for offenders convicted of certain offenses, neither statute specifically
considered application of the death penalty to juveniles. "The statutes therefore cannot be construed
to authorize imposition of the death penalty for crimes committed by juveniles. Absent such
authorization, appellant's death sentence cannot stand.").
110. Brennan v. State, 754 So. 2d 1, 7 (Fla. 1999) ("[T]he death penalty is cruel or unusual if
imposed on a defendant under the age of seventeen."). The Court in Stanford v. Kentucky noted that
"the determinations required by juvenile transfer statutes to certify a juvenile for trial as an adult
ensure individualized consideration of the maturity and moral responsibility of 16-and 17-year old
offenders before they are even held to stand trial as adults." 492 U.S. 361, 375 (1989). By contrast,
the Florida waiver law provided that a child of any age may be indicted for a capital crime and tried
as an adult, and the death penalty statute failed to provide any minimum age for death eligibility.
See Brennan, 754 So. 2d at 9.
[As a consequence] [t]he Legislature's failure to impose a minimum age, the
legislative mandate that a child of any age indicted for a capital crime shall be subject to
the death penalty, and the failure to set up a system through our juvenile transfer statutes
that "ensure[s] individualized consideration of the maturity and moral responsibility"
render our statutory scheme suspect under the federal constitution and the reasoning of
Stanford as it applies to sixteen-year-old offenders.
Id. (alteration in original).
111. 112 S.W.3d 397 (Mo. 2003) (en bane).
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age at 18, and that the imposition of the juvenile death penalty has
become truly unusual over the last decade."
2
Significantly, the Missouri Supreme Court based its decision on
federal constitutional grounds and found that "the Supreme Court would
today hold that such executions are prohibited by the Eighth and
Fourteenth Amendments." ' 1 3 By ruling on the federal, rather than state,
constitution, Simmons frontally challenged the continuing vitality of
Stanford. 114
Simmons replicated the Supreme Court's empirical and normative
analyses in Thompson" 5 and Atkins 16 and concluded that the Court
today would prohibit executing offenders under the age of eighteen."
7
The same legislative trend that Atkins found to provide a "national
consensus" against executing mentally retarded defendants also existed
with respect to state laws prohibiting executing juveniles." 8 Although
twenty-one other states theoretically authorized the death penalty for
juveniles, only six states had executed a juvenile since the Stanford
112. Id.at399.
113. Id. at 400.
114. See supra notes 106, 110-13 and accompanying text (noting Court's grant of certiorari in
Roper v. Simmons).
115. See Simmons, 112 S.W.3d at 401-03 (noting that Thompson's assessment of "evolving
standards of decency" focused on legislative enactments, jury behavior, the views of professional
organizations, and the Court's own normative judgments).
116. See id. at 404 (reasoning that Atkins' decision to overrule Penry more closely resembled
the Court's analysis in Thompson than in Stanford).
117. See id. at 407-13 (examining changes in state laws, jury behavior, the policy positions of
national and international legal and religious organizations, and the culpability ofjuveniles).
118. See id. at 408. Noting the legislative parallelisms between executing mentally retarded in
Atkins and juvenile offenders, the Missouri Court found that:
That same consistency of change has been shown in opposition to the juvenile death
penalty.... Since Stanford... five more states have banned the practice of executing
juvenile offenders. Two have done so by adopting legislation raising the age of
execution to 18, and two have done so by newly reinstating the death penalty, but only
for those offenders who were 18 or older at the time of their offense. The Washington
Supreme Court has also held that its death penalty statute cannot be construed to
authorize imposition of the death penalty for crimes committed by juvenile
offenders .... Thus, a total of sixteen states-to which should be added federal civilian
and military courts-require a minimum age of 18 for imposition of the death penalty,
only two fewer than the eighteen states Atkins identified as prohibiting the execution of
the mentally retarded. If the twelve states and the District of Columbia that bar the death
penalty entirely are added, the combined total is twenty-eight states that prohibit juvenile
executions-two fewer than the thirty states that prohibited executions of the mentally
retarded at the time Atkins was decided.
Id. (footnotes omitted); see also Hughes, supra note 8, at 1004-06 (noting the role that the trend in
state legislation had on the Court's ultimate decision in Atkins).
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decision, and only three had done so within the preceding decade.' 19
Simmons found that national and international professional, social, and
religious organizations opposed executing offenders for crimes
committed when they were younger than eighteen years of age.,
20
Because of juveniles' reduced culpability, categorically exempting them
from the death penalty would not erode the retributive or deterrent
functions of the death penalty.'
21
States Barring Execution
of Mentally Retarded
Defendants, cited in Atkins
v. Vireinia. *
States Currently
Barring Execution
of Juvenile Defendants
(16-17 Years Old).**
Alabama N/A. N/A.
Alaska No Death Penalty. No Death Penalty.
Arizona ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. N/A.§ 13-703.02 (West 2001).
Arkansas ARK. CODE ANN. § 5-4- N/A.618 (Michie 1997).
No Juvenile Execution:
California N/A. CAL. PENAL CODE
§ 190.5 (West 1999).
No Juvenile Execution:
COLO. REV. STAT. Ann. COLO. REV. STAT. ANN.
§ 16-9-401 (West 1999). § 18-1.3-1201(1)(a)
(West Supp. 2003).
No Juvenile Execution:
CONN. GEN. STAT. § 53a- CONN. GEN. STAT.
46a(h)(2) (West 2001). ANN. § 53a-46a(h)(1)
I_ I (West 2001).
119. See Simmons, 112 S.W.3d at 409. The Court noted that the infrequency of the practice
obviated the need for legislatures formally to prohibit executing juveniles. "[lin light of the small
number of executions of juvenile offenders carried out in the last decade, legislatures in states with a
juvenile death penalty may have seen little reason to pass legislation barring it." Id. at 410.
120. Seeid.at410-11.
121. See id. at 411-12. ("[A]s to juveniles, neither retribution nor deterrence provides an
effective rationale for the imposition of the juvenile death penalty, and the risk of wrongful
execution of juveniles is enhanced for reasons similar to that [sic] set out in Atkins in regard to the
mentally retarded."). In addition to juveniles' lesser culpability, the Simmons court reasoned that
because the death penalty is imposed so infrequently, the remote threat of execution could not be
part of a "rational" juvenile's deterrent calculus. See id. at 413.
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Delaware N/A. N/A.
No Juvenile Execution
FLA. STAT. ANN. for Defendants Under
Florida § 921.137 (West Supp. Seventeen:
2002). Brennan v. State, 754
So. 2d 1, 11 (Fla. 1999).
No Juvenile Execution
for Defendants UnderGeorgia GA. CODE ANN. § 17-7- SvnenGoga1316() (1997). Seventeen:
GA. CODE ANN. § 17-9-
3 (1997).
Hawaii No Death Penalty. No Death Penalty.
Idaho N/A. N/A.
No Juvenile Execution:
720 ILL. COMP. STAT.ANN. 5/9-1(b) (West
2002).
No Juvenile Execution:
IND. CODE ANN. §§ 35-36- ND CODExNn.
Indiana 9-2 to 35-36-9-6 (West 50-2-3(3)(b)(1)(A)
1998). (West Supp. 2003).
Iowa No Death Penalty. No Death Penalty.
No Juvenile Execution:
Kansas 3 STAT. ANN. § 21- KAN. STAT. ANN. § 21-
4623 (1995). 4622 (1997).
KY. REV. STAT. ANN.
Kentucky §§ 532.130-140 (Michie N/A.
1999).
Louisiana N/A. N/A.
Maine No Death Penalty. No Death Penalty.
No Juvenile Execution:
Maryland MD. ANN. CODE. at. 27, MD. CODE ANN., CRIM.§ 412(g)(1) (1996). § 2-202(b)(2)(i) (2000).
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Massachuset No Death Penalty. No Death Penalty.
ts
Michigan No Death Penalty. No Death Penalty.
Minnesota No Death Penalty. No Death Penalty.
Mississippi N/A. N/A.
No Juvenile Execution:
Mo. ANN. STAT. Simnv.Rpr12
Missouri § 565.030 (West Supp. Simmons v. Roper, 1122002).SW.3d 397,399-400
2002). (Mo. 2003).
No Juvenile Execution:
Montana N/A. MONT. CODE ANN.
§ 45-5-102(2) (2003).
No Juvenile Execution:
NEB. REV. STAT. ANN. NEB. REV. STAT. ANN.
Nebraska § 28-105.01 (Michie Supp. § 28-105.01(l)-(2)
2001). (Michie 2003).
A.B. 353, 71st Reg. Sess.
(2001); this legislation had
passed the state Assembly,
but died when the
legislative session
adjourned; the Court in
Nevada Atkins listed it as support N/A.
for a national consensus on
barring the execution of
mentally retarded
defendants. See Atkins v.
Virginia, 536 U.S. 304,
315 n.17 (2002).
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N/A.
No Juvenile Executions
for Defendants Under
Seventeen:
N.H. REV. STAT. ANN.
§ 630:1(V) (1996). On
February 19, 2004, the
state senate passed S.B.
513, 2004 Sess., which
would increase the
death-eligible age to
eighteen years old. The
bill was passed by the
state house of
representatives on April
22, 2004. It is currently
awaiting action by the
Governor.
No Juvenile Execution:
N.J. STAT. ANN.New Jersey N/A.N..SA .
§ 2C:1 1-3(b), (g) (West
- 1995).
No Juvenile Execution:
N.M. STAT. ANN. § 31- N.M. STAT. ANN.
20A-2.1 (Michie 2000). §§ 31-18-14(A), 28-6-
S1(A) (Michie 2003).
No Juvenile Execution:
N.Y. PENAL LAW
N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 125.27(1)(b)New York § 400.27(12) (McKinney (McKinney 1998); NY
Supp.2002). SENTENCE CHARTS,
CHART IA: CLASS A-I
FELONY (McKinney
2004).
S.B. 173, 2001 Gen. No Juvenile Execution
North Assm., 1 st Sess., 2001 for Defendants UnderNorth N.C. Sess. Laws 346, later Seventeen:
codified at N.C. GEN. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-
STAT. § 15A-2005. 17 (2003).
NorthDota No Death Penalty. No Death Penalty.Dakota
IMPLICATIONS OF ATKINS
New
Hampshire
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No Juvenile Execution:
OHIO REV. CODE ANN.
§ 2929.02 (Anderson
1996).
Oklahoma N/A. N/A.
No Juvenile Execution:
Oregon N/A. OR. REV. STAT.
§ 161.620 (2001).
Pennsylvania N/A. N/A.
Rhode Island No Death Penalty. No Death Penalty.
SouthColin N/A. N/A.Carolina
No Juvenile Execution:
South S CODIFIED LAWS S.B. 182, 79th Leg.,
Dakota § 23A-27A-26.1 (Michie 2004 Reg. Sess. (S.D.
Supp. 2001). Mar. 3, 2004).
No Juvenile Execution:
Tennessee 1TEN CODE ANN. TENN. CODE ANN. § 37-13-203 (1997). 1-134(a)(1) (2001).
H.B. 236, 77th Leg.
passed in the House on
April 24, 2001; S.B. 686,
77th Leg. passed in the
,Senate on May 16, 2001. No Juvenile Execution
Governor Perry then for Defendants Under
vetoed the legislation, but Seventeen:
the Court in Atkins listed it TEX. PENAL CODE ANN.
as support for a national § 8.07(c) (Vernon
consensus on barring the 2003).
execution of mentally
retarded defendants. See
Atkins v. Virginia, 536
U.S. 304, 315 n.16 (2002).
Utah N/A. N/A.
Vermont No Death Penalty. No Death Penalty.
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Virginia
S.B. 497, 2002 Leg.
(2002), House Bill No.
957, 2002 Leg. (2002);
although this legislation
was not yet in effect when
Atkins was decided, the
Court listed it as support
for a national consensus on
barring the execution of
mentally retarded
defendants. See Atkins v.
Virginia, 536 U.S. 304,
315 n. 17 (2002).
N/A.
H CNo Juvenile Execution:
WASHg1.E.0 ) C E State v. Furman, 858
Washington § 10.95.030(2) (Supp. P.2d 1092, 1103 (Wash.
2001). 1993).
WestWeni No Death Penalty. No Death Penalty.Virginia
Wisconsin No Death Penalty. No Death Penalty.
No Juvenile Execution:
H.E.A. 19, 57th Leg.,
Wyoming N/A. 2004 Budget
Sess. (Wyo. Mar. 3,
2004).
Nineteen states do not
execute any defendant
under the age of
eighteen at the time of
the capital offense ( plus
one state withTwenty-one states esaewtTweny-oe sttes legislation pending) and
Totals (excludes states that do not five states do notimpose the death penalty
on any defendant). execute any defendant
under the age of
seventeen at the time of
the capital offense) for a
total of twenty-four
states-excluding states
that do not impose the
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death penalty on any
defendant-restricting
juvenile executions.
Federal No Juvenile Execution:
Government 18 U.S.C. § 3596(c). 18 U.S.C. § 3591(a)Governm t 1 (2000).
* All of the statutes listed in the Atkins v. Virginia column were
cited by the Supreme Court in Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 314-16
(2002), and appear here as in effect at the time Atkins was decided.
States designated as "N/A" either permitted execution of the mentally
retarded at the time Atkins was decided, or prohibited it but were not
cited in that decision.
** The Supreme Court held that the execution of a defendant that
was under sixteen years of age when he committed his crime was
unconstitutional in Thompson v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 815 (1988). States
in this column designated as "N/A" do not bar the execution of sixteen
and seventeen year olds.
Following the Simmons ruling, two more states-South Dakota and
Wyoming-passed laws banning the execution of juveniles, and the
New Hampshire house and senate also passed a prohibition bill. Of the
thirty-eight state death penalty jurisdictions and the two federal
government (civil and military) jurisdictions, twenty-one (52.5 %)
expressly provide that eighteen years of age is the minimum age for
death eligibility, another five (12.5 %) specify seventeen years of age as
the minimum age for death eligibility, and fourteen (35 %) use sixteen
years of age as the minimum age either by statute or by court ruling
relying on Stanford.122 Even after Stanford approved executing sixteen-
or seventeen-year-old offenders, no death penalty state which previously
allowed executing only eighteen-year-old offenders lowered its statutory
minimum age. 123 Like the clear national trend observed in Atkins, states
122. See Streib, supra note 8, at 191; VICTOR L. STREIB, THE JUVENILE DEATH PENALTY
TODAY: DEATH SENTENCES AND EXECUTIONS FOR JUVENILE CRIMES, JANUARY 1, 1973-APRIL 30,
2004, at 7 (2004) [hereinafter STREIB, JUVENILE DEATH PENALTY TODAY 2004], available at
http://www.law.onu.edu/faculty/streib/JuvDeathApr302004.pdf.
123. See STREIB, THE JUVENILE DEATH PENALTY TODAY 2004, supra note 122, at 8; see also
In re Stanford, 537 U.S. 968, 972 (2002) (Stevens, J., dissenting) ("[T]he treatment of this issue by
the legislatures has led to a trend in only one direction-toward [the] abolition of the death penalty
for juveniles offenders-the fact that the legislatures are paying attention to this issue is remarkable.
Juvenile offenders make up only 2 % of the total population of death row and about that same
percentage of the executions that are carried out. As a result of such small numbers, one might
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consistently have moved only to raise the minimum age for death
eligibility. In the post-Stanford era, several states have adopted or raised
their minimum age from sixteen to eighteen, 124 and several other
legislatures have come close to amending their death penalty statutes to
prohibit executing juveniles. 125
The dissent in Atkins and the Thompson Court viewed jury
sentencing practices as another indicator of "evolving standards of
decency."'126 Even in states that nominally approve the death penalty for
juveniles, juries seldom impose them and states even less frequently
carry them out thereby reducing the impetus to amend their laws.
Although twenty-two states officially sanctioned the death penalty for
juveniles, at the time Simmons v. Roper was decided, only seven states
have executed a juvenile during the post-Furman era, and since
Stanford, only Texas, Oklahoma, and Virginia have executed youths
with any regularity. 127 In Texas, between 1982 and 2003, of the three
hundred and thirteen persons executed, thirteen (4.2 %) were juvenile
offenders, and an additional twenty-eight youths remain on death row.' 28
During the same period in Virginia, three (3.4 %) of eighty-nine people
executed were juveniles. 2 9 The decision by the jury in Virginia to spare
expect that this issue would draw little public attention and even less interest from the state
legislatures. But the legislatures have acted, and those actions are uniformly against the execution of
those who were under 18 when they committed their offenses.").
124. See STREIB, JUVENILE DEATH PENALTY TODAY 2004, supra note 122, at 7 (noting that, in
recent years, New York (1994) and Kansas (1995) enacted death penalty statutes with minimum
ages for execution of eighteen, and Montana (1999), Indiana (2002), South Dakota (2004), and
Wyoming (2004) raised the minimum age for execution to eighteen).
125. See VICTOR L. STREIB, THE JUVENILE DEATH PENALTY TODAY: DEATH SENTENCES AND
EXECUTIONS FOR JUVENILE CRIMES, JANUARY 1, 1973-JUNE 30, 2003, at 8 (2003) (noting that
legislative efforts to raise the statutory minimum age to eighteen "ha[ve] progressed at least partway
to adoption in Arizona, Arkansas, Delaware, Florida, Kentucky, Mississippi, Missouri, Nevada,
Pennsylvania, South Dakota and Texas. This is the most legislative attention to this issue since the
early- to mid-1980s").
126. See Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 323 (2002) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting); Thompson
v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 815, 821-22 (1988) (plurality opinion).
127. See Simmons v. Roper, 112 S.W.3d 397, 409 (Mo. 2003) ("Although twenty-two states
theoretically permit the death penalty for juveniles, only six (Missouri, Texas, Virginia, Georgia,
Oklahoma, and Louisiana) have actually executed a juvenile offender since Stanford was decided
fourteen years ago. Of these six states, only three have executed juvenile offenders since 1993-
Texas, Virginia, and Oklahoma.") (citations omitted); JUVENILE JUSTICE CENTER, ABA,
FACTSHEET: THE JUVENILE DEATH PENALTY 1 (2003), available at
http://www.abanet.org/crimjust/juvjus/factsheetgeneral.pdf ("[Twenty-two] states permit the
juvenile death penalty, but only Texas, Virginia, and Oklahoma have executed more than one
juvenile offender (13, 3, and 2 respectively). Four other states have each executed one.").
128. See VICTOR L. STREIB, THE JUVENILE DEATH PENALTY TODAY: DEATH SENTENCES AND
EXECUTIONS FOR JUVENILE CRIMES, JANUARY 1, 1973-DECEMBER 31, 2003, at 5, 12 (2004).
129. Seeid. at5.
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the life of seventeen-year-old Washington, D.C.-area sniper, Lee Boyd
Malvo, also evidences the erosion of popular support for the practice.
130
III. ATKINS AND ADOLESCENTS RECONSIDERED: COMPETENCE AND
CULPABILITY
The developmental limitations that reduce the culpability of
mentally retarded defendants characterize most normal adolescent
offenders as well.'13  When states punish young offenders, they assume
that adolescents possess sufficient cognitive capacity and volitional
controls to hold them responsible and accountable for their criminal
behavior. 132 However, even criminally responsible young offenders
deserve less severe penalties than do mature offenders. 33 Every other
130. See Tom Jackman, Malvo Is Spared Death Penalty: Jury Gives Teen Life Sentence for His
Role in Sniper Slayings, WASH. POST, Dec. 24, 2003, at A1, A8; Adam Liptak, Penalty for Young
Sniper Could Spur Change in Law, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 25, 2003, at A12 ("'The Malvo verdict should
be taken as a signal that the public has little enthusiasm for executing juveniles, . . . even for the
most horrendous of crimes, and that people understand that young offenders are less culpable than
adults."') (quoting Elizabeth Scott); Adam Liptak, Younger Sniper Given Sentence of Life Term,
N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 24, 2003, at Al ("[T]he jury's decision to spare Mr. Malvo's life showed that it
was reluctant to put a young murderer to death even though it had rejected his insanity defense.");
Andrea F. Siegel, Sniper Malvo Eludes Death Penalty: Jurors Cite Age in Life Sentence, CHI. TRIB.,
Dec. 24, 2003, at 15 ("Swayed by the youthfulness and troubled past of Lee Boyd Malvo, a jury
voted Tuesday to spare the younger of two snipers."). But see Michelle Boorstein, Mistaken Belief
About Mistrial Troubles Jurors, WASH. POST, Dec. 25, 2003, at BI (reporting that "[j]urors
deciding whether to sentence Lee Boyd Malvo to life in prison or death said yesterday they had
feared that if they did not come to a unanimous decision, a mistrial would be declared-an erroneous
belief that led several who believed Malvo should die to vote to spare his life.").
131. The .cognitive deficits that characterize people with mental retardation include
"diminished capacities to understand and process information, to communicate, to abstract from
mistakes and learn from experience, to engage in logical reasoning, to control impulses, and to
understand the reactions of others." Atkins, 536 U.S. at 318. For the adolescent analogues, see infra
notes 142-43 and accompanying text.
132. See Feld, supra note 2, at 97. In contrast, Zimring uses the term "diminished
responsibility" to refer to adolescents who possess "the minimum abilities for blameworthiness and
thus for punishment... [whose] immaturity still suggests that less punishment is justified."
Zimring, supra note 1, at 273.
133. See Zimring, supra note 1, at 273. Developmental psychology and criminal sentencing
policy justify sentencing young people less severely than their adult counterparts. The common law
infancy defense recognized that young people may lack criminal capacity. The classical criminal
law assumed that rational actors make blameworthy choices and deserve to suffer the consequences
of their freely chosen acts. See Richard Bonnie & Thomas Grisso, Adjudicative Competence and
Youthful Offenders, in YOUTH ON TRIAL, supra note 1, at 80; Sanford H. Kadish, Excusing Crime,
75 CAL. L. REv. 257, 262 (1987). The common law recognized and mitigated the punishments of
actors who lacked the requisite moral and criminal responsibility, for example, the insane and the
young. See id.; ABRAHAM S. GOLDSTEIN, THE INSANITY DEFENSE 199-202 (1967). But see Sanford
J. Fox, Responsibility in the Juvenile Court, 11 WM. & MARY L. REv. 659, 659 (1970) ("Insanity
and infancy constituted the only substantive law defenses exculpating juvenile criminals on grounds
of irresponsibility."). It conclusively presumed that children less than seven years old lacked
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area of law recognizes that young people have limited judgment, are less
competent decision-makers because of their immaturity, and require
greater protection than do adults.' 34 Applying the same principle of
diminished responsibility in the criminal law requires a categorical ban
on executing youths and shorter sentences for youths than for adults
convicted of the same offenses.
Deserved punishment entails condemnation for making
blameworthy choices and imposes proportional 'sentences commensurate
with the seriousness of the offense.'35 Two elements define the
seriousness of a crime-harm and culpability. 136 An offender's age has
little bearing on assessments of harm-the quality of the injury inflicted
or the value taken13 7-but youthfulness and immaturity bear quite
criminal capacity, and treated those fourteen years of age and older as fully responsible. Between
the ages of seven and fourteen years, the law created a rebuttable presumption that youths lacked
criminal capacity. See id. at 660; Francis Barry McCarthy, The Role of the Concept of Responsibility
in Juvenile Delinquency Proceedings, 10 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 181, 184-85 (1977); Andrew
Walkover, The Infancy Defense in the New Juvenile Court, 31 UCLA L. REV. 503, 510-11 (1984);
James C. Weissman, Toward an Integrated Theory of Delinquency Responsibility, 60 DENV. L.J.
485,490 (1983).
134. See, e.g., Thompson v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 815, 823 (1988) (describing limitations on
juveniles' rights to drink, drive, vote, marry, contract as a result of immaturity); FRANKLIN
ZIMRING, THE CHANGING LEGAL WORLD OF ADOLESCENTS 35-36 (1982); Donald L. Beschle, The
Juvenile Justice Counterrevolution: Responding to Cognitive Dissonance in the Law's View of the
Decision-Making Capacity of Minors, 48 EMORY L.J. 65, 89-91 (1999) (analyzing the inconsistency
between punishing adolescents like adults while denying their autonomy claims in areas outside of
the criminal law); Rhonda Gay Hartman, Adolescent Autonomy: Clarifying an Ageless Conundrum,
51 Hastings L.J. 1265, 1268 (2000) (arguing that presumption of decisional incapacity pervades
most areas of law and conflicts with model of adolescent autonomy); Elizabeth S. Scott, Judgment
and Reasoning in Adolescent Decisionmaking, 37 VILL. L. REV. 1607, 1608, 1611 (1992); Zimring,
supra note 1, at 287.
135. See ANDREW VON HIRSCH, DOING JUSTICE: THE CHOICE OF PUNISHMENTS 48 (1976)
("[P]unishing someone conveys in dramatic fashion that his conduct was wrong and that he is
blameworthy for having committed it."); see also ANDREW VON HIRSCH, CENSURE AND SANCTIONS
15 (1993); ANDREW VON HIRSCH, PAST OR FUTURE CRIMES: DESERVEDNESS AND DANGEROUSNESS
IN THE SENTENCING OF CRIMINALS 31 (1985) [hereinafter VON HIRSCH, PAST OR FUTURE CRIMES].
136. See Stanford v. Kentucky, 492 U.S. 361, 393 (1989) (Brennan, J., dissenting) ("[T]he
proportionality principle takes account not only of the 'injury to the person and to the public' caused
by a crime, but also of the 'moral depravity' of the offender.") (citation omitted); Enmund v.
Florida, 458 .U.S. 782, 815 (1982) (O'Connor, J., dissenting) (arguing that the offender's
culpability-"the degree of the defendant's blameworthiness"-is central to determining the
penalty) (footnote omitted); Logan, supra note 2, at 707 ("[A] sentence must correspond to the
crime-not just to the harm caused by the offense, but also to the culpability of the offender."); Scott
& Steinberg, supra note 1, at 822 ("Only a blameworthy moral agent deserves punishment at all,
and blameworthiness (and the amount of punishment deserved) can vary depending on the attributes
of the actor or the circumstances of the offense."); Zimring, supra note 1, at 271 ("But desert is a
measure of fault that will attach very different punishment to criminal acts that cause similar
amounts of harm.").
137. Ernest van den Haag contends that:
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directly on the quality of choices, the culpability of the actor, and the
moral seriousness of the crime. 
1 38
In the context of homicide gradations, for example, criminal law
arrays actors' culpability and blameworthiness along a continuum from a
premeditated killer for hire at one end to the minimally responsible actor
barely capable of discerning right from wrong at the other end, even
though each caused the same harm. 139 Assigning sentences proportional
to culpability attempts to gauge the actor's location along this continuum
of responsibility. Although determinations of culpability reflect complex
moral evaluations, judgments about blameworthiness also reflect an
actor's response to external factors, such as provocation, and to
individual psychological, developmental, or emotional features,
subsumed as "diminished responsibility.' 140 Because the criminal law
There is little reason left for not holding juveniles responsible under the same laws that
apply to adults. The victim of a fifteen-year-old muggers [sic] is as much mugged as the
victim of a twenty-year-old mugger, the victim of a fourteen-year-old murderer or rapist
is [just] as dead or as raped as the victim of an older one. The need for social defense or
protection is the same.
ERNEST VAN DEN HAAG, PUNISHING CRIMINALS 174 (1975).
138. Just deserts theory and criminal law grading principles base the degree of deserved
punishment on the actor's culpability. For example, a person may cause the death of another
individual with premeditation and deliberation, intentionally, "in the heat of passion," recklessly,
negligently, or accidentally. See JEROME HALL, GENERAL PRINCIPLES OF CRIMINAL LAW 105-45
(2d ed. 1960). The criminal law treats the same objective consequence or harm-for example, the
death of a person-differently depending on the nature of the choices made. In a framework of
deserved punishment, to impose the same penalty upon offenders who do not share equal culpability
would be unjust. When gauging the culpability of choices, youthfulness has central importance
because young people are neither fully responsible nor the moral equals of adults. See Feld, supra
note 2, at 121-23.
139. See GEORGE P. FLETCHER, RETHINKING CRIMINAL LAW 235-320 (1978) (summarizing
gradations of criminal liability for unlawfully causing the death of another); WAYNE R. LAFAVE &
AUSTIN W. SCOTT, JR., CRIMINAL LAW §§ 7.1-7.13 (2d ed. 1986) (describing degrees of homicide
and relationship to culpability); VON HIRSCH, PAST OR FUTURE CRIMES, supra note 135, at 73
(describing "'half madness,"' where the defendant is not completely exculpated by reason of
insanity, as mitigating the degree of deserved punishment because the "actor is less blameworthy
because his own psychic disabilities significantly diminished his capacity to comprehend and be
guided by the law's requirements").
140. See, e.g., FLETCHER, supra note 139, at 242-53 (describing reasonable provocation as a
mitigating factor because the actor under the circumstances "is not expected completely to control
himself' and the increased reliance on diminished capacity as a "progressive recognition that the
impaired psychological condition of the accused," short of insanity, provides a proper basis for
mitigating punishment); VON HIRSCH, PAST OR FUTURE CRIMES, supra note 135, at 31-34 (arguing
the relevance of culpability and excuse to sentencing decisions as well as to definitions of offense);
Joshua Dressier, Why Keep the Provocation Defense?: Some Reflections on a Difficult Subject, 86
MINN. L. REV. 959, 973 (2002) (arguing that the "provocation defense is based to a considerable
extent on the law's concession to ordinary human frailty; the ultimate question, therefore, is whether
we (or the jury) consider the provoked party's anger within the range of expected human responses
to the provocative situation. Put somewhat differently, we must decide if the provocative event
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presumes free-willed moral actors-those who morally can be blamed
for wrong-doing-it deems less culpable those whose capacity to make
rational choices or whose ability to exercise self-control is significantly
constrained by external circumstances or individual impairments.
141
Youthfulness affects the actor's abilities to reason instrumentally and
freely to choose behavior, and locates an offender closer to the
diminished responsibility end of the continuum than to the fully
autonomous free-willed actor.1
42
might cause an ordinary person--one of ordinary and neither short nor saintly temperament-to
become enraged or otherwise emotionally overcome." (footnote omitted)); Kadish, supra note 133,
at 264 (describing proper attribution of criminal blameworthiness as "express[ion of] a moral
criticism"); Stephen J. Morse, Undiminished Confusion in Diminished Capacity, 75 J. CRIM. L. &
CRIMINOLOGY 1, 5-20 (1984) (describing and advocating "complete mens rea" approach to
diminished capacity); see also infra notes 356-59 and accompanying text.
141. See FLETCHER, supra note 139, at 461-62 (describing the theory of deserved punishment
and arguing that "[i]f the actor is fully accountable, he ought to be fully punished. Yet if his
culpability is partial, he ought to be punished less. Lesser culpability justifies a mitigated
punishment."); VON HIRSCH, PAST OR FUTURE CRIMES, supra note 135, at 71-74 (summarizing
principles of culpability in substantive criminal law); Peter Arenella, Character, Choice and Moral
Agency: The Relevance of Character to Our Moral Culpability Judgments, Soc. PHIL. & POL'Y,
Spring 1990, at 59, 61 (arguing that "the individual's capacity for moral responsiveness
encompasses several distinct but interrelated abilities to react to moral norms in thought, feeling,
perception, and behavior. In assessing whether individuals deserve moral blame for their acts when
they lack such attributes or fail to exercise them competently, we should consider whether these
agents can control those aspects of their character that impair their capacity for moral
responsiveness.").
142. Peter Arenella argues that the criminal law treats children differently than adults because,
even though it expects them to adhere to moral norms, it recognizes that they only gradually will
develop the capacity to understand their normative significance and abide by their
dictates. And when they make a rational and voluntary choice to engage in morally
objectionable conduct..., we may hold them accountable to some sanction to teach
them the significance of the rule they have broken.
But we do not treat young children as full moral agents, despite their capacity for
practical reason and their freedom to act on the basis of their reasoned choices....
... [T]hey have not yet fully developed this capacity to respond appropriately to
moral reasons for action. This capacity for moral responsiveness presupposes that moral
agents appreciate the normative significance of the moral norms governing their
behavior. It also assumes that moral agents can exercise moral judgment about how these
norms apply in a particular context. Acting on the basis of moral judgment also requires
moral motivation: the capacity to use the applicable moral norm as the basis for acting.
Aranella, supra note 141, at 67-68; see also Elizabeth S. Scott & Thomas Grisso, The Evolution of
Adolescence: A Developmental Perspective on Juvenile Justice Reform, 88 J. CRIM. L. &
CRIMINOLOGY 137, 176 (1997) (arguing that adolescents' "criminal choices are presumed less to
express individual preferences and more to reflect the behavioral influences characteristic of a
transitory developmental stage that are generally shared with others in the age cohort. This
difference supports drawing a line based on age, and subjecting adolescents to a categorical
presumption of reduced responsibility."); Laurence Steinberg & Elizabeth Cauffman, The Elephant
in the Courtroom: A Developmental Perspective on the Adjudication of Youthful Offenders, 6 VA. J.
SOC. POL'Y & L. 389, 407-09 (1999) (arguing that youths lack "ability to control [their] impulses, to
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Criminal responsibility and moral blameworthiness hinge on
cognitive and volitional competence. In a framework of deserved
punishment, it is unjust to impose the same penalty on offenders who do
not possess comparable culpability. Younger offenders are not as
blameworthy as adults because they have not yet fully internalized moral
norms, developed sufficient empathic identification with others,
acquired adequate moral comprehension, or had sufficient opportunity to
learn to control their actions. 143 In short, they possess neither the
rationality-cognitive capacity-nor the self-control-volitional
capacity-to justify equating their criminal responsibility with that of
adults.
Developmental psychology studies changes across the life-cycle in
physical, social, intellectual, and emotional development,' 44 and, from its
earliest foundation, has posited that young people move through a
sequence of stages in legal reasoning and moral decision making.1
45
manage [their] behavior in the face of pressure from others to violate the law, or to extricate
[themselves] from a potentially problematic situation," and these deficiencies render them less
blameworthy).
143. See Fagan, supra note 48, at 235 (arguing that adolescents' "judgment is immature
because they have not yet attained several dimensions of psychosocial development that
characterize adults as mature, including the capacity for autonomous choice, self-management, risk
perception, and the calculation of future consequences"); Scott & Steinberg, supra note 1, at 823
("[A]ctors, whose decisionmaking capacities are less severely impaired, or who are subject to
compelling (but not overwhelming) pressures and constraints that limit their freedom of choice, may
pass the minimum threshold of responsibility but be judged less culpable and deserving of less
punishment than the typical criminal actor.").
144. See, e.g., Steinberg & Cauffman, supra note 142, at 391 ("Developmental psychology,
broadly defined, concerns the scientific study of changes in physical, intellectual, emotional, and
social development over the life cycle. Developmental psychologists are mainly interested in the
study of 'normative' development (i.e., patterns of behavior, cognition, and emotion that are regular
and predictable within the vast majority of the population of individuals of a given chronological
age), but they are also interested in understanding normal individual differences in development
(i.e., common variations within the range of what is considered normative for a given chronological
age) as well as the causes and consequences of atypical or pathological development (i.e.,
development that departs significantly from accepted norms).").
145. See, e.g, JEAN PIAGET, THE MORAL JUDGMENT OF THE CHILD 26-28 (Marjorie Gabain
trans., First Free Press Paperback ed. 1965) (1932) (describing four stages of development); JEAN
PIAGET & BARBEL INHELDER, THE PSYCHOLOGY OF THE CHILD 152 (Helen Weaver trans., 1969)
(1966) ("[T]he mental development of the child appears as a succession of three great periods.");
Lawrence Kohlberg, Development of Moral Character and Moral Ideology, in I REVIEW OF CHILD
DEVELOPMENT RESEARCH 383, 394-409 (Martin L. Hoffman & Lois Wladis Hoffman eds., 1964);
Lawrence Kohlberg, Stage and Sequence: The Cognitive-Developmental Approach to Socialization,
in HANDBOOK OF SOCIALIZATION THEORY AND RESEARCH 347, 347-472 (David A. Goslin ed.,
1969); Lawrence Kohlberg, The Development of Children's Orientations Toward a Moral Order, 6
VITA HUMANA 11, 11-14 (1963); June Louin Tapp & Lawrence Kohlberg, Developing Senses of
Law and Legal Justice, in LAW, JUSTICE, AND THE INDIVIDUAL IN SOCIETY 89,90 (June Louin Tapp
& Felice J. Levine eds., 1977); June Louin Tapp & Felice J. Levine, Legal Socialization: Strategies
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Some of the developmental changes parallel the imputations of
responsibility associated with the common law infancy defense, and by
mid-adolescence most youths acquire cognitive reasoning capacity
roughly comparable to that of adults.146 When, for example, youths make
informed consent decisions for psychotherapy or medical treatment, few
bases exist to distinguish between mid-adolescents and adults in terms of
the information used or the reasoning processes employed.1 47 Studies
that equate adolescent and adult cognitive ability derive primarily from
informed consent research that emphasizes subjective preferences.' 48 But
for an Ethical Legality, 27 STAN. L. REV. 1, 12-15 (1974). But see Scott, supra note 134, at 1632
(summarizing criticisms of the early research on stage and sequence of development and arguing
that "recent research has revealed that similar skills develop at different rates in different task
domains").
146. See PIAGET, supra note 145, at 314-25 (discussing the development toward an adult
standard of youths' sense of justice through age twelve); June Louin Tapp, Psychology and the
Law: An Overture, 27 ANN. REV. PSYCHOL. 359, 374 (1976); supra note 133 (summarizing
common law infancy defense). Somewhere between about eleven and fourteen years of age,
children achieve the "formal operations" stage, in which they can begin to think abstractly and
hypothetically, weigh and compare consequences, and consider alternative solutions to problems.
See ROBERT S. SIEGLER, CHILDREN'S THINKING 41-42 (1986).
147. Developmental psychological research on adolescents' cognitive decisionmaking ability
suggests that "for most purposes, adolescents cannot be distinguished from adults on the ground of
competence in decisionmaking alone." Gary B. Melton, Toward "Personhood" for Adolescents:
Autonomy and Privacy as Values in Public Policy, 38 AM. PSYCHOLOGIST 99, 100 (1983). When
youths solve problems or make informed consent decisions, social psychologists find the quality of
judgments made by adolescents fourteen years of age or older comparable to that of adults'
judgments. See id. at 100-01; Gary B. Melton, Children's Competence to Consent: A Problem in
Law and Social Science, in CHILDREN'S COMPETENCE TO CONSENT 1, 15 (Gary B. Melton et al.
eds., 1983). But see Elizabeth Cauffman et al., Justice for Juveniles: New Perspectives on
Adolescents' Competence and Culpability, 18 QUINNIPIAC L. REV. 403, 406-07 (1999) (criticizing
cognitive studies as methodologically limited and relying on "small, unrepresentative, usually
white, middle class samples of youth taking part in laboratory studies rather than in studies that
compare adolescent and adult performance under conditions that adequately resemble daily life");
Scott, supra note 134, at 1609 (criticizing researchers who contend that "no differences distinguish
adults and adolescents in their capacity for rational decisionmaking" and arguing that they focus too
narrowly on cognitive as opposed to judgmental factors).
148. Research on young peoples' ability to make informed medical decisions tends to support
equating adolescents' and adults' cognitive abilities. See Thomas Grisso & Linda Vierling, Minors'
Consent to Treatment: A Developmental Perspective, 9 PROF. PSYCHOL. 412, 423 (1978) (finding
that little research evidence exists that adolescents aged fifteen or older possess less competence
than adults to provide knowing, intelligent, and voluntary informed consent); Lois A. Weithom &
Susan B. Campbell, The Competency of Children and Adolescents to Make Informed Treatment
Decisions, 53 CHILD DEV. 1589, 1595 (1982) (fourteen-year-olds' choices did not differ
significantly from those of adults in terms of "evidence of choice, reasonable[ness of] outcome,
rational[ity of] reason[ing], and understanding" when responding to medical and psychological
treatment hypotheticals). A review of several psychological studies of adolescents' reasoning
processes, and understanding and use of medical information about their conditions and treatment
options, found that adolescents and adults generally made qualitatively comparable decisions. See
Scott, supra note 134, at 1627-30.
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the ability to make hypothetical decisions under structured laboratory
conditions with complete information differs significantly from the
ability to exercise mature judgment when equipped with incomplete
knowledge, under stressful conditions, and with real-life
consequences.
49
From a clinical and social policy perspective, there is increasing
recognition of the importance of emotions in decision making, relevant
to a wide range of risk-taking behaviors. In many ways, this
perspective increasingly blurs the traditional boundaries of cognitive
vs. emotional processes. This is important because the "decision" to
engage in a specific behavior that has long-term health
consequences-e.g., smoking a cigarette, drinking alcohol, or
engaging in unprotected sex-cannot be completely understood within
the framework of "cold" cognitive processes. Cold cognition refers to
thinking under conditions of low emotion and/or arousal, whereas hot
cognition refers to thinking under conditions of strong feelings or high
arousal. The cognitive processes involved in hot cognition may, in fact,
be much more important for understanding why people[--especially
youths-] make risky choices in real-life situations. 1
50
While adolescents' cognitive abilities to think and to reason may be
comparable to adults', youths' interpersonal context, emotional
149. See Elizabeth Cauffman & Laurence Steinberg, The Cognitive and Affective Influences on
Adolescent Decision-Making, 68 TEMP. L. REV. 1763, 1770 (1995) [hereinafter Cauffman &
Steinberg, Cognitive and Affective Influences]; Scott & Steinberg, supra note 1, at 812-13 ("These
findings from laboratory studies are only modestly useful, however, in understanding how youths
compare to adults in making choices that have salience to their lives or that are presented in stressful
unstructured settings (such as the street) in which decisionmakers must rely on personal experience
and knowledge."); L.P. Spear, The Adolescent Brain and Age-Related Behavioral Manifestations,
24 NEUROSCIENCE & BIOBEHAVIORAL REVS. 417, 423 (2000) ("Given the only small differences in
decision making capacity between individuals from mid-adolescence onward, the question arises as
to why the decision making efforts of adolescents result in substantially more risk-taking behavior
than is characteristics of adults.... [O]ne little explored possibility is that the decision making
capacity of adolescents may be more vulnerable to disruption by the stresses and stains of everyday
living than that of adults. That is, unlike adults, adolescents may exhibit considerably poorer
cognitive performance under circumstances involving everyday stress and time-limited situations
than under optimal test conditions."); Laurence Steinberg & Elizabeth Cauffman, Maturity of
Judgment in Adolescence: Psychosocial Factors in Adolescent Decision Making, 20 LAW & HUM.
BEHAV. 249, 250 (1996) [hereinafter Steinberg & Cauffinan, Maturity of Judgment] ("[T]he
informed consent model is too narrow in scope to adequately illuminate differences between
adolescents' and adults' decision making, because it overemphasizes cognitive functioning (e.g.,
capacity for thinking, reasoning, understanding) and minimizes the importance of noncognitive,
psychosocial, [sic] variables that influence the decision-making process (i.e., aspects of
development and behavior that involve personality traits, interpersonal relations, and affective
experience." (citation omitted)).
150. Ronald E. Dahl, Affect Regulation, Brain Development, and Behavioral/Emotional Health
in Adolescence, 6 CNS SPECTRUMS 60, 61 (2001) (citations omitted).
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responsivity, and inexperience affect the quality of their choices and
behavior.
151
While psycho-social development proceeds through a series of
stages, decision-making competencies emerge unevenly rather than as a
uniform increase in overall capacity, and young people use different
reasoning processes in different task domains. 152 Differences in language
ability, knowledge, experience, and culture affect the ages at which
youths' various competencies emerge. 153  Many characteristics of
delinquent youths-lower intellectual ability, poverty, social
disadvantage, and cultural isolation-further hamper cognitive
development and competent legal decision-making.
154
A. Atkins, Adolescents, and Reduced Culpability
Atkins prohibited executing mentally retarded defendants because
"their disabilities in areas of reasoning, judgment, and control of their
151. Many developmental psychologists question the appropriateness of advocating for legal
equality based on adolescents' cognitive parity with adults to make informed medical decisions. See
William Gardner et al., Asserting Scientific Authority: Cognitive Development and Adolescent Legal
Rights, 44 AM. PSYCHOLOGIST 895, 897-98 (1989); Scott, supra note 134, at 1631-36; Elizabeth
Scott et al., Evaluating Adolescent Decision Making in Legal Contexts, 19 LAW & HUM. BEHAV.
221, 224 (1995); Scott & Steinberg, supra note 1, at 813 ("Psycho-social development proceeds
more slowly than cognitive development. As a consequence, even when adolescent cognitive
capacities approximate those of adults, youthful decisionmaking may still differ due to immature
judgment."); Kim Taylor-Thompson, States of Mind/States of Development, 14 STAN. L. & POL'Y
REV. 143, 152 (2003) ("[F]or all the importance of cognitive development, aspects of behavior that
involve interpersonal and affective experience may offer even more information about an
adolescent's decision-making processes." (footnote omitted)).
152. See Thomas Grisso, What We Know About Youths' Capacities as Trial Defendants, in
YOUTH ON TRIAL: A DEVELOPMENTAL PERSPECTIVE ON JUVENILE JUSTICE 139, 145 (Thomas
Grisso & Robert G. Schwartz eds., 2000) ("Youths may begin to manifest certain cognitive or social
abilities in one context (for example, school or peer interactions) while failing to apply it to a new
context until some time later in their development."); Elizabeth S. Scott, Criminal Responsibility in
Adolescence: Lessons from Developmental Psychology, in YOUTH ON TRIAL: A DEVELOPMENTAL
PERSPECTIVE ON JUVENILE JUSTICE 291, 302-03 (Thomas Grisso & Robert G. Schwartz eds., 2000)
("[S]kills seem to develop at different rates in different domains, and competence to make one kind
of decision can not [sic] be generalized."); Scott & Steinberg, supra note 1, at 813.
153. See Thomas Grisso, Society's Retributive Response to Juvenile Violence: A
Developmental Perspective, 20 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 229, 233 (1996) ("Progress toward
completion of cognitive and moral developmental stages can be detoured or delayed by cultural,
intellectual, and social disadvantages." (citation omitted)); Taylor-Thompson, supra note 151, at
152 ("[D]ifferences in both comprehension and reasoning emerge between adolescents and adults
from lower socio-economic backgrounds and with lower IQ levels.").
154. See Grisso, supra note 152, at 145; Grisso, supra note 153, at 233; Thomas Grisso et al.,
Juveniles' Competence to Stand Trial: A Comparison of Adolescents' and Adults' Capacities as
Trial Defendants, 27 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 333, 348-50 (2003) (reporting that juveniles in the
justice system have lower IQs than a sample of youths drawn from the community and arguing that
youths with lower IQs are more likely to lack adjudicative competence).
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impulses" prevented them from acting "with the level of moral
culpability that characterizes the most serious adult criminal conduct."
' 155
Similarly, adolescents think qualitatively differently than adults, and
their poor judgment, psycho-social immaturity, and truncated self-
control also require a different criminal sentencing policy. 15 6 It is
important to distinguish between cognitive competencies, which affect
decision-making processes, and maturity of judgment, which affects the
quality of decisions.
This is so because psycho-social developmental factors influence
values and preferences, which in turn shape the cost-benefit calculus,
which determines outcomes. The influence of these factors will change
as the individual matures and values and preferences change-
resulting in different choices.... [T]he intuition is that
developmentally linked predispositions and responses systematically
affect youthful decision making in ways that may lead to harmful
choices.
157
While adolescents possess sufficient cognitive competency to
justify some degree of punishment, psycho-social maturity of judgment
and temperance provide a broader framework through which to assess
their culpability. 158  Most youths lack the maturity of judgment
155. Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 306 (2002).
156. See Steinberg & Caufftnan, Maturity of Judgment, supra note 149, at 251. "[T]he intuition
behind paternalistic policies is that developmentally linked traits and responses systematically affect
the decision making of adolescents in a way that may incline them to make choices that threaten
harm to their own and others' health, life, or welfare, to a greater extent than do adults." Scott et al.,
supra note 151, at 227; see also Scott & Steinberg, supra note 1, at 801 ("[T]eens are simply less
competent decisionmakers than adults, largely because typical features of adolescent psycho-social
development contribute to immature judgment. Adolescent capacities for autonomous choice, self-
management, risk perception and calculation of future consequences are deficient as compared to
those of adults, and these traits influence decisionmaking in ways that can lead to risky conduct.");
Taylor-Thompson, supra note 151, at 143 ("An adolescent's poor choice to engage in unlawful
conduct is different from an adult's poor decision, although each may cause harm.").
157. Scott, supra note 152, at 303-04.
158. See Cauffman & Steinberg, Cognitive and Affective Influences, supra note 149, at 1765;
Scott et al., supra note 151, at 227; Scott & Grisso, supra note 142, at 157 (arguing that psycho-
social factors affecting adolescents' decisions to engage in crime include "peer influence, temporal
perspective (a tendency to focus on short-term versus long-term consequences), and risk perception
and preference. . . . We designate these psychosocial influences as 'judgment' factors, and argue
that immature judgment in adolescence may contribute to choices about involvement in crime.");
Steinberg & Cauffman, Maturity of Judgment, supra note 149, at 252; Steinberg & Cauffman, supra
note 142, at 407-08 (explaining that the quality of adolescent decision-making subsumes three
categories of psycho-social factors: "responsibility (the capacity to make a decision in an
independent, self-reliant fashion), perspective (the capacity to place a decision within a broader
temporal and interpersonal context), and temperance (the capacity to exercise self-restraint and
control one's impulses)").
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characteristic of adulthood in a variety of areas-perceptions of risk,
appreciation of future consequences, capacity for self-management, and
ability to make autonomous choices.1 59  Their decision-making
preferences and values are in a state of transition, and they are prone to
make poorer judgments than they would make several years later.1 60
Youths differ from adults in their breadth of experience, short-term
versus long-term time perspective, attitude toward risk, impulsivity, and
the importance they attach to peer influence.1 6' These differences are
linked to developmental process and affect their qualities of judgment
and ability to appreciate the consequences of their actions. These generic
developmental differences justify a less punitive stance toward younger
offenders, which allows them to survive the mistakes of adolescence.
162
159. See, e.g., Scott et al., supra note 151, at 229-35. (describing psycho-social and
developmental factors that contribute to juveniles' immature judgment); Steinberg & Cauffman,
Maturity of Judgment, supra note 149, at 252 (emphasizing temperance, perspective and judgment
as ways in which adolescents' thinking diverges from adults); Taylor-Thompson, supra note 151, at
144 (arguing that "adolescents think differently than mature adults. Adolescents may, for example,
perceive and calculate the probability of risk differently than adults do, or be less aware of-and
less alert to-information. In any event, adolescents use what information they have less effectively
in making choices: They fixate on an initial possibility in the decision-making process and fail to
adjust as new information becomes available.").
160. See Scott et al., supra note 151, at 232-35; Steinberg & Cauffman, Maturity of Judgment,
supra note 149, at 268.
161. See Scott, supra note 134, at 1610; Scott & Grisso, supra note 142, at 160-61 (noting that
psycho-social developmental factors affecting judgment and criminal responsibility in adolescents
include "(1) conformity and compliance in relation to peers, (2) attitude toward and perception of
risk, and (3) temporal perspective"); Scott & Steinberg, supra note 1, at 813 ("The psycho-social
factors most relevant to differences in judgment [between youths and adults] include: (a) peer
orientation, (b) attitudes toward and perception of risk, (c) temporal perspective, and (d) capacity for
self-management."); Scott et al., supra note 151, at 227 (proposing "judgment" framework to
evaluate quality of adolescent decisionmaking that includes not only cognitive capacity, but also
influence of factors such as "conformity and compliance in relation to peers and parents, attitude
toward and perception of risk, and temporal perspective"); Steinberg & Cauffman, Maturity of
Judgment, supra note 149, at 258-62.
162. See Zimring, supra note 1, at 272 ("[E]ven when a particular young person possesses the
cognitive capacities and social controls necessary to eligibility for punishment, immaturity should
continue to be a mitigating circumstance for some time."). A developmentally informed youth
sentencing policy would emphasize qualities of "judgment" rather than narrow cognitive capacity,
ask whether young people characteristically make poorer quality choices than they would when they
are somewhat older (because of adolescent-specific emotional, psychosocial, or developmental
differences) and reflect young people's lesser developmental capacities. If adolescents likely will
make better, adult-quality decisions with maturity, "then the case for protecting the opportunities
and prospects of that future adult from the costs of her immature youthful judgment and choices
seems powerful." Scott et al., supra note 151, at 228 (citation omitted).
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1. Risky Behavior
Young people act more impulsively, exercise less self-control,
more frequently fail adequately to calculate long-term consequences,
and therefore engage in more risky behavior than do adults. 63 Risky
behavior may be developmentally necessary for adolescents to acquire
the skills needed to negotiate successfully the transition to adulthood. 164
Adolescents need to learn to function independently of parental
caretakers.1 65  Acquiring these skills entails certain characteristic
behaviors such as "increases in peer-directed social interactions and
elevations in novelty-seeking and risk-taking behaviors.
'0 66
This developmental transition is disruptive and entails opportunities
for growth as well as dangers. "Adolescents are risk takers. Relative to
individuals at other ages, human adolescents as a group exhibit a
disproportionate amount of reckless behavior, sensation seeking and risk
taking ... ,167 Compared to adults, adolescents generally underestimate
the magnitude or probability of risks, use a shorter time-frame, and focus
on opportunities for gains rather than possibilities of losses.1 68 The
163. See Scott & Steinberg, supra note 1, at 814 ("Future orientation, the capacity and
inclination to project events into the future, may also influence judgment, since it will affect the
extent to which individuals consider the long-term consequences of their actions in making choices.
Over an extended period between childhood and young adulthood, individuals become more future-
oriented." (citation omitted)).
164. See Spear, supra note 149, at 147 ("Certain behavioral features common among
adolescents of a variety of species may have evolved to promote attainment of the necessary skills
for independence; these age-related behaviors, such as an adolescent-associated increase in risk
taking, may be promoted less by increases in pubertal hormones that by developmental events
occurring in brain during adolescence. These age-related neural alterations provide a partial
biological basis for the unique behavioral strategies of adolescence .... [T]hese transient neuronal
features may predispose adolescents to behave in particular ways .... ").
165. See id. at 421 ("Risk taking may allow the adolescent to explore adult behavior and
privileges, to accomplish normal developmental tasks, and to develop and express mastery of
hierarchal challenges associated with certain risky behaviors." (references omitted)).
166. Id. at 418 ("Increased affiliation with peers and the taking of risks via exploring novel
areas, behaviors and reinforcers may also help facilitate the dispersal of adolescents away from the
natal family unit.").
167. Id. at 421.
168. Lita Furby and Ruth Beyth-Marom, speculate that "adolescents [may] judge some
negative consequences in the distant future to be of lower probability than do adults or to be of less
importance than adults do." Lita Furby & Ruth Beyth-Marom, Risk Taking in Adolescence: A
Decision-Making Perspective, 12 DEVELOPMENTAL REV. 1, 19 (1992); see also Grisso, supra note
152, at 161 ("[Ajdolescents on average may differ from adults in the weights that they give to
potential positive and negative outcomes ... [and] are more likely than adults to give greater weight
to anticipated gains than to possible losses or negative risks."); Scott, supra note 152, at 305-06
("[Aldolescents, for developmental reasons, could differ from adults in the subjective value that is
assigned to perceived consequences... [and] may weigh costs and benefits differently, sometimes
even viewing as a benefit what adults would consider to be a cost."); Spear, supra note 149, at 446
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greater prevalence of accidents, suicides, and homicides as causes of
death of the young reflects greater "risk-taking" behavior.' 69 Criminal
behavior is a particularly risky form of behavior, and every theory of
crime attempts to account for its greater prevalence during
adolescence. 7 0
Risk entails a chance of loss, as well as gain, and risky behavior
exposes the actor to potential adverse consequences.' 71 A decision-
maker must identify possible outcomes, identify consequences that may
follow from each option, evaluate the desirability of positive or negative
results, estimate the likelihood of those various events occurring, and
make a choice to optimize outcomes. 172 Adolescents may approach these
decision-making steps differently than adults when they engage in
riskier behavior. Youths may possess or use different amounts of
information when they make decisions. 73 Unlike informed consent
studies conducted under laboratory conditions, in less-structured, real-
life circumstances, adolescents simply may know less about risks than
("In terms of their expectations for future rewards, adolescents (12-18 years of age) are less
optimistically biased when compared with either college students or adults (18-65 years of age).").
169. See William Gardner, A Life-Span Rational-Choice Theory of Risk Taking, in
ADOLESCENT RISK TAKING 66, 67 (Nancy J. Bell & Robert W. Bell eds., 1993); Spear, supra note
149, at 421 ("Other potential negative outcomes from adolescent risk taking include incarceration,
AIDS infection, unwanted pregnancy, and alcohol or drug dependence."). Teenagers' greater
proclivity to engage in unprotected sex and to speed and drive recklessly reflect various forms of
risk taking with respect to health and safety. See Scott et al., supra note 151, at 230; Spear, supra
note 149, at 421 ("[W]ith half or more of adolescents exhibiting drunk driving, sex without
contraception, use of illegal drugs, and minor criminal activities, 'reckless behavior becomes
virtually a normative characteristic of adolescent development."' (citation omitted)).
170. See, e.g., MICHAEL R. GOTrFREDSON & TRAVIS HIRSCHI, A GENERAL THEORY OF CRIME
123-44 (1990); Scott, supra note 152, at 300-01 ("Many adolescents become involved in criminal
activity in their teens and desist by the time they reach young adulthood... leading criminologists
to conclude that participation in delinquency is 'a normal part of teen life.' For most adolescent
delinquents, desistance from antisocial behavior also seems to be a predictable part of the
maturation process." (citation omitted)); John H. Laub & Robert J. Sampson, Understanding
Desistance from Crime, 28 CRIME & JUST. 1, 38-48 (2001) (summarizing criminological research
reporting peak of criminal involvement in mid-to-late adolescence with sharp desistance thereafter
and attributing youthful involvement to normal developmental transition to adulthood).
171. See Furby & Beyth-Marom, supra note 168, at 3.
172. See id. at 3-4; see also Grisso, supra note 153, at 241 ("We need to examine the extent to
which midadolescents typically might not yet have achieved adultlike ways of framing problems...
and generating alternative responses to stressful situations or weighing the potential consequences
of their alternatives.").
173. See Scott, supra note 152, at 304 ("Adolescents, perhaps because they have less
knowledge and experience, are less aware of risks than are adults." (citation omitted)); Taylor-
Thompson, supra note 151, at 153 (arguing that adolescents approach risky decisions differently
than adults because of youths "being unaware of risks that adults typically perceive, having
incorrect information about risks, or calculating the probability or magnitude of the risk in ways that
adults would not" (footnotes omitted)).
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do adults. 74 They may perceive fewer alternative options than do
adults.' 75 Young people may discount negative future consequences
because they have more limited experience. Disadvantaged youths, in
particular, may feel a sense of "futurelessness," fatalism, and despair,
which inclines them to discount future consequences even more than do
other teenagers. 
76
Even when adolescents possess and use comparable information,
they may assign different subjective values to the alternative
consequences. 77  Youths may weigh benefits and consequences
differently and discount negative future consequences in ways that skew
the quality of their choices. 178 In some instances, youths simply may
estimate negative consequences of risky behavior as having lower
probabilities of occurring than do adults. In others cases, youths'
subjective valuations of risks and consequences may cause them to make
174. See, e.g., Thompson v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 815, 835 (1988) ("Inexperience, less
education, and less intelligence make the teenager less able to evaluate the consequences of his or
her conduct while at the same time he or she is much more apt to be motivated by mere emotion or
peer pressure than is an adult."); Scott, supra note 152, at 305 ("[T]he fact that adolescents have less
experience and knowledge than adults seems likely to affect their decision making in tangible and
intangible ways.").
175. See Taylor-Thompson, supra note 151, at 153 ("In situations where adults will likely
perceive and weight multiple alternatives as part of rational decision-making, adolescents typically
see only one option. This inflexible 'either-or-mentality' becomes especially acute under stressful
conditions.").
176. See Grisso, supra note 153, at 234 ("Numerous studies describe the sense of
'futurelessness' and fatalism that is experienced by adolescents whose dependent status does not
allow them to escape neighborhoods in which violent death is a daily occurrence, and they suggest
that many urban youths who murder believe that there is no future to consider. Such conditions are
said to influence their decision making negatively, producing a tendency to discount the future when
weighing potential gains and losses of anticipated consequences." (citations omitted)).
177. See id.; see also Scott, supra note 134, at 1645-47 (discussing how youths' perceptions of
and preferences for risk differ from those of adults).
178. Rational choice theory helps to explain adolescents' greater propensity for risk-taking. See
Gardner, supra note 169, at 70-73. People make utility-maximizing choices within a context of
constraints, and people at different stages of their lives assign different valuations to uncertain
future events. Knowledge about one's self, social environment, and life-course trajectory increase
with age and affect a person's short-term versus long-term calculus. Youths' "focus on the
immediate rather than the long-term consequences of a decision is a rational response to uncertainty
about the future." Id. at 77. As a result, young people may discount the negative value of future
consequences because they have more difficulty than adults in integrating a future consequence into
their more limited experiential baseline. Thus, adolescents may discount the cost of longer-term
future consequences and weigh shorter-term benefits more heavily than adults. See William Gardner
& Janna Herman, Adolescents 'AIDS Risk Taking: A Rational Choice Perspective, in ADOLESCENTS
AND THE AIDS EPIDEMIC 17, 17-19 (William Gardner et al. eds., 1990); Taylor-Thompson, supra
note 151, at 154 ("Adolescents, more than adults, tend to discount the future and to afford greater
weight to short-term consequences of decisions." (footnote omitted)).
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different choices than adults. 179 In addition, adolescents may weigh the
consequences of not engaging in risky behaviors differently than
adults.180 Youths' unrealistic optimism and feelings of "invulnerability"
and "immortality" further contribute to risk-taking behavior.' 8 '
A predisposition toward sensation-seeking inclines adolescents to
seek exciting and novel activities. Risk-taking can be fun, and successful
experiences may enhance self-esteem.18 2 Youths seek novelty and take
risks as part of the process of separating from family and becoming
autonomous.18 3  They experience more difficulty controlling their
impulses than do adults because of physiological changes, mood
volatility, and predisposition toward sensation-seeking. 184  Youths
179. See Scott & Steinberg, supra note 1, at 815 ("[A]dolescents are less risk-averse than
adults, generally weighing rewards more heavily than risks in making choices. In part, this may be
due to limits on youthful time perspective; taking risks is more costly for those who focus on the
future." (footnote omitted)).
180. See Taylor-Thompson, supra note 151, at 153 ("[A]dolescents experience greater
concern-and anxiety-over the consequences of refusing to engage in risky conduct than adults
do, thanks to greater fear of being socially ostracized."); Scott & Grisso, supra note 142, at 163.
181. See Lawrence D. Cohn et al., Risk-Perception: Differences Between Adolescents and
Adults, 14 HEALTH PSYCHOL. 217, 221 (1995) (arguing that adolescents engage in "health-
threatening activities" because they "do not regard [such] behavior as extremely risky or unsafe,"
rather than because of "unique feelings of invulnerability"); Furby & Beyth-Marom, supra note 168,
at 19-21.
182. See Grisso, supra note 152, at 163 (arguing that adolescents are "more willing to take
physical and social risks for the sake of experiencing novel and complex sensations."); Spear, supra
note 149, at 421 ("Risk taking has sometimes but not always been linked to gains in self-esteem,
perhaps via reinforcement provided for such behavior among peers engaged in similar activities.
Risk takers report that they feel more accepted by peers, and view risk taking as reinforcing
('fun')." (references omitted)); Taylor-Thompson, supra note 151, at 153 (arguing that sensation-
seeking activity increases for youths between sixteen and nineteen years of age).
183. See Spear, supra note 149, at 423 ("Evolutionarily, adolescent-associated increases in
novelty seeking and risk taking may have facilitated adolescent emigration from the natal group by
providing the impetus to explore novel and broader areas away from the home .... Such increases
in risk taking may also provide the opportunity to explore new behaviors and reinforcers, perhaps
facilitating the relinquishing of juvenile patterns of behavior as well as the acquisition of behaviors
essential for adult functioning.").
184. See Cauffman & Steinberg, Cognitive and Affective Influences, supra note 149, at 1780;
Scott, supra note 134, at 1645 (suggesting that youths' impulsiveness "might affect decisionmaking
competence, if impulsiveness disables the young individual from considering alternatives or
weighing and comparing consequences according to his or her subjective utility. More likely,
impulsiveness might simply affect the care with which actual decisions are made .... "); Steinberg
& Cauffman, Maturity of Judgment, supra note 149, at 259 (suggesting that "sensation seeking
increases during adolescence, leading to increased risk taking as a means of achieving excitement.
Another viewpoint posits that hormonal and physiological changes that accompany puberty result in
higher levels of impulsivity and recklessness. Finally, a third perspective emphasizes the influence
of emotion and mood on decision making.").
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engage in risky behavior for the excitement of the "adrenaline rush.'
85
As a result of habituation, they may require more intense and novel
stimuli to achieve the desired affect. 186 "[D]ecision-making sequences
regarding risky behavior in adolescence cannot be fully understood
without considering the role of emotions, with key aspects of these
'decision' processes involving interactions between thinking and feeling
processes."'187 Adolescents' predisposition toward risk reflects generic
developmental processes rather than malevolent personal choices.
2. Peer Group Influences
Atkins noted that mentally retarded offenders are followers in
groups; similarly, adolescents also respond to peer group influences
more readily than do adults.' 88 Adolescents typically commit their
crimes in a group context, and group-offending puts normally law-
abiding youth at greater risk to commit crimes and reduces their ability
publicly to withdraw.' 89 The social setting of adolescent offending
185. See Spear, supra note 149, at 422 ("Individuals engaging in risk taking may do so to attain
the positive arousal produced by the sensations of novelty, complexity, change or intensity of
experience.... Perceived risks of risk taking decline with age during adolescence, so it is possible
that the level of risk taking necessary to attain an 'adrenaline rush' of danger may rise as well,
perhaps leading to an escalation of risk-taking behaviors in certain individuals, particularly those
with poor prospects for attaining other reinforcers." (reference omitted)).
186. See id. at 446 ("[A]dolescents may generally attain less positive impact from stimuli with
moderate to low incentive value, and may pursue new appetitive reinforcers through increases in
risk taking/novelty seeking and via engaging in deviant behaviors such as drug taking.").
187. Dahl, supra note 150, at 62 ("[T]he developmental changes in AR [affect regulation]
during adolescence involve interactions between thoughts and feelings to modulate complex
behavior in emotional situations in ways that are adaptive to serve a goal or purpose.").
188. See Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 318 (2002) ("[T]here is abundant evidence that [the
mentally retarded] often act on impulse rather than pursuant to a premeditated plan, and that in
group settings they are followers rather than leaders." (footnote omitted)). For discussion of the
same characteristics in adolescents, see, for example, Scott, supra note 134, at 1643-44 (describing
adolescent responsiveness to peer influences); Scott & Steinberg, supra note 1, at 813 ("[T]eens are
more responsive to peer influence than are adults. Susceptibility to peer influence increases between
childhood and early adolescence as adolescents begin to individuate from parental control. This
susceptibility peaks around age fourteen and declines slowly during the high-school years."
(footnote omitted)); and Steinberg & Cauffman, Maturity of Judgment, supra note 149, at 253-54.
189. Youths adjust their behavior and attitudes to conform to those of their contemporaries to
garner greater acceptance and approval. See Scott & Grisso, supra note 142, at 162 ("Peer influence
seems to operate through two means: social comparison and conformity. Through social
comparison, adolescents measure their own behavior by comparing it to others. Social
conformity... influences adolescents to adapt their behavior and attitudes to that [sic] of their
peers." (footnote omitted)); Scott et al., supra note 151, at 230; Taylor-Thompson, supra note 151,
at 153-54 ("The choice to engage in antisocial conduct is often linked to the adolescent's desire for
peer approval. Prodding by peers can substitute for, and even overwhelm, an adolescent's own
'better' judgment about whether to engage in certain conduct.").
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increases youths' difficulty with resisting peer pressure.1 90 Indeed,
adolescents' proclivity toward risk-taking and susceptibility to peer
influences likely interact to produce even riskier behavior in a group
setting.1 9' In some social contexts, youths' struggles to achieve
autonomy and to define a social identity may require adherence to
subcultural norms that provide powerful pressures to engage in criminal
activity. 192 Because of the social setting of youth crime, young people
need time, experience, and opportunities to develop the ability to make
independent judgments and to resist peer influence. 193 While an inability
Police arrest a larger proportion of two or more juveniles for involvement in a single
criminal event than they do adults. See, e.g., Franklin E. Zimring, Kids, Groups and Crime: Some
Implications of a Well-Known Secret, 72 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 867, 870 tbl.l (1981) (noting
that sixty-four percent of robberies committed by people under age twenty-one were committed in
groups while only thirty-nine percent of robberies committed by people twenty-one and older were
committed in groups); see also id. at 867 (arguing that young people "commit crimes, as they live
their lives, in groups."); HOWARD N. SNYDER & MELISSA SICKMUND, JUVENILE OFFENDERS AND
VICTIMS: 1999 NATIONAL REPORT 77 (1999) (showing percentages of various crimes committed by
juveniles that were committed in groups from 1973 to 1997).
190. See Zimring, supra note I, at 282 ("That social settings account for the majority of all
youth crime suggests that the capacity to deflect or resist peer pressure is a crucially necessary
dimension of being law-abiding in adolescence.... Kids who do not know how to deal with such
pressure lack effective control of the situations that place them most at risk of crime in their
teens.").
191. See Scott & Steinberg, supra note 1, at 815 ("[A] synergy likely exists between adolescent
peer orientation and risk-taking; considerable evidence indicates that people generally make riskier
decisions in groups than they do alone.").
192. See, e.g., Jeffrey Fagan, Context and Culpability of Adolescent Violence, 6 VA. J. SOC.
POL'Y & L. 507, 535-39 (1999) [hereinafter Fagan, Context and Culpability]; Jeffrey Fagan,
Contexts of Choice by Adolescents in Criminal Events, in YOUTH ON TRIAL: A DEVELOPMENTAL
PERSPECTIVE ON JUVENILE JUSTICE 371, 374 (Thomas Grisso & Robert G. Schwartz eds., 2000)
[hereinafter Fagan, Choices by Adolescents] (using a social context framework "to show how the
unique demands of adolescence interact with social contexts to motivate decisions to engage in
crime and violence"); Jeffrey Fagan & Deanna Wilkinson, Guns, Youth Violence and Social
Identity, in 24 CRIME & JUST. 105, 124 (1998) ("Violence 'scripts,' developed in a neighborhood
context that values toughness and displays of violence, ... may limit the behavioral and strategic
options for resolving disputes ...."). Fagan argues that
[slocial context influences decisions to engage in crime through the interaction of
individual developmental needs and functional goals specific to adolescence (such as
identity, affinity, mastery, and defiance). Competition over limited resources, including
social status, respect, and material goods, by violent or other antisocial means is central
to this dynamic. When neighborhood and community contexts are isolated and deprived,
social interactions are likely to be dominated by street codes that reward displays of
physical domination and social approval for antisocial behavior.
Fagan, Choices by Adolescents, supra, at 382.
193. Franklin E. Zimring argues that:
[t]he ability to resist peer pressure is yet another social skill that is a necessary part of
legal obedience not fully developed in many adolescents. A teen may know right from
wrong and may even have developed the capacity to control his or her impulses while
alone, but resisting temptation while alone is a different task than resisting the pressure
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to resist peer pressure does not excuse criminal conduct, youths who
have not yet learned to manage peer relations successfully are not as
responsible for their behavior as we hold adults to be.
194
3. Communities and Dependence
Children depend on adults to care for them and to enable them to
develop the capacity for positive behavior and moral action.' 95 The
ability to exercise self-control is the outcome of a socially constructed
developmental process in which families, schools, and communities
share responsibility.' 96 Community structures affect the conditions
within which young people grow, interact with peers, and experience the
risks of criminal involvement. 197 Neighborhoods characterized by weak
informal social controls provide greater opportunities for criminal
activity and contribute to the higher crime rates in inner-city areas.'
98
to commit an offense when adolescent peers are pushing for misbehavior and waiting to
see whether or not the outcome they desire will occur.
Zimring, supra note 1, at 280.
194. See id. at 282 ("But if social experience in matters such as anger and impulse-
management also counts, and a fair opportunity to learn to deal with peer pressures is regarded as
important, expecting the experienced-based ability to resist impulses and peers to be fully formed
prior to age eighteen or nineteen would seem on present evidence to be wishful thinking.").
195. See Arenella, supra note 141, at 82 (emphasizing that children depend on others to
develop and exercise their moral capacities and that "[t]he capacities of critical self-reflection and
self-revision are not simply some individual properties that some individuals have the moral luck to
possess. Their acquisition and development depend on an interpersonal process between the agent
and other human beings. The ability to control one's character is a process that often requires some
form of socially created transformational opportunity being made available to an individual who
has the capacity to take advantage of it."); David E. Arredondo, M.D., Child Development,
Children 's Mental Health and the Juvenile Justice System: Principles for Effective Decision-
Making, 14 STAN. L. & POL'Y REV. 13, 16-17 (2003) (arguing that children require attention as part
of normal brain development and that if they become attention-deprived, they will engage in both
positive and negative behaviors to satisfy their needs); Scott, supra note 76, at 547 ("[C]hildren are
assumed to need care, support, and education in order to develop into healthy productive adults. The
obligation to provide the services critical to children's welfare rests first with parents and ultimately
with the state.").
196. See Steinberg & Cauffman, supra note 142, at 393 ("[A]dolescence is seen as a period of
tremendous malleability, during which experiences in family, peer group, school, and other settings
have the potential to influence the course of development.").
197. See, e.g., Fagan, Choices by Adolescents, supra note 192, at 376 (noting that social
context contributes to adolescents' violent behavior); Fagan, Context and Culpability, supra note
192, at 535-39 (suggesting that criminogenic social context contributes to young gang members'
criminal behavior); Deanna L. Wilkinson & Jeffrey Fagan, The Role of Firearms in Violence
"Scripts ": The Dynamics of Gun Events Among Adolescent Males, 59 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS.
55, 63-66 (1996) (describing how peer interactions create "scripts" that prescribe how youths should
respond to disrespect and that lead to violent confrontations).
198. See ROBERT J. BURSIK, JR. & HAROLD G. GRASMICK, NEIGHBORHOODS AND CRIME 29-
59 (1993) (concluding that "low levels of systemic control increase the likelihood of crime, high
levels of crime decrease the effectiveness of systemic control, and the entire process spirals
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Community settings also affect youths' opportunities to learn and
practice responsible behavior.' 99 Unlike presumptively mobile adults,
juveniles' dependency limits their ability to escape from criminogenic
environments.2 °°
4. Adolescent Brain and Neurobiology
Developmental psychologists consistently report differences
between the thinking and behavior of children, adolescents, and adults.
Recent neuroscience research suggests that these behaviors reflect more
fundamental dissimilitude in brain development, biological maturation,
and intellectual functioning. 20  In short, a "hard-science" explanation
may exist for the "soft-science" observations of social scientists.
20 2
Neurobiological evidence suggests that the human brain does not
achieve physiological maturity until the early twenties and that
adolescents simply do not have the same physiologic capability as adults
to make mature decisions or to control impulsive behavior.20 3
onward"); cf Philip J. Cook & John H. Laub, The Unprecedented Epidemic in Youth Violence, 24
CRIME & JUST. 27, 51, 53-58 (1998) (attributing increase in adolescent homicide rates to increased
gun use associated with crack cocaine industry in urban, inner-city neighborhoods).
199. See Arredondo, supra note 195, at 16 (arguing that delinquent youths typically come from
chaotic homes and unresponsive neighborhoods and that as a result "he has not had the necessary
developmental opportunity of internalizing [lessons learned from] consistently benevolent, reliable,
and fair adult authority figures").
200. See Scott & Steinberg, supra note 1, at 818 ("[A]dolescents are subject to legal and
practical restrictions on their ability to escape these criminogenic settings. Financially dependent on
their parents or guardians and subject to their legal authority, adolescents cannot escape their
homes, schools, and neighborhoods.... Because adolescents lack legal and practical autonomy,
they are in a real sense trapped in whatever social setting they occupy and are more restricted in
their capacity to avoid coercive criminogenic influences than are adults.").
201. See NAT'L INST. OF MENTAL HEALTH, TEENAGE BRAIN: A WORK IN PROGRESS 2 (2001),
available at http://www.nimh.nih.gov/publicat/teenbrain.pdf, Torn l Paus et al., Structural
Maturation of Neural Pathways in Children and Adolescents: In Vivo Study, 283 SCIENCE 1908,
1908 (March 19, 1999); Elizabeth R. Sowell et al., In Vivo Evidence for Post-Adolescent Brain
Maturation in Frontal and Striatal Regions, 2 NATURE NEUROSCIENCE 859, 859 (1999) [hereinafter
Sowell et al., In Vivo Evidence]; Elizabeth R. Sowell et al., Mapping Continued Brain Growth and
Gray Matter Density Reduction in Dorsal Frontal Cortex: Inverse Relationships During
Postadolescent Brain Maturation, 21 J. NEUROSCIENCE. 8819, 8819 (Nov. 15, 2001) [hereinafter
Sowell et al., Mapping Continued Brain Growth] (discussing significant changes in brain structure
prior to adulthood); Spear, supra note 149, at 438 ("[T]he adolescent brain is a brain in flux,
undergoing numerous regressive and progressive changes in mesocorticolimbic regions.").
202. See Spear, supra note 149, at 417 ("[M]aturational changes in brain contribute to the age-
specific behavioral characteristics of adolescence .... ).
203. Elizabeth S. Scott and Laurence Steinberg summarize some of the preliminary research on
brain development and its implications for adolescent self-control.
[R]egions of the brain implicated in processes of long-term planning, regulation of
emotion, impulse control, and the evaluation of risk and reward continue to mature over
the course of adolescence, and perhaps well into young adulthood. At puberty, changes
2003]
HOFSTRA LA W REVIEW
The frontal lobe comprises the largest portion of the brain, and the
prefrontal cortex of the frontal lobe functions as the "chief executive
officer" and controls most advanced cerebral functions. 20 4  These
"executive functions" include impulse control, reasoning, abstract
thinking, imagining, planning behavior, and anticipating
consequences.0 5 Brain maturation influences "affect regulation" and the
ability to control emotions and behavior.
20 6
Magnetic Resonance Imaging (MRI) studies provide cross-sectional
images of the brain and enable neuroscientists to study longitudinal
changes in brain structure and function.0 7 In the womb and during the
first eighteen months of life, the human brain consists primarily of gray
in the limbic system-a part of the brain that is central in the processing and regulation
of emotion-may stimulate adolescents to seek higher levels of novelty and to take more
risks; these changes also may contribute to increased emotionality and vulnerability to
stress. At the same time, patterns of development in the prefrontal cortex, which is active
during the performance of complicated tasks involving planning and decisionmaking,
suggest that these higher-order cognitive capacities may be immature well into middle
adolescence.
Scott & Steinberg, supra note 1, at 816 (footnotes omitted); see also Dahl, supra note 150, at 69
("Regions in the PFC [prefrontal cortex] that underpin higher cognitive-executive functions mature
slowly, showing functional changes that continue well into late adolescence/adulthood."); Fagan,
supra note 48, at 238-39 (summarizing recent research reporting that "functions and regions of the
brain regulating long-term planning, regulation of emotion, impulse control, and the evaluation of
risk and reward.., continue to mature over the course of adolescence, and perhaps beyond age
twenty and well into young adulthood").
204. PRINCIPLES OF NEURAL SCIENCE 9 (Eric R. Kandel et al. eds., 4th ed. 2000) (describing
specialized functions of lobes of the brain and reporting that "[t]he frontal lobe is largely concerned
with planning future action and with the control of movement"); Sowell et al., Mapping Continued
Brain Growth, supra note 201, at 8819 (mapping the distribution of cortical gray matter in post-
adolescents and reporting "an inverse relationship between cortical gray matter density reduction
and brain growth primarily in the superior frontal regions that control executive cognitive
functioning."); Frontline, Inside the Teenage Brain: Interview with Jay Giedd, at
http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/teenbrain/interviews/giedd.html (last visited Mar.
25, 2004) (excerpted in PBS television broadcast, 2002) ("The frontal lobe is often called the CEO,
or the executive of the brain. It's involved in things like planning and strategizing and organizing,
initiating attention and stopping and starting and shifting attention.").
205. See Sarah Spinks, Frontline, Inside the Teenage Brain: Adolescent Brains Are Works in
Progress, at http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/teenbrain/work/adolescent.html (last
visited Mar. 25, 2004) ("The prefrontal cortex sits just behind the forehead. It is particularly
interesting to scientists because it acts as the CEO of the brain, controlling planning, working
memory, organization, and modulating mood. As the prefrontal cortex matures, teenagers can
reason better, develop more control over impulses and make judgments better. In fact, this part of
the brain has been dubbed 'the area of sober second thought."').
206. See Dahl, supra note 150, at 60. According to Dr. Dahl, affect regulation relates to the
control of feelings and behavior and "involves some inhibition, delay, or intentional change of
emotional expression or behavior to conform with learned social rules, to meet long-term goals, or
to avoid future negative consequences." Id. A broad range of cognitive, behavioral, and social
changes occur during adolescence and facilitate affect regulation.
207. See, e.g., Sowell et al., Mapping Continued Brain Growth, supra note 201, at 8819-29.
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matter that is composed of neurons. 20 8 A neuron is the basic nerve cell.
Dendrites are branch-like protrusions from the neurons that receive
electrochemical impulses from other nerve cell. Axons are transmitters
to conduct electrochemical impulses from one neuron to the next.209 A
process of myelination occurs in which the myelin, a fatty white
substance, forms a sheath that surrounds and insulates the axons of
certain neurons, gives it a white appearance, and allows for more rapid
and efficient neurotransmission. 210  The brain transmits information
through electrochemical impulses and myelination functions like
insulation and enhances the speed of the electrochemical impulse.2 '
Although the human brain attains its adult weight by early
childhood, during the first two decades, it undergoes separate processes
of dendritic pruning or loss, and grey matter conversion into white
matter through myelination. "[C]ortical grey and cerebral white matter
volumes are quite dynamic throughout childhood," with a loss of grey
volume and a corresponding gain in white volume associated with
212age. 2 The neural connections or synapses that the brain uses are
208. See PRINCIPLES OF NEURAL SCIENCE, supra note 204, at 21-25 (describing the basic types
and functionality of neurons); Adolf Pfefferbaum et al., A Quantitative Magnetic Resonance
Imaging Study of Changes in Brain Morphology From Infancy to Late Adulthood, 51 ARCHIVES
NEUROLOGY 874, 874, 880 fig.3 (1994) (noting that total brain weight peaks at age 10 and that gray
matter volume grows rapidly during the first eighteen months, peaking around age four); Allan L.
Reiss et al., Brain Development, Gender and IQ in Children. A Volumetric Imaging Study, 119
BRAIN 1763, 1770 (1996) (finding that brain weight peaks between ages five and ten years and that
gray matter volume begins to decline as early as age five).
209. See PRINCIPLES OF NEURAL SCIENCE, supra note 204, at 21-25.
210. The organic changes in brain maturation and function during adolescence include a
density reduction in the gray matter and an increase in myelination and brain growth in the frontal
cortex. See NAT'L INST. OF MENTAL HEALTH, supra note 201, at 2 ("Unlike gray matter, the brain's
white matter-wire-like fibers that establish neurons' long-distance connections between brain
regions-thickens progressively from birth in humans. A layer of insulation called myelin
progressively envelops these nerve fibers, making them more efficient, just like insulation on
electric wires improves their conductivity."); Sowell et al., Mapping Continued Brain Growth,
supra note 201, at 8826 ("The strong correspondence in the age effects for gray matter density
reduction and increased brain growth in frontal cortex may provide new insight for making
inferences about the cellular processes contributing to postadolescent brain maturation. Regressive
(i.e., synaptic pruning) and progressive (i.e. myelination) cellular events are known to occur
simultaneously in the brain during childhood, adolescence, and young adulthood ... ").
211. See, e.g., PRINCIPLES OF NEURAL SCIENCE supra note 204, at 18-34; Paus et al., supra
note 201, at 1908 ("Structural maturation of individual brain regions and their connecting pathways
is a condition sine qua non for the successful development of cognitive, motor, and sensory
functions. The smooth flow of neural impulses throughout the brain allows for information to be
integrated across the many spatially segregated brain regions involved in these functions. The speed
of neural transmission depends not only on the synapse, but also on structural properties of the
connecting fibers, including the axon diameter and the thickness of the insulating myelin sheath.").
212. Reiss et al., supra note 208, at 1770, 1767 (1996) ("Age predicted a significant proportion
of the variance in the volumes of both total cortical grey matter and cerebral white matter."); see
2003]
HOFSTRA LAW REVIEW
retained, or etched for specific sensory, motor, and intellectual functions,
and those that are not exercised are shed and discarded or "pruned.,
213
During childhood and in early adolescence, the brain undergoes
simultaneous processes of "pruning" and myelination. 1 4 In early
childhood, the portions of the brain that receive sensory input-the
occipital and parietal lobes-myelinate initially to transmit sensory
information more efficiently to the temporal and frontal lobes.215 During
adolescence, the brain undergoes a second period of rapid "pruning"
accompanied by further myelination.216 The separate and distinct
processes of pruning and myelination are critical to proper brain
function because dendritic pruning affects cognitive functioning and
reasoning ability, while myelin insulation affects the rapidity and quality
of brain activity. 217  Because the process of myelination occurs
also Pfefferbaum et al., supra note 208, at 884 (describing "change in human cortical gray matter,
matter[and] cortical white matter... during the age range from 3 months to 70 years. Head size
increased to about age 10 years. Cortical gray matter volume peaked at age 4 years and then
decreased throughout the adult age-range sampled. Cortical white matter volume increased through
late adolescence (age 20 years) and remained stable thereafter.").
213. See Spear, supra note 149, at 438-39 ("Globally speaking, there is a massive loss of
synapses in neocortical brain regions during adolescence ... leading to an ultimate loss of almost
one-half of the average number of synapses per cortical neuron that was evident in the preadolescent
period.").
214. See NAT'L INST. OF MENTAL HEALTH, supra note 201, at 1; Jay N. Giedd et al., Brain
Development During Childhood and Adolescence. A Longitudinal MRI Study, 2 NATURE
NEUROSCIENCE 861 (1999) (confirming "linear .. . increases in white matter across ages 4 to
20," but finding, contrary to previous studies, "nonlinear changes in cortical gray matter.... Gray
matter in the frontal lobe increased during pre-adolescence with a maximum size occurring at 12.1
years for males and 11.0 years for females, followed by a decline during post-adolescence that
resulted in a net decrease in volume across this age span." (emphasis added)); Pfefferbaum et al.,
supra note 208, at 880 fig.3, 885 ("[A]ge-related changes in the gray-white matter ratio suggested
that the growth [rate] in white matter exceeded that of gray matter during the first 5 years, followed
by a decline in gray matter volume accompanied by continued growth in white matter until about
age 20 years, when white matter volume leveled off."); Spear, supra note 149, at 439 ("[P]runing is
an example of developmental plasticity whereby the brain is ontogenetically sculpted on the basis of
experience to effectively accommodate environmental needs. .... [A]long with this developmental
loss in synapses is an increase in focal activation of the brain, with less widespread activation of
brain function during task performance as development proceeds through childhood and
adolescence.").
215. See PRINCIPLES OF NEURAL SCIENCE supra note 204, at 349-66 (describing location and
functional specialization of sensory, motor, and cognitive capabilities in the brain); Giedd et al.,
supra note 214, at 862 (reporting that "changes in primary visual and auditory cortex occur[] before
those in frontal cortex").
216. See NAT'L INST. OF MENTAL HEALTH, supra note 201, at 1.
217. See PRINCIPLES OF NEURAL SCIENCE supra note 204, at 147-48 (describing role of
myelination of axons in speeding conduction velocity and noting that "conduction in myelinated
axons is typically faster than in nomyelinated axons of the same diameter"); Paus et al., supra note
201, at 1908 ("[S]peed of neural transmission depends.., on structural properties of the connecting
fibers, including ... the thickness of the insulating myelin sheath."); Sowell et al., Mapping
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approximately from the back of the brain to the front, the shift from gray
matter to white matter in the frontal cortex and the corresponding
abilities to process information quickly, to control behavior, and to
suppress impulses develop more slowly, and maturation is completed
only in the late teens and early twenties.21 8 As a result, the portions of
the adolescent brain that mediate sensory input and language functions
mature earlier than the portions in the frontal lobe governing "executive
functioning" capacities.219
The part of the brain called the amygdala-the lymbic system
located at the base of the brain-is responsible for instinctual or "gut
reactions" such as "fight or flight., 220 Functional magnetic resonance
Continued Brain Growth, supra note 201, at 8828 ("[I]t is likely that the visuospatial functions
typically associated with parietal lobes are operating at a more mature level earlier than the
executive functions typically associated with frontal brain regions. The new findings described here
may suggest that cortical thinning or reduction in gray matter density is first accompanied by
growth (as seen in the frontal lobes in the postadolescent years) and later by brain shrinkage as the
regressive changes overtake the progressive changes (as seen earlier on in the parietal lobes).
Perhaps gray matter density reduction associated with growth (presumably increased myelination) is
associated with different aspects of improved cognitive functioning than the cortical thinning
associated with brain surface contraction (presumably synaptic pruning). It may not be unreasonable
to hypothesize that improved accuracy (i.e., improved cognitive task performance) may result from
regressive changes such as synaptic pruning, given that unused or less efficient synaptic connections
are being pruned away during this age range. On the other hand, increased efficiency (i.e., reduced
reaction times) might result from increased myelination observed as brain growth, given that
myelinated fibers improve the conduction speed of electrical impulses between various brain
regions." (citation omitted)).
218. See NAT'L INST. OF MENTAL HEALTH, supra note 201, at 2 (MRI image analyses of brain
development "suggest[] a wave of brain white matter development that flows from front to back,
[while] animal, functional brain imaging and postmortem studies have suggested that gray matter
maturation flows in the opposite direction, with the frontal lobes not fully maturing until young
adulthood"); Pfefferbaum et al., supra note 208, at 884-85 (reporting steady rise in myelination
from birth to about twenty years of age); Sowell et al., In Vivo Evidence, supra note 201, at 859
("Post-mortem studies show that myelination, a cellular maturational event, begins near the end of
the second trimester of fetal development and extends well into the third decade of life and beyond.
Such autopsy studies reveal a temporally and spatially systematic sequence of myelination,
progressing from inferior to superior and from posterior to anterior; that is brain stem and cerebellar
regions myelinate before cerebral hemispheres, and frontal lobes myelinate last." (references
omitted)).
219. See Sowell et al., Mapping Continued Brain Growth, supra note 201, at 8819
("Maturation, particularly in the frontal lobes, has been shown to correlate with measures of
cognitive functioning.").
220. See, e.g., PRINCIPLES OF NEURAL SCIENCE supra note 204, at 986-93 (describing role of
amygdala in mediating between emotions and cognition); Dr. David Fassler testified before the
Nevada State Judiciary Committee prior to the Nevada Assembly's 36-6 vote to ban execution of
youths under eighteen years of age. See Mark Moran, Adolescent Brain Development Argues
Against Teen Executions, PSYCHIATRIC NEWS, May 16, 2003, at 8, available at
http://pn.psychiatryonline.org/cgi/content/full/38/10/8.
"It's important to understand that the primitive, or instinctual, part of the brain
develops first, followed by the parts of the brain that control reasoning and that help us
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imaging reveals that teenagers rely more heavily than adults on the
amygdala and less heavily on the prefrontal cortex when responding to
stressful stimuli.221 Thus, adolescent reactions to fear-evoking stimuli
appear to be more instinctual responses rather than the product of
cognitive processes. 222 One recent study of MRI imaging of adolescent
brains reported that
[i]n regions of frontal cortex, we observed reduction in gray matter
between adolescence and adulthood, probably reflecting increased
myelination in peripheral regions of the cortex that may improve
cognitive processing in adulthood.... Neuropsychological studies
show that the frontal lobes are essential for such functions as response
inhibition, emotional regulation, planning and organization. Many of
these aptitudes continue to develop between adolescence and young
adulthood.... Thus, observed regional patterns of static versus plastic
maturational changes between adolescence and adulthood are
consistent with cognitive development.
223
think before we act," Fassler told the panel members. "In terms of actual brain anatomy,
we're talking about the amygdala, which is a more primitive part of the brain,
responsible for gut reactions, including fear and aggressive behaviors, versus areas like
the frontal cortex, which develops later and helps us control our emotions and modify our
actions and responses."
He cited research using functional magnetic resonance imaging demonstrating that
teens use their brains differently from adults when reasoning or solving problems. "For
example, they tend to rely more on these instinctual structures, like the amygdala, and
less on the more advanced areas, like the frontal lobes, which are associated with more
goal-oriented and rational thinking."
Id.
221. See NAT'L INST. OF MENTAL HEALTH, supra note 201, at 2 (noting that processing of
emotions shifted from the amygdala to the frontal lobe over the course of the teenage years and that
"areas of the frontal lobe showed the largest differences between young adults and teens. This
increased myelination in the adult frontal cortex likely relates to the maturation of cognitive
processing and other 'executive' functions."); cf Abigail A. Baird, M.A. et al., Functional Magnetic
Resonance Imaging of Facial Affect Recognition in Children and Adolescents, 38 J. AM. ACAD.
CHILD & ADOLESCENT PSYCHIATRY 195, 198 (1999) ("[D]evelopmental perturbation of the
amygdala and its connections can result in profound behavioral disturbances. These disturbances are
not as pronounced when damage occurs during adulthood. Adults who have lesions of the amygdala
suffer from various affect recognition deficits, but they do not manifest the myriad of social and
emotional disturbances consistent with limbic developmental abnormalities." (citations omitted)).
222. See Arredondo, supra note 195, at 15 ("Adolescents tend to process emotionally charged
decisions in the limbic system, the part of the brain charged with instinctive (and often impulsive)
reactions. Most adults use more of their frontal cortex, the part of the brain responsible for reasoned
and thoughtful responses. This is one reason why adolescents tend to be more intensely emotional,
impulsive, and wiling to take risks than their adult counterparts." (footnote omitted)); Dahl, supra
note 150, at 67 ("[T]here may be a gradual shift toward a stronger dorsolateral-prefrontal cortex
influence on AR [affect regulation] skills across adolescent development, which fits a more
traditional concept of 'cognitive' processes.").
223. Sowell et al., In Vivo Evidence, supra note 201, at 860 (reference omitted).
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Many adolescents' decisions about risky behavior appear to be more a
function of "gut reactions" than of conscious thought processes. 224 Just
as organic features produce the developmental characteristics of
mentally retarded defendants, similarly, the behaviors of adolescents
225may have a significant neurobiological component.
Although this section focuses primarily on deserved punishment
and adolescents' reduced culpability, the Supreme Court in Atkins and
Thompson noted that mentally retarded and younger offenders also were
less susceptible than rational adult actors to the deterrent threat of capital
punishment.226 Whether substantive changes in criminal law doctrines or
liability produce any deterrent effect on criminal behavior remains
controverted.227 However, all of the developmental characteristics that
render adolescent offenders less culpable-impaired judgment and
reasoning, limited impulse control, and susceptibility to peer
influences-also reduce the likelihood that the threat of execution or
draconian sentences will have any appreciable deterrent effect on
younger offenders decisions to commit crimes.228
224. See Dahl, supra note 150, at 64 ("These affective influences are relevant ... to many day-
to-day 'decisions' that are made at the level of gut feelings about what to do in a particular situation
(rather than any conscious computation of probabilities and risk value). These gut feelings appear to
be the products of affective systems in the brain that are performing computations that are largely
outside conscious awareness (except for the feelings they evoke).").
225. See Spear, supra note 149, at 447 ("To the extent that transformations occurring in
adolescent brain contribute to the characteristic behavioral predispositions of adolescence,
adolescent behavior is in part biologically determined.").
226. See supra notes 40, 78; see also Enmund v. Florida, 458 U.S. 782 (1982) (finding that
death sentence for felony-murder would not serve as a deterrent where person sentenced to death
neither killed nor intended to kill victim).
227. See, e.g., Paul H. Robinson & John M. Darley, The Role of Deterrence in the Formulation
of Criminal Law Rules: At Its Worst When Doing Its Best, 91 GEO. L.J. 949, 951 (2003) ("[T]here is
growing evidence to suggest skepticism about the criminal law's deterrent effect-that is,
skepticism about the ability to deter crime through the manipulation of criminal law rules and
penalties. The general existence of the system may well deter prohibited conduct, but the
formulation of criminal law rules within the system, according to a deterrence-optimizing analysis,
may have a limited effect or even no effect beyond what the system's broad deterrent warning has
already achieved. We suggest that, while it may be true that manipulation of criminal law rules can
influence behavior, it does so only under conditions not typically found in the criminal justice
systems of modem societies.").
228. See BARRY C. FELD, BAD KIDS: RACE AND THE TRANSFORMATION OF THE JUVENILE
COURT 229-30 (1999) (summarizing research evaluating whether increased certainty and
predictability of waiver laws had a deterrent effect on youths committing serious crimes). While
states exclude serious offenses from juvenile court jurisdiction in order to increase the certainty and
severity of criminal sanctions, several evaluation studies report no appreciable deterrent effect of
such legislative changes. For example, after New York excluded juveniles thirteen years of age or
older charged with murder, and juveniles fourteen years of age or older charged with kidnapping,
arson, and rape, N.Y. PENAL LAW § 30.00(2) (McKinney 1998 & Supp. 2004) (enacted 1978), an
evaluation of the impact of the law found no systematic decrease in juvenile arrests for the excluded
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B. Atkins, Adolescents, and Adjudicative Competence
In addition to their reduced culpability, the Supreme Court in Atkins
noted that the developmental disabilities of defendants with mental
retardation also reduced their competence to stand trial and adversely
affected the fairness and reliability of criminal proceedings. 229 As states
transfer more and younger offenders for adult prosecution, criminal
courts increasingly encounter more youths whose immaturity and
developmental limitations also pose difficult questions about their
adjudicative competence.
In reaction to significant increases in the juvenile arrest rates for
violent crimes in the late 1980s and early 1990s, virtually every state
revised its transfer laws to prosecute more juveniles in criminal court.23°
Changes in waiver statutes use offense criteria either as guidelines to
control and limit judicial discretion, to guide prosecutorial charging
decisions, or automatically to exclude serious offenses from juvenile
court jurisdiction. Changes in waiver laws reflect a cultural and legal
reconceptualization of youths from innocent and dependent children to
responsible, adult-like offenders, and criminal sentencing laws typically
offenses. See Simon I. Singer & David McDowall, Criminalizing Delinquency: The Deterrent
Effects of the New York Juvenile Offender Law, 22 LAW & SoC'Y REv. 521,529-32 (1988). Another
quasi-experiment compared juvenile arrest rates in Idaho with those in Montana and Wyoming
before and after Idaho excluded youths fourteen year or older and charged with murder, rape and
robbery from juvenile court jurisdiction. See Eric L. Jensen & Linda K. Metsger, A Test of the
Deterrent Effect of Legislative Waiver on Violent Juvenile Crime, 40 CRIME & DELINQ. 96, 99
(1994). It found that violent juvenile crimes actually increased in Idaho and decreased in the
comparison states following the changes. See id. at 100-01. The study concluded that "the
movement away from the traditional juvenile court model to the more punitive criminal justice
system did not deter youth from committing violent crimes." Id. at 102.
229. See supra note 43 and accompanying text.
230. See TORBET ET AL., supra note 92, at 1, 6 fig.4; Barry C. Feld, Juvenile and Criminal
Justice Systems' Responses to Youth Violence, in YOUTH VIOLENCE 189, 195-98, 205-06 (Michael
Tonry & Mark H. Moore eds., 1998) [hereinafter Feld, Responses to Youth Violence]; Barry C. Feld,
Race, Politics, and Juvenile Justice: The Warren Court and the Conservative "Backlash," 87 MINN.
L. REV. 1447, 1562-63 (2003). These changes have a clearly disproportionate affect on minority
youth. See Feld, Violent Youth and Public Policy, supra note 92, at 977-78 & nn.44-46.
231. See PANEL ON JUVENILE CRIME: PREVENTION, TREATMENT, & CONTROL, NAT'L
RESEARCH COUNCIL & INST. OF MED., JUVENILE CRIME, JUVENILE JUSTICE 206-09 (Joan McCord
et al. eds., 2001), available at http://www.nap.edu/books/0309068428/html/; TORBET ET AL., supra
note 92, at 3; Feld, Responses to Youth Violence, supra note 230, at 196-97; Jolanta Juszkiewicz,
Youth Crime/Adult Time: Is Justice Served?, BUILDING BLOCKS FOR YOUTH, Oct. 26, 2000, at 30-31
& fig.10, at http://www.buildingblocksforyouth.org/ycat/ycat.html (reporting that in a multi-
jurisdiction study of juveniles tried as adults in eighteen large urban counties, prosecutors
transferred forty-five percent, legislative exclusion accounted for an additional forty percent, and
judges transferred only fifteen percent of youths); David S. Tanenhaus & Steven A. Drizin, "Owing
to the Extreme Youth of the Accused": The Changing Legal Response to Juvenile Homicide, 92 J.
CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 641, 665-66 (2003).
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provide no formal recognition of youthfulness once states transfer a
juvenile to criminal court.232 When states try youths as adults, criminal
court judges sentence them as if they are adults, imposing the same
length sentences, sending them to the same prisons, and executing them
for the crimes they committed as children.
233
Waiver reforms that lower the age of transfer eligibility to fourteen
years of age or even younger present criminal courts with many youths
whose developmental immaturity, rather than-or in addition to-
mental illness, presents significant issues of adjudicative competence as
well as diminished responsibility.234 The influx of more young juveniles
into criminal courts raises questions about their ability to understand the
trial process and to make critical legal decisions.235
Adjudicative competence refers to a person's ability to understand
the nature and consequences of legal proceedings, to make decisions,
and to assist counsel.236 A defendant must be able to understand the
232. For in-depth discussions of these effects of the modem changes in waiver laws, see FELD,
supra note 228; Barry C. Feld, The Transformation of the Juvenile Court-Part 11: Race and the
"Crack Down" on Youth Crime, 84 MINN. L. REV. 327 (1999); and Feld, supra note 2.
233. See Feld, Responses to Youth Violence, supra note 225, at 212-13; Ellie D. Shefi, Note,
Waiving Goodbye: Incarcerating Waived Juveniles in Adult Correctional Facilities Will Not Reduce
Crime, 36 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 653, 663-68 (2003) (summarizing the impact of changes in waiver
policies on juveniles incarcerated in adult prisons); Tanenhaus & Drizin, supra note 23 1, at 643
("[l]n 1998 nearly 200,000 children under eighteen were tried as adults; some 18,000 children were
housed in adult prisons, 3500 of whom shared living spaces with adults.").
234. See PATRICK GRIFFIN ET AL., OFFICE OF JUVENILE JUSTICE & DELINQUENCY
PREVENTION, UNITED STATES DEP'T OF JUSTICE, TRYING JUVENILES AS ADULTS: AN ANALYSIS OF
STATE TRANSFER PROVISIONS 14-15 (1998), available at http://www.ncjrs.org/pdffiles/172836.pdf
(reporting that 23 states have at least one provision to transfer a juvenile to criminal court with no
minimum age specified); Feld, Legislative Exclusion, supra note 92, at 91-101 (describing changes
in waiver laws that transfer more and younger juveniles to criminal court without either judicial
hearing or assessment of competence); Thomas Grisso, Juveniles' Competence to Stand Trial: New
Questions for an Era of Punitive Juvenile Justice Reform, in MORE THAN MEETS THE EYE:
RETHINKING ASSESSMENT, COMPETENCY AND SENTENCING FOR A HARSHER ERA OF JUVENILE
JUSTICE 23, 28-33 (Patricia Puritz et al. eds., 1997), available at
http://www.abanet.org/crimjust/juvjus/mtmtefull.pdf [hereinafter Grisso, New Questions]
(discussing ways in which young adolescents are limited in their ability to understand the trial
process, assist counsel, and make decisions regarding their own defense); Thomas Grisso, The
Competence ofAdolescents as Trial Defendants, 3 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL'Y & L. 3, 6-7 (1997).
235. See Bonnie & Grisso, supra note 133, at 73; Grisso et al., supra note 154, at 358 ("The
issue that [this] study addresses-the relationship between immaturity and competence to stand
trial-has been largely unnoticed (at least in policy circles) during the last decade or so, as
legislatures around the country have moved to facilitate the adjudication of younger and younger
offenders in adult criminal court."); Richard E. Redding & Linda E. Frost, Adjudicative Competence
in the Modern Juvenile Court, 9 VA. J. SOC. POL'Y & L. 353, 374-78 (2001).
236. See Drope v. Missouri, 420 U.S. 162, 171 (1975) ("It has long been accepted that a person
whose mental condition is such that he lacks the capacity to understand the nature and object of the
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purpose of the trial process, to provide information to and process
information from counsel, to reason appropriately, and realistically to
apply that information to the legal situation she confronts.237
Competence is necessary to assure the legitimacy of the criminal
process, to reduce the risk of erroneous convictions, and to protect the
dignity and autonomy of the defendant.238 Because criminal courts
employ a low standard of competence and threshold for criminal
liability, recognizing the diminished responsibility of youth as grounds
for mitigation of punishment becomes even more imperative. 9
Typically, defendants' mental illness or developmental disability
provides reasons to question their competence to stand trial and their
ability to understand proceedings and to assist counsel. 240 However,
developmental immaturity also may render juveniles incompetent to
stand trial.241 Juveniles' questionable competence does not derive
proceedings against him, to consult with counsel, and to assist in preparing his defense may not be
subjected to a trial.").
237. See Grisso et al., supra note 154, at 335 (noting that adjudicative competence entails "a
basic comprehension of the purpose and nature of the trial process (Understanding), the capacity to
provide relevant information to counsel and to process information (Reasoning), and the ability to
apply information to one's own situation in a manner that is neither distorted nor irrational
(Appreciation)").
238. See Bonnie & Grisso, supra note 133, at 76 ("The dignity of the criminal process is
undermined if the defendant lacks a basic moral understanding of the nature and purpose of the
proceedings against him or her. The accuracy or reliability of the adjudication is threatened if the
defendant is unable to assist in the development and presentation of a defense. Finally, to the extent
that decisions about the course of adjudication must be made personally by the defendant, he or she
must have the abilities needed to exercise decision-making autonomy.").
239. See, e.g., Zimring, supra note 1, at 274.
240. See Dusky v. United States, 362 U.S. 402, 402 (1960) (per curium opinion) (requiring a
defendant to possess "sufficient present ability to consult with his lawyer with a reasonable degree
of rational understanding" and a "rational as well as factual understanding of proceedings against
him" to be competent to stand trial (internal quotation marks omitted)).
241. See, e.g., Thomas Grisso, Juvenile Competency to Stand Trial: Questions in an Era of
Punitive Reform, CRIM. JUST., Fall 1997, at 4, 7-9 (questioning youths' ability to understand trial
process, to assist counsel, and to make strategic legal decision); Grisso et al., supra note 154, at 356;
Redding & Frost, supra note 235, at 397. About half the states address juveniles' competency to
stand trial as delinquents, and statutes and case law conclude that they have a fundamental right not
to be tried while incompetent. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. § 985.223 (West 2001) (incompetency in
juvenile delinquency cases); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 38-1637 (2000) (proceedings to determine
competency in delinquency proceedings); In re Charles B., 978 P.2d 659, 660 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1998)
("Although the Juvenile... has no mental disorder or disability, he fits the description of
'incompetent' ... because he lacks a present ability to consult with his attorney with a reasonable
degree of rational understanding, and he does not have a rational and factual understanding of the
proceeding against him."); Golden v. State, 21 S.W.3d 801, 803 & n.2 (Ark. 2000) (holding that a
juvenile has a due process right to a competency determination prior to adjudication and that such
evaluation consists of an "'age appropriate' capacity standard to apply to juveniles, which is
different from adults"); In re S.H., 469 S.E.2d 810, 811 (Ga. Ct. App. 1996) (providing juveniles
with procedural rights in delinquency proceedings would be meaningless if defendant was not
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necessarily from mental illness or disability, but rather from generic
developmental limitations which affect their ability to communicate, to
reason and understand, and to exercise judgment and make sound
decisions. Although a relaxed standard of competence may be
appropriate for delinquents tried in juvenile court, youths tried in
criminal court must demonstrate an adult standard of competence.
242
While competence focuses primarily on the ability to understand
and reason, youths' immaturity of judgment also affects their decision-
making capability. Research evaluating adolescents' and young adults'
competence to participate in their trials found significant differences in
understanding and judgment.243 Most youths younger than thirteen or
fourteen years of age lacked even basic competence either to understand
or to meaningfully participate in their defense.244 Many youths younger
than sixteen years of age lacked competence either to stand trial as adults
or to make legal decisions without the assistance of counsel, and many
older youths exhibited substantial impairment.245 Moreover, youths'
limited time-perspective, emphasis on short-term versus long-term
consequences, and concerns about peer approval cause them to make
immature decisions relative to those of adults.246 One recent study
reported that:
[A]pproximately one fifth of 14- to 15-year-olds are as impaired in
capacities relevant to adjudicative competence as are seriously
mentally ill adults who would likely be considered incompetent to
capable of exercising them); In re J.M., 769 A.2d 656, 662 (Vt. 2001) (holding that the "evaluations
of a particular juvenile's competency are to be made with regard to juvenile [developmental]
norms").
242. See Grisso et al., supra note 154, at 359-61 ("Most children and adolescents who are
found incompetent to proceed in criminal court because of immaturity could likely be adjudicated in
a juvenile delinquency proceeding under a more relaxed competence standard.").
243. See id. at 343-46; Redding & Frost, supra note 235, at 374-78 (summarizing research on
adjudicative competence of adolescents and reporting that younger age, lower IQ, and mental illness
combine to detract from juveniles ability to understand proceedings and to assist counsel).
244. See Bonnie & Grisso, supra note 133, at 87-88 ("Some youths, especially those who are
nearer to the minimum age for waiver to criminal court, may have significant deficits in
competence-related abilities due not to mental disorder but to developmental immaturity....
Formalistic, disorder-oriented application of current standards, therefore, may result in unfair
jeopardy for youths whose developmental incapacities impair their ability to participate in their
defense."); Vance L. Cowden & Geoffrey R. McKee, Competency to Stand Trial in Juvenile
Delinquency Proceedings-Cognitive Maturity and the Attorney-Client Relationship, 33 U.
LoUISVILLE J. FAM. L. 629, 652-53 (1995) (reporting that majority of juveniles younger than
fourteen failed to meet adult standard of competence); Grisso et al., supra note 154, at 344 ("30 %
of II- to 13-year-olds, and 19 % of 14- to 15-year-olds, were significantly impaired on one or both
of these subscales [measuring understanding and reasoning].").
245. See Grisso et al., supra note 154, at 356; Scott & Grisso, supra note 142, at 170-71.
246. See Bonnie & Grisso, supra note 133, at 91.
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stand trial by clinicians who perform evaluations for courts.... Not
surprisingly, juveniles of below-average intelligence are more likely
than juveniles of average intelligence to be impaired in abilities
relevant for competence to stand trial. Because a greater proportion of
youths in the juvenile justice system than in the community are of
below-average intelligence, the risk for incompetence to stand trial is
therefore even greater.
247
Atkins noted that the disabilities of mentally retarded defendants
adversely affected their competence to stand trial, reduced the assistance
they could provide to their lawyers, and impaired their demeanor and
effectiveness as witnesses.248 Atkins also found that mental retardation
exposed such defendants to the dangers of erroneous convictions
because of their greater susceptibility to interrogation techniques and the
concomitant dangers of false confessions.249 The same concerns about
the dangers of erroneous convictions exist with respect to the
competence of adolescents. 50 Juveniles' diminished understanding of
rights, confusion about trial processes, limited language skills, and
inadequate decision-making abilities increase their vulnerability to
interrogation tactics and their likelihood of giving false confessions.2 1'
247. Grisso et al., supra note 154, at 356.
248. See supra notes 33-35, 43-52 and accompanying text.
249. See Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 320-21 (2002); see also Morgan Cloud et al., Words
Without Meaning: The Constitution, Confessions, and Mentally Retarded Suspects, 69 U. CHI. L.
REV. 495, 580 fig.20 (2002) (finding that ninety-six percent of mentally retarded subjects
completely failed to understand at least one aspect of the Miranda warnings).
250. Atkins emphasized the inability of defendants with mental retardation to assist their
attorneys or to present a favorable demeanor to jurors. See Atkins, 536 U.S. at 320-21. Adolescents
too have a pronounced disability to assist in their own defense. See Bonnie & Grisso, supra note
133, at 91-92; Grisso, New Questions, supra note 234, at 30-31 ("[O]ne study asked detained
juveniles why defendants must be truthful with their lawyers. About one-third of them (compared to
about 10 % of adult offenders) believed that this was necessary so that the lawyer could decide
whether to advocate the defendant's interests, to report the defendant's guilt to the court, or to
decide whether to "let him go or send him up."); Grisso, supra note 152, at 141 (arguing that quite
apart from adjudicative competence, the effectiveness of a juvenile's ability to participate may
affect trial outcomes by "the impression that the defendant's lack of attentiveness to the trial process
might have on the judge or jury."); Ann Tobey et al., Youths' Trial Participation as Seen by Youths
and Their Attorneys: An Exploration of Competence-Based Issues, in YOUTH ON TRIAL: A
DEVELOPMENTAL PERSPECTIVE ON JUVENILE JUSTICE 225, 231-34 (Thomas Grisso & Robert G.
Schwartz eds., 2000) (arguing that juveniles are less effective as clients than adults due to
differences in understanding, memory, attention and motivation).
251. See Saul M. Kassin & Katherine L. Keichel, The Social Psychology of False Confessions:
Compliance, Internalization, and Confabulation, 7 PSYCHOL. SCI. 125, 125 (1996) (noting that there
is considerable evidence that "youth, [low] intelligence, personality, stress, [and] mental state" are
all factors that can make a defendant vulnerable not only to giving a false confession but also to
believing his own false confession); Lisa M. Krzewinski, But I Didn't Do It: Protecting the Rights
of Juveniles During Interrogation, 22 B.C. THIRD WORLD L.J. 355, 356 (2002) (questioning
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Juveniles are less able than adults to exercise their Miranda rights and
exhibit a significant tendency to comply with authority, such as by
confessing to police. 2
When the Supreme Court in In re Gault applied the privilege
against self incrimination to delinquency proceedings, 53 the "warning"
safeguards developed in Miranda v. Arizona254 became available to
juveniles. Courts evaluate juveniles' waivers of Fifth Amendment rights
and the voluntariness of any confessions by assessing whether the they
made a "knowing, intelligent, and voluntary" waiver under the "totality
of the circumstances. 255 Even before Miranda and Gault, the Supreme
Court had cautioned trial judges to closely scrutinize the impact of
youthfulness and inexperience on the validity of waivers and the
voluntariness and reliability of confessions.256 However, the Court in
juveniles' capacity to understand privilege against self-incrimination or to voluntarily give reliable
statements).
252. See Grisso et al., supra note 154, at 353, 356.
253. See 387 U.S. 1, 42-57 (1967). See generally Barry C. Feld, Criminalizing Juvenile
Justice: Rules of Procedure for the Juvenile Court, 69 MINN. L. REV. 141, 153-57 (1984)
[hereinafter Feld, Criminalizing Juvenile Justice] (analyzing Supreme Court's rationale to
incorporate constitutional privilege against self-incrimination in state delinquency proceedings);
Barry C. Feld, Juveniles' Waiver of Legal Rights: Confessions, Miranda, and the Right to Counsel
in YOUTH ON TRIAL: A DEVELOPMENTAL PERSPECTIVE ON JUVENILE JUSTICE 105, 111-20 (Thomas
Grisso & Robert G. Schwartz eds., 2000) (analyzing inadequacy of Miranda framework to
safeguards juveniles' ability to exercise privilege against self-incrimination).
254. 384 U.S. 436 (1966). Although the Supreme Court has never explicitly held that Miranda
applies to juvenile proceedings, the Court, in Fare v. Michael C., 442 U.S. 707, 717 n.4 (1979),
"assume[d] without deciding that the Miranda principles were fully applicable to the present
[juvenile] proceeding." For further discussion of the applicability of Miranda to juvenile
proceedings, see, for example, Larry E. Holtz, Miranda in a Juvenile Setting. A Child's Right to
Silence, 78 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 534 (1987).
255. See Feld, Criminalizing Juvenile Justice, supra note 253, at 169-90; see also Fare, 442
U.S. at 725.
256. In Haley v. Ohio, 332 U.S. 596 (1948), police interrogated a fifteen-year-old "lad" in
relays beginning shortly after midnight, denied him access to counsel, and confronted him with
confessions by co-defendants until he finally confessed at five o'clock a.m. The Supreme Court
reversed his conviction and ruled that a confession obtained under these circumstances was
involuntary:
What transpired would make us pause for careful inquiry if a mature man were
involved. And when, as here, a mere child-an easy victim of the law-is before us,
special care in scrutinizing the record must be used. Age 15 is a tender and difficult age
for a boy .... He cannot be judged by the more exacting standards of maturity. That
which would leave a man cold and unimpressed can overawe and overwhelm a lad in his
early teens. This is the period of great instability which the crisis of adolescence
produces.... [W]e cannot believe that a lad of tender years is a match for the police in
such a contest. He needs counsel and support if he is not to become the victim first of
fear, then of panic.
Id. at 599-601.
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Fare v. Michael C. retreated from its earlier concern that youthfulness
might increase suggestibility and vulnerability to coercion2 57 and
endorsed the adult "totality of the circumstances" test as the standard by
which to evaluate the admissibility of juvenile confessions.25 8 The
"totality" approach provides trial judges with discretion to protect youths
who lack capacity or who succumb to police coercion without unduly
limiting police ability to interrogate juveniles. 259
In Gallegos v. Colorado, 370 U.S. 49 (1962), the Court reiterated that the age of the
accused constituted a special circumstance that affects the voluntariness of confessions and re-
emphasized the vulnerability of youth:
[A] 14-year-old boy, no matter how sophisticated,.., is not equal to the police in
knowledge and understanding ... and ... is unable to know how to protect his own
interests or how to get the benefits of his constitutional rights....
... A lawyer or an adult relative or friend could have given the petitioner the
protection which his own immaturity could not.... Without some adult protection
against this inequality, a 14-year-old boy would not be able to know, let alone assert,
such constitutional rights as he had.
Id. at 54.
The Court in In re Gault repeated that "admissions and confessions of juveniles require
special caution." 387 U.S. at 45. Thus, the Court long had recognized that youths are not the equals
of adults in the interrogation room and that they require greater procedural safeguards than adults,
such as the presence of counsel, to compensate for their vulnerability and susceptibility to coercive
influences.
257. See Fare, 442 U.S. at 726-28 (finding a "knowing, intelligent and voluntary" waiver of
Miranda rights by a sixteen-year-old offender with several prior arrests who had "served time" in a
youth camp).
258. See id. at 718-24. Fare held that a youth's request to speak with his probation officer
when police interrogated him constituted neither a per se invocation of his Miranda privilege
against self-incrimination nor the functional equivalent of a request for counsel which would have
required further questioning to cease. See id at 722. Earlier, the California Supreme Court had held
in People v. Burton that when a child who is in custody and who is interrogated without the
presence of counsel requests to see one of his or her parents, then further questioning must cease.
See 491 P.2d 793, 798 (Cal. 1971). In In re Michael C., 579 P.2d 7 (Cal. 1978), rev'd sub noma. Fare
v. Michael C., 442 U.S. 707 (1979), the California Supreme Court extended Burton's "parental
request" rule to a youth's request to consult with his probation officer. See id at 11. The Supreme
Court in Fare rejected this position and distinguished the role of counsel from that of probation
officers in the Miranda process.
259. The Fare Court concluded that there were
no persuasive reasons why any other approach is required where the question is whether
a juvenile has waived his rights, as opposed to whether an adult has done so. The totality
approach permits-indeed, it mandates-inquiry into all the circumstances surrounding
the interrogation. This includes evaluation of the juvenile's age, experience, education,
background, and intelligence, and into whether he has the capacity to understand the
warnings given him, the nature of his Fifth Amendment rights, and the consequences of
waiving those rights.
442 U.S. at 725.
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Fare declined to give children greater procedural protection than
adults.26° Instead, the Court insisted that children must invoke their legal
rights with adult-like technical precision and denied that young people
lacked the ability to exercise or validly waive their rights.261 The Court
260. See id.; see also Feld, Criminalizing Juvenile Justice, supra note 253, at 171 & n.100
(criticizing Fare); Francis Barry McCarthy, Pre-Adjudicatory Rights in Juvenile Court: An
Historical and Constitutional Analysis, 42 U. PITT. L. REV. 457, 492 (1981) ("The Supreme Court's
decisions in delinquency cases [through Fare] indicate that an application of the rules with respect to
the interrogation of adults is not to be mechanically carried over to the interrogation ofjuveniles.");
Irene Merker Rosenberg, The Constitutional Rights of Children Charged with Crime: Proposal for
a Return to the Not So Distant Past, 27 UCLA L. REV. 656, 694 (1980) (arguing that when, "as in
[Fare],... the Court purports to interpret the content of a right uniformly for children and adults, it
may in fact grant juveniles far less than their adult counterparts.").
261. See Fare, 442 U.S. at 722-24. Most states that follow Fare use the adult "totality of the
circumstances" test, and allow juveniles to waive Miranda rights and other constitutional rights. See
Kimberly Larson, Note, Improving the "'Kangaroo Courts ": A Proposal for Reform in Evaluating
Juveniles' Waiver of Miranda, 48 VILL. L. REV. 629, 645-46 & n.91 (2003) (summarizing majority
of states' use of "totality of circumstances" test and factors they consider); see also, e.g., Quick v.
State, 599 P.2d 712, 719-20 (Alaska 1979) (holding that juvenile may waive Miranda rights without
consulting parent or other adult); Carter v. State, 697 So. 2d 529, 532-33 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1997)
(affirming "totality" approach and upholding trial court exclusion of "Grisso Test" used to measure
juvenile's ability to comprehend Miranda warnings); Dutil v. State, 606 P.2d 269, 271-72 (Wash.
1980) (declining to adopt per se rule requiring presence of parent, guardian or counsel).
Judges focus on characteristics of the juvenile, such as age, education, and IQ, and on
circumstances surrounding the interrogation, such as methods and length of the questioning, when
determining the voluntariness of a juvenile's waiver. See, e.g., West v. United States, 399 F.2d 467,
469 (5th Cir. 1968); Lara, 432 P.2d at 217-18. Several leading cases provide extensive lists of
factors for trial judges to consider when assessing the validity of juveniles' waiver decisions-age,
education, physical condition, presence of or opportunity to consult with parent or other adult,
length of interrogation, method of interrogation, knowledge of the charges, subsequent repudiation
of the statement, understanding of the warnings given, warning of possible transfer to criminal
court, and the like. See, e.g., Fare, 442 U.S. at 725; Riley v. State, 226 S.E.2d 922, 926 (Ga. 1976);
State v. Benoit, 490 A.2d 295, 301-02 (N.H. 1985).
While appellate courts identify factors that bear on the validity of a juvenile's waiver of
Miranda rights, they do not assign controlling weight to any particular element and instead rely on
the discretion of the trial court. When judges apply the "totality" test, they exclude only the most
egregiously obtained confessions and then only on a haphazard basis. See Feld, Criminalizing
Juvenile Justice, supra note 253, at 176 & nn.120-21; see also, e.g., In re W.C., 657 N.E.2d 908,
913 (I1. 1995) (upholding validity of waiver by thirteen-year-old who was "illiterate and
moderately mentally retarded with an IQ of 48, ... the equivalent developmentally of a six- to
eight-year-old[,]... possessing the emotional maturity of a six- to seven-year-old"); Wallace J.
Mlyniec, A Judge's Ethical Dilemma: Assessing a Child's Capacity to Choose, 64 FORDHAM L.
REV. 1873, 1902 (1996) (noting that "[p]olice seldom do more ... than [get] the child's answer
'yes' to the police officer's question 'do you understand these rights' before determining that a
child has waived his rights). Even overtly coercive police interrogation techniques combined with a
juvenile's young age and mental deficiencies do not prevent trial judges from finding-and
appellate courts from upholding-a waiver to be "voluntary." See, e.g., W.M. v. State, 585 So. 2d
979 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1991) (Farmer, J., dissenting) ("[T]he court.., holds that a 10 year old boy
with an I.Q. of 69 or 70, who had been placed by school authorities in a learning disability program
... , who had no prior record with the police, who was crying and upset when taken into custody,
and who was then held by the police for nearly 6 hours ... without any nonaccusatorial adult
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explicitly rejected the view that developmental or psychological
differences between juveniles and adults required different rules or
special procedural protections during interrogation. 62
Despite Fare's endorsement of the "totality" approach, reasons
exist to question whether a typical juvenile can waive her rights in a
"knowing, intelligent, and voluntary" manner. Evaluation studies
indicate that most juveniles who receive a Miranda warning do not
understand it well enough to exercise or waive their rights263 Juveniles
present, could in the end knowingly and voluntarily confess to nearly every unsolved burglary on
the police blotter."). Courts admit confessions of illiterate, mentally retarded juveniles with IQs in
the 60s, whom psychologists characterize as incapable of abstract reasoning. See, e.g., People v.
Cheatham, 551 N.W.2d 355, 359, 370 (Mich. 1996) (upholding validity of waiver by an illiterate
juvenile with an IQ of 62 because "[1low mental ability in and of itself is insufficient to establish
that a defendant did not understand his rights"); State v. Cleary, 641 A.2d 102, 105, 109 (Vt. 1994)
(upholding validity of waiver by juvenile with limited ability to read or write and an IQ of 65).
262. See Fare, 442 U.S. at 725 ("This totality-of-the-circumstances approach is adequate to
determine whether there has been a waiver even where interrogation of juveniles is involved. We
discern no persuasive reasons why any other approach is required where the question is whether a
juvenile has waived his rights, as opposed to whether an adult has done so.").
A few states recognize youths' developmental limitations and unique vulnerabilities
during interrogation. Some state courts have adopted strategies to assure the validity of a juvenile's
waiver of rights such as requiring the presence of a parent or an "interested adult." See, e.g., People
v. Saiz, 620 P.2d 15, 20-21 (Colo. 1980) (applying "fruit of the poisonous tree" doctrine to
confessions obtained without the presence of a parent in violation of statute); Lewis v. State, 288
N.E.2d 138 (Ind. 1972) (requiring parents to be informed of child's rights and requiring an
opportunity for child to consult with parents or an attorney before a child can waive his Miranda
rights) (superceded by statute, see infra); Commonwealth v. A Juvenile, 449 N.E.2d 654, 657
(Mass. 1983) (requiring in most cases, and in all cases for a minor under age fourteen, that the state
show that "a parent or an interested adult was present, understood the warnings, and had the
opportunity to explain his rights to the juvenile so that the juvenile understands the significance of
waiver of these rights"); In re E.T.C., 449 A.2d 937, 940 (Vt. 1982) (holding, as a matter of state
constitutional law, in order to establish a valid waiver by a juvenile, the youth "must be given the
opportunity to consult with an adult; ... that adult must be one who is not only genuinely interested
in the welfare of the juvenile but completely independent from and disassociated with the
prosecution, e.g., a parent, legal guardian, or attorney representing the juvenile; and.., the
independent interested adult must be informed and be aware of the rights guaranteed to the
juvenile"). Several states provide the right to the presence of a parent or interested adult by statute.
See, e.g., COLO. REV. STAT. § 19-2-511(1) (1999) (requiring parent or counsel to be present at
interrogation and advised ofjuvenile's Miranda rights); IND. CODE ANN. § 31-32-5-1 (West 1998)
(codifying and expanding Lewis v. State so that only a parent or attorney can waive an
unemancipated minor's rights). Other states require a juvenile below the age of fourteen years to
actually consult with an interested adult, while providing older juveniles only with an opportunity to
consult with an interested adult as a prerequisite to a valid waiver. See In re B.M.B., 955 P.2d 1302,
1312-13 (Kan. 1998); State v. Presha, 748 A.2d 1108, 1118 (N.J. 2000).
263. See THOMAS GRISSO, JUVENILES' WAIVER OF RIGHTS: LEGAL AND PSYCHOLOGICAL
COMPETENCE 59-93, 106-07 (1981) (finding that juveniles under age fifteen have a significantly
lesser understanding of Miranda warnings than do adults, and that juveniles fifteen or sixteen years
of age and of average intelligence have a slightly better than fifty percent chance to adequately
understand the warnings); Marty Beyer, Immaturity, Culpability & Competency in Juveniles: A
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most frequently misunderstood the advisory that they had the right to
consult with an attorney and to have one present during interrogation.264
Younger juveniles exhibited even greater difficulties understanding their
rights.
As a class, juveniles younger than fifteen years of age failed to meet
both the absolute and relative (adult norm) standards for
comprehension .... The vast majority of these juveniles
misunderstood at least one of the four standard Miranda statements,
and compared with adults, demonstrated significantly poorer
comprehension of the nature and significance of the Miranda rights.
265
Although younger juveniles exhibited significantly poorer
comprehension than did comparable adults, the level of understanding
by youths sixteen and older, although more similar to that of adults, left
much to be desired.266 Even if juveniles abstractly understand the words
Study of 17 Cases, GRIM. JUST., Summer 2000, at 26, 28 (reporting that more than half of juveniles
in a small sample size study did not understand the words of the Miranda warning); A. Bruce
Ferguson & Alan Charles Douglas, A Study of Juvenile Waiver, 7 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 39, 53-54
(1970) (reporting that over ninety percent of the juveniles whom police interrogated waived their
rights, that an equal number did not understand the rights they waived, and that even a simplified
version of the language in the Miranda warning failed to cure these defects); Thomas Grisso,
Juveniles' Capacities to Waive Miranda Rights: An Empirical Analysis, 68 CAL. L. REV. 1134,
1153-54 (1980) [hereinafter Grisso, Juveniles' Capacities to Waive] (reporting that most juveniles
who received the warnings did not understand their rights well enough to waive them, that only
20.9 % of the juveniles, as compared with 42.3 % of the adults, demonstrated adequate
understanding of the four components of a Miranda warning, and that 55.3 % of juveniles as
contrasted with 23.1 % of the adults exhibited no comprehension of at least one of the four
warnings); Thomas Grisso, Juveniles' Consent in Delinquency Proceedings, in CHILDREN'S
COMPETENCE TO CONSENT 131, 138-42 (Gary B. Melton et al. eds., 1983) [hereinafter Grisso,
Juveniles' Consent in Delinquency Proceedings].
264. See Grisso, Juveniles' Capacities to Waive, supra note 263, at 1152 tbl.l (finding that
only 29.9 % of juveniles had adequate understanding of the right to an attorney, while 63.1 % to
89.3 % understood each of the other elements of the Miranda warning); see also Beyer, supra note
263, at 33-34 (reporting that juveniles' misunderstood role of defense counsel).
265. Grisso, Juveniles' Capacities to Waive, supra note 263, at 1160.
266. See id. at 1157. A replication of Grisso's study in Canada reported that very few juveniles
fully understood their warnings and that the youths who lacked comprehension waived their rights
more readily. See Rona Abramovitch et al., Young Persons' Comprehension of Waivers in Criminal
Proceedings, 35 CAN. J. CRIMINOLOGY 309, 320 (1993) ("[lit seems likely that many if not most
juveniles who are asked by the police to waive their rights do not have sufficient understanding to
be competent to waive them."). Another study of 115 high school students from Virginia reported
that youths interpreted the warning that "'anything said could be used against them"' to mean that
"'any disrespectful words directed to the police would be reported to the judge."' Ellen R. Fulmer,
Note, Novak v. Commonwealth: Are Virginia Courts Providing Special Protection to Virginia's
Juvenile Defendants?, 30 U. RICH. L. REV. 935, 956-57 (1996) (quoting Brief of Amicus Curiae on
Behalf of Youth Advocacy Clinic and Mental Disabilities Clinic, University of Richmond Law
School at 29, Novak v. Commonwealth, 457 S.E.2d 402 (Va. Ct. App. 1995) (No. 1416-92-1)); see
also Shavaun M. Wall & Mary Furlong, Comprehension of Miranda Rights by Urban Adolescents
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of the Miranda warning, they may not appreciate the significance and
function of their rights.267  Research conducted under laboratory
conditions may fail to capture the social context and stressful conditions
associated with actual police interrogation. 2
68
Adolescents have difficulty grasping the basic concept of a "right"
269as an entitlement that they can exercise without adverse consequences.
Children question whether law enforcement officials will punish them if
they exercise their rights.270 Societal expectation of youthful obedience
to authority and youths' inferior social status relative to adults render
juveniles more vulnerable to police interrogation techniques.271 Many
people from traditionally disempowered communities, such as females,
African-Americans, and youth, pragmatically use indirect speech
patterns to avoid conflict when dealing with authority figures.272 People
with lower social status than their interrogators typically respond more
passively, talk more readily, acquiesce to police suggestions more easily,
and speak less assertively.273 Thus, Fare's requirement that youths
with Law-Related Education, 56 PSYCHOL. REP. 359, 369-72 (1985) (reporting that urban, black
high school students' participation in a year-long "Street Law" course that included education about
Miranda rights did not improve their understanding or comprehension in ways that would enable
them to assert their rights).
267. See Larson, supra note 261, at 649-53 (reviewing social psychological research and
juveniles' limited understanding of the concept of "rights" as an entitlement to be exercised).
268. See Abramovitch et al., supra note 266, at 319 (noting that responses to hypothetical
questions in a relaxed atmosphere do not replicate adequately the conditions created by police who
"can be gentle or tough, can explain the rights well or poorly, and in many ways can exert varying
amounts of pressure to comply"); Grisso, Juveniles' Consent in Delinquency Proceedings, supra
note 263, at 139.
269. See Grisso, New Questions, supra note 234, at 29-30; Larson, supra note 261, at 651-52.
270. See GRISSO, supra note 263, at 109-30 & tbl. 20 (finding that only 33.2 % of juveniles
understood that there was no penalty for asserting a right); Gary B. Melton, Taking Gault Seriously:
Toward a New Juvenile Court, 68 NEB. L. REV. 146, 171 (1989) (arguing that immaturity,
inexperience, and lower verbal competence than adults render youths especially vulnerable to police
interrogation tactics).
271. Gerald D. Robin, Juvenile Interrogation and Confessions, 10 J. POLICE SCI. & ADMIN.
224, 225 (1982) ("[F]actors which are particularly characteristic of juveniles which highlight the
coercive aspects involved in juvenile waiver on Miranda rights [include] their low social status in
relation to their adult interrogators, societal norms concerning youthful obedience to authority,
children's greater dependence upon adults, and their lower threshold of intimidation.").
272. See Janet E. Ainsworth, In a Different Register: The Pragmatics of Powerlessness in
Police Interrogation, 103 YALE L.J. 259, 261 (1993); Beyer, supra note 263, at 35 (reporting that
victims of abuse fear police and feel they have to confess because "[h]aving been powerless when
adults abused them in the past, these young people probably could not do anything but comply with
police").
273. See Ainsworth, supra note 272, at 316; Edwin D. Driver, Confessions and the Social
Psychology of Coercion, 82 HARV. L. REV. 42, 57 (1968). Barbara Kaban and Ann E. Tobey argue
that juveniles are especially susceptible to the coercive pressures of authority figures because of
their social disadvantage:
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invoke Miranda rights with adult-like precision contradicts the normal
social reactions and verbal styles of most delinquents.
Juveniles' lack of understanding and vulnerability to coercion raise
questions about the adequacy of the Miranda warning as a procedural
safeguard to prevent youths from giving unreliable or false
confessions. 274 Deceptive interrogation techniques may be especially
effective when employed against the young and inexperienced.275
Interrogation tactics such as presenting false evidence, using leading
questions, and adopting police interpretations are more likely to induce
juveniles to give false or inaccurate confessions than adults.276 The
coercive context of interrogation and youths' limited understanding and
verbal skills render young offenders more likely to comply with
authority, to acquiesce in police interpretations, to fill in gaps through
fabrication, to tell police what they think they want to hear, and to give
From early childhood on, children are taught to answer questions directed to them by
adults. Police officers often occupy an elevated position of power relative to
children.... [W]hen a "status differential" exists in the interview context, lower-status
individuals are more likely to defer to the authority of higher-status individuals....
[W]hen an adult interviewer presents himself or herself as authoritarian or unfriendly,
children have more difficulty disagreeing with the adult.
Barbara Kaban & Ann E. Tobey, Wen Police Question Children: Are Protections Adequate?, I J.
CENTER CHILD. & CTS. 151, 155 (1999).
274. See Colorado v. Connelly, 479 U.S. 157, 166-67 (1986) (holding that the Fourteenth
Amendment Due Process Clause only protects defendants against police coercion, but reliability of
confession is governed by state evidence law); Larson, supra note 261, at 659-65 (proposing
alternatives to Miranda framework to protect juveniles' ability to exercise rights); Welsh S. White,
False Confessions and the Constitution: Safeguards Against Untrustworthy Confessions, 32 HARV.
C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 105, 115-17 (1997) (analyzing Supreme Court's post-Miranda decision involving
involuntary confessions).
275. See Kaban & Tobey, supra note 273, at 158 ("Interrogation procedures designed for
adults but used with children increase the likelihood of false confessions and may even undermine
the integrity of the fact-finding process."); Laurie Magid, Deceptive Police Interrogation Practices:
How Far is Too Far?, 99 MICH. L. REV. 1168, 1169 (2001) (noting that "Miranda offers suspects
little protection from deceptive interrogation techniques"); Welsh White, False Confessions in
Criminal Cases, CRIM. JUST., Winter 2003, at 5; White, supra note 274, at 118-21 (summarizing
standard interrogation techniques especially likely to elicit false confessions from suspects who are
particularly suggestible such as youth and those with mental retardation).
276. See Beyer, supra note 263, at 28-29; Matthew B. Johnson & Ronald C. Hunt, The
Psycholegal Interface in Juvenile Assessment of Miranda, 18 AM. J. FORENSIC PSYCHOL. 17, 29-32
(2000) (reporting that stressful conditions may cause children to change their stories and actually
believe their distorted perception of the event); Gerald P. Koocher, Different Lenses: Psycho-Legal
Perspectives on Children's Rights, 16 NOVA L. REV. 711, 715-16 (1992) (attributing children's
difficulty making decisions to exercise their rights to socialization to obey authority figures);
Thomas D. Lyon, The New Wave in Children's Suggestibility Research: A Critique, 84 CORNELL L.
REV. 1004, 1011 (1999) (discussing the susceptibility of children to suggestion about allegations of
sexual abuse).
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unreliable and false confessions.277 Immaturity and suggestibility
increase the likelihood of false confessions.278 Youths are also less able
than adults to think strategically and to appreciate the consequences of
admissions, and are more likely than adults to assume responsibility out
of a misguided feeling of loyalty to peers. 279 Aggressive questioning by
police further increases the likelihood of false confessions, and instances
abound of juveniles confessing to homicides and other serious crimes
that they did not commit.280 Although younger offenders are at greatest
risk, even older youths evidence a heightened risk of giving false
confessions.281 Juveniles' lack of competence and vulnerability to
277. See Gisli H. Gudjonsson, Suggestibility and Compliance Among Alleged False Confessors
and Resisters in Criminal Trials, 31 MED. SCI. & L. 147, 148-49 (1991) (reporting a correlation
between suggestibility and being an imprisoned, self-identified "false confessor"); Johnson & Hunt,
supra note 276, at 24 (noting compliance as "tendency to go along with instructions and directions
without actual acceptance of the premises"); Krzewinski, supra note 251, at 360 (describing
interrogation technique by which "juveniles will readily agree to an officer's words without
understanding the significant implications of these words"); Tanenhaus & Drizin, supra note 23 1, at
671-89 (summarizing three homicide interrogation cases demonstrating police use of leading
questions, suggesting answers, and drafting confessions for very young offenders).
278. See Saul M. Kassin, The Psychology of Confession Evidence, 52 AM. PSYCHOLOGIST 221,
227 (1997) ("[C]oerced-intemalized confessions ... all have ... factors in common [including] a
suspect who is 'vulnerable'-that is, one whose memory is malleable by virtue of his or her youth,
interpersonal trust, naivet6, suggestibility, lack of intelligence, stress, fatigue, alcohol, or drug use
...."); Allison D. Redlich & Gail S. Goodman, Taking Responsibility for An Act Not Committed:
The Influence ofAge and Suggestibility, 27 L. & HUMAN BEH. 141, 152 (2003) (describing research
in which younger, more suggestible experimental subjects presented with false evidence were more
likely to confess to wrong-doing).
279. See Beyer, supra note 263, at 29-31; Grisso, New Questions, supra note 234, at 32; Kaban
& Tobey, supra note 273, at 155-56 ("A failure to consider consequences may be due to a lack of
understanding of the consequences as well as a failure to consider them. For instance, a child may
be more easily led into making damaging statements under the pretense that if he or she tells the
police what they want to know the child can go home.").
280. See Krzewinski, supra note 251, at 357-63 (summarizing cases of demonstrably false
confessions obtained from juveniles and the police interrogation techniques that produce them);
Tanenhaus & Drizin, supra note 23 1, at 671-89 (describing several instances of false confessions by
young juveniles); Steven A. Drizin & Beth A. Colgan, Let the Cameras Roll: Mandatory
Videotaping of Interrogations Is the Solution to Illinois' Problem of False Confessions, 32 LOY. U.
CHI. L.J. 337, 349-55 (2001) (summarizing and analyzing cases of false confessions obtained from
innocent juveniles); see also Richard A. Leo & Richard J. Ofshe, The Consequences of False
Confessions: Deprivations of Liberty and Miscarriages of Justice in the Age of Psychological
Interrogation, 88 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 429, 443-44 (1998) ("[S]ome interrogation manual
writers and trainers persist in the unfounded belief that contemporary psychological methods will
not cause the innocent to confess-a fiction so thoroughly contradicted by all of the research on
police interrogation that it can be labeled a potentially deadly myth. This fiction perpetuates the
commonly held belief that only torture can cause an innocent suspect to confess, and it allows some
police to rationalize accepting coerced and demonstrably unreliable confession statements as true."
(footnotes omitted)).
281. See Fagan, supra note 48, at 245 (reporting that "[i]n experiments and other laboratory
studies, the spread in susceptibility scores in these experiments suggests that many defendants older
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coercive interrogation increase the risks of false confessions and
erroneous convictions.
IV. YOUTH POLICY AND CRIME POLICY:
CAPITAL PUNISHMENT AND LWOP SENTENCES
Youths' immature judgment, limited self-control, and inability to
appreciate fully the consequences of their behavior reduce their degree
of criminal responsibility and deserved punishment. While young
offenders possess sufficient understanding and culpability to hold them
accountable for their acts, their crimes are less blameworthy than those
of adults, justifying a categorically different sentencing policy.282
Similarly, youths' diminished adjudicative competence increases the
likelihood of false confessions and erroneous convictions. The Court's
reasoning in Atkins and the analogous developmental limitations of
adolescents should ban imposition of the death penalty. Penal
proportionality and the reduced culpability of youth also should preclude
sentences of Life Without Parole (LWOP) and even of lengths
equivalent to those of adult offenders. As a matter of sentencing policy,
there is no principled basis on which to distinguish between the
diminished responsibility of youth that precludes the death penalty and
the reduced culpability that warrants shorter sentences for all serious
crimes. 283 And, it is the reality of draconian sentences, rather than the
risk of execution, that faces far more irresponsible young offenders.
than sixteen would be prone to false confessions" and citing the false confessions given by fifteen-
to seventeen-year-old defendants in the Central Park jogger case as a paradigmatic example).
282. See Scott & Steinberg, supra note 1, at 830 ("[Y]ouths are likely to act more impulsively
and to weigh the consequences of their options differently from adults, discounting risks and future
consequences, and over-valuing (by adult standards) peer approval, immediate consequences, and
the excitement of risk taking. These influences are predictable, systematic and developmental in
nature (rather than simply an expression of personal values and preferences), and they undermine
decisionmaking capacity in ways that are accepted as mitigating culpability.").
283. Professor Zimring argues that
[d]octrines of diminished responsibility have their greatest impact when large injuries
have been caused by actors not fully capable of understanding and self-control. The
visible importance of diminished responsibility in these cases arises because the
punishments provided for the fully culpable are quite severe, and the reductive impact of
mitigating punishment is correspondingly large. But if the doctrine of diminished
responsibility means anything in relation to the punishment of immature offenders, its
impact cannot be limited to trivial cases. Diminished responsibility is either generally
applicable or generally unpersuasive as a mitigating principle.
FRANKLIN E. ZIMRING, AMERICAN YOUTH VIOLENCE 84 (1998). Similarly, international human
rights conventions, such as the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights ("ICCPR"),
provide for separate and mitigated treatment for juveniles in general, see ICCPR arts. 10.2(b), 10.3,
and not just with respect to capital punishment, see ICCPR art. 6.5.
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The case of Lionel Tate graphically illustrates the hazards of
disproportionality and adjudicative incompetence when states try young
offenders as adults in criminal court. The grand jury indicted twelve-
year-old Tate for first-degree murder for the brutal injuries he inflicted
on a six-year-old girl.284  Under Florida's waiver law,2 85  Tate's
indictment for a capital crime required the state to prosecute him as an
adult, and his conviction of first degree murder required the judge to
impose a mandatory sentence of life in prison without parole.28 6 The
Florida Court of Appeals reversed his conviction, holding that the trial
judge should have conducted a competency hearing to determine
whether Tate understood the consequences of proceeding to trial and
whether he was able to assist counsel prior to and during the trial.287
However, it rejected Tate's contention that imposing a mandatory
LWOP sentence on a twelve-year-old child was disproportionate or
constituted "cruel and unusual punishment."
288
For two decades the Supreme Court has struggled with the question
of whether the Eighth Amendment's prohibition on cruel and unusual
punishment contains a "narrow proportionality principle" that "applies to
noncapital sentences., 28 9 The Court in Rummel v. Estelle290 held that it
did not violate the Eighth Amendment for a State to sentence a three-
time offender to life in prison with the possibility of parole.29'
Subsequently, in Solem v. Helm292 the Court held that the Eighth
Amendment prohibited a sentence of "life without possibility of parole"
for a repeat offender convicted of a minor property crime. 293 Solem
284. See Tate v. State, 864 So. 2d 44, 47 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2003).
285. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 985.225 (West 2001 & Supp. 2004).
286. See id. § 985.225(1); see also Tate, 864 So. 2d. at 48; Tanenhaus & Drizin, supra note
23 1, at 678-81 (summarizing waiver procedures, rejected plea offers, and failed defense strategy
that ultimately led both prosecutor and judge to recommend that Governor Jeb Bush commute
Tate's mandatory LWOP sentence imposed following conviction for murder as manifestly unjust
for a twelve-year-old).
287. See Tate, 864 So. 2d at 48 ("[A] competency evaluation was constitutionally mandated to
determine whether Tate had sufficient present ability to consult with his lawyer with a reasonable
degree of rational understanding and whether he had a rational, as well as factual, understanding of
the proceedings against him.").
288. See id. at 54 (discussing other Florida cases affirming sentences of life without parole
imposed on defendants convicted of murder at ages thirteen and fourteen years).
289. E.g., Harmelin v. Michigan, 501 U.S. 957, 996-97 (1991) (Kennedy, J., concurring in part
and concurring in judgment).
290. 445 U.S. 263 (1980).
291. See id. at 284-85 (approving Rummel's sentence under a recidivism statute for his third
conviction for relatively minor property crimes).
292. 463 U.S. 277 (1983).
293. See id. at 281, 303. The Court noted that the Eighth Amendment's ban on cruel and
unusual punishments "prohibits ... sentences that are disproportionate to the crime committed," id.
[Vol. 32:463
IMPLICATIONS OF ATKINS
identified three factors that a court must consider to determine whether a
sentence is so disproportionate that it violates the Eighth Amendment:
"(i) the gravity of the offense and the harshness of the penalty; (ii) the
sentences imposed on other criminals in the same jurisdiction; and
(iii) the sentences imposed for commission of the same crime in other
jurisdictions." 294 However, in Harmelin v. Michigan295 a fractured Court
rejected a proportionality challenge and upheld a sentence of life without
possibility of parole for a first-time offender convicted of a drug
offense.296
In his concurrence in Harmelin, Justice Kennedy asserted that
"[t]he Eighth Amendment proportionality principle also applies to
,,297noncapital sentences. His concurrence has emerged as the operative
test for disproportionality and holds that the Eighth Amendment
prohibits "only extreme sentences that are 'grossly disproportionate' to
the crime. 298 While conceding that the contours of the proportionality
principle are unclear, Kennedy identified four factors-the primacy of
legislative judgments about penalties, the multiplicity of legitimate penal
objectives, the limited role for federal oversight of state sentencing
schemes, and the requirement that objective factors inform federal
proportionality review-to enable a court to determine whether a penalty
is "grossly disproportionate., 299 Recently, the Court in Ewing v.
California300 upheld the imposition of a sentence of twenty-five years to
at 284, and that the "constitutional principle of proportionality has been recognized explicitly in this
Court for almost a century." Id. at 286.
294. Id. at 292. Despite the elements of recidivism, the distinguishing factor in Salem was the
imposition of an LWOP sentence for a minor property crime. See id. at 297.
295. 501 U.S. 957 (1991).
296. Compare id. at 994 (Scalia., J.) (announcing opinion of the Court and arguing that
proportionality principle only limited application of death penalty but did not constitute a general
feature of Eighth Amendment analysis) with id. at 997, 1009 (Kennedy, J., concurring) (upholding
sentence by finding it proportional under an Eighth Amendment analysis). Neither Scalia's nor
Kennedy's legal reasoning was agreed to by a majority of the Court.
297. Id. at 997.
298. Id. at 1001.
299. See id. at 998-1001 (Kennedy J., concurring). According to Justice Kennedy,
[a]ll of these principles-the primacy of the legislature, the variety of legitimate
penological schemes, the nature of our federal system, and the requirement that
proportionality review be guided by objective factors-inform the final one: The Eighth
Amendment does not require strict proportionality between crime and sentence. Rather,
it forbids only extreme sentences that are "grossly disproportionate" to the crime.
Id. at 1001.
300. 538 U.S. 11 (2003).
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life under California's "three-strike" sentencing statute for the theft of
three golf clubs.301
Given the imprecision of the Supreme Court's interpretation of the
proportionality principle in noncapital cases, courts have struggled with
its application to LWOP sentences imposed on juvenile offenders.30 2
Although proportionality emphasizes the relationship between the
seriousness of the crime and the sentence imposed, courts focus almost
exclusively on the gravity of the crime rather than the culpability of the
actor who caused the harm when they assess seriousness. 313 In Harris v.
Wright,304 Judge Alex Kozinski rejected Harris' Eighth Amendment
challenge to a mandatory LWOP sentence imposed on a fifteen-year-old
convicted of murder. 30 5  Kozinski emphasized that proportionality
analyses are strictly circumscribed to instances of "gross
disproportionality" 306 and insisted
Youth has no obvious bearing on this problem: If we can discern no
clear line for adults, neither can we for youths. Accordingly, while
capital punishment is unique and must be treated specially, mandatory
life imprisonment without parole is, for young and old alike, only an
outlying point on the continuum of prison sentences. Like any other
3C. See id. at 19, 30-31 ("We hold that Ewing's sentence of 25 years to life in prison, imposed
for the offense of felony grand theft under the three strikes law, is not grossly disproportionate and
therefore does not violate the Eighth Amendment's prohibition on cruel and unusual
punishments.").
302. See generally Logan, supra note 2, at 703-09 (reviewing cases upholding LWOP
sentences on juveniles).
303. For example, see, State v. Massey, 803 P.2d 340 (Wash. Ct. App. 1991), where the court
upheld a mandatory sentence of life without parole imposed on a thirteen-year-old juvenile
convicted of aggravated murder:
The test is whether in view of contemporary standards of elemental decency, the
punishment is of such disproportionate character to the offense as to shock the general
conscience and violate principles of fundamental fairness. That test does not embody an
element or consideration of the defendant's age, only a balance between the crime and
the sentence imposed. Therefore, there is no cause to create a distinction between a
juvenile and an adult who are sentenced to life without parole for first degree aggravated
murder.
Id. at 348 (citation omitted); see also State v. Stinnett, 497 S.E.2d 696, 701-02 (N.C. Ct. App. 1998)
(upholding mandatory LWOP sentence imposed on fifteen-year-old convicted of murder and noting
that "when a punishment does not exceed the limits fixed by statute, the punishment cannot be
classified as cruel and unusual in a constitutional sense").
304. 93 F.3d 581 (9th Cir. 1996).
305. See id. at 583-85.
306. See id. at 584 ("Disproportion analysis, however, is strictly circumscribed; we conduct a
detailed analysis only in the 'rare case in which a threshold comparison of the crime committed and
the sentence imposed leads to an inference of gross disproportionality."').
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prison sentence, it raises no inference of disproportionality when
imposed on a murderer.
30 7
By emphasizing only the gravity of the offense and the harm
caused, rather than the culpability of the offender, courts engage in
circular reasoning-serious crimes are serious-and thereby exclude
considerations of moral blameworthiness from the proportionality
inquiry.30 8
Although Stanford established sixteen as the minimum age at which
states can impose the death penalty, for noncapital sentencing, the Court
has not set any minimum age for imposing sentences of life without
parole on younger offenders.30 9 Youthfulness may be a relevant factor,
albeit not a controlling one, when courts assess culpability. 310 However,
courts only conduct proportionality analyses when sentences are
"grossly disproportionate" to the seriousness of the crime rather than to
the culpability of the criminal. They routinely uphold LWOP and other
very lengthy sentences imposed on very young offenders and rebuff
claims that youthfulness is a mitigating factor that should trump
mandatory sentences. 311 Indeed, for some perverse reasons, courts may
treat youthfulness as an aggravating, rather than mitigating, factor.
312
307. Id. at 585 (citation omitted).
308. See Logan, supra note 2, at 703 ("By divorcing 'crime' from offender culpability in
proportionality analysis, these courts subscribe to an essentially circular inquiry: because murder,
for instance, is a very 'serious' crime in the eyes of the legislature, it can be met with a very
'serious' statutory punishment.").
309. But cf Naovarath v. State, 779 P.2d 944, 947 (Nev. 1989) (questioning the
constitutionality of imposing an LWOP sentence on any thirteen-year-old, but overturning sentence
on more narrow grounds).
310. See, e.g., Hawkins v. Hargett, 200 F.3d 1279, 1284 (10th Cir. 1999) (recognizing that
"age is a relevant factor to consider in a proportionality analysis"); State v. Green, 502 S.E.2d 819,
832 (N.C. 1998) (upholding life imprisonment sentence for thirteen-year-old convicted of rape,
recognizing that "the chronological age of a defendant is a factor that can be considered in
determining whether a punishment is grossly disproportionate to the crime," but emphasizing that
Green was morally responsible for the crime because he possesses sufficient mental capacity to
form criminal intent).
311. Cf. Adams v. State, No. CR-98-0496, 2003 WL 22026043, at *59-*60 (Ala. Crim. App.
Aug. 29, 2003) (refusing to grant weight as a factor mitigating against execution to the fact that
defendant was seventeen years old at the time he committed crime leading to his death sentence).
312. See SNYDER & SICKMUND, supra note 189, at 178 (reporting that "juvenile transfers
convicted of murder received longer sentences than their adult counterparts. On average, the
maximum prison sentence imposed on transferred juveniles convicted of murder in 1994 was 23
years 11 months. This was 2 years and 5 months longer than the average maximum prison sentence
for adults age 18 or older, and 8 months longer than the average maximum sentence for under-18
adults convicted of murder."); Donna Bishop & Charles Frazier, Consequences of Transfer, in THE
CHANGING BORDERS OF JUVENILE JUSTICE: TRANSFER OF ADOLESCENTS TO THE CRIMINAL COURT
236-37 (Jeffrey Fagan & Franklin E. Zimring eds., 2002) (comparing the sentences imposed on
youths transferred to criminal courts with those of adults and reporting that "transferred youths are
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Although it reversed the trial court on competency grounds, the
appellate court in Tate v. State "reject[ed] the argument that a life
sentence without the possibility of parole is cruel or unusual punishment
on a twelve-year-old child."3"3 In State v. Green,3t 4 the North Carolina
Supreme Court approved a mandatory sentence of life imprisonment
imposed on a thirteen-year-old convicted of a first-degree sexual
offense.315 The Green court noted that many states transfer very young
offenders to criminal court for adult prosecution,316 that age is a factor
that may be considered but is not dispositive "in determining whether a
punishment is grossly disproportionate to the crime, 3 " and that
retribution and incapacitation are appropriate sentencing goals even for
young offenders.3t8 In Hawkins v. Hargett,319 the Tenth Circuit Court of
Appeals approved sentences totaling 100 years for burglary, rape, and
robbery imposed on a juvenile for crimes committed when he was
sentenced more harshly, both in terms of the probability of receiving a prison sentence and the
length of the sentences they receive. In other words, we see no evidence that criminal courts
recognize a need to mitigate sentences based on considerations of age and immaturity." (footnote
omitted)); Tanenhaus & Drizin, supra note 231, at 665 (citing the impact of "get tough" politics and
arguing that "[b]y the mid-1990's [sic], youth had ceased to be a mitigating factor in adult court,
and instead had become a liability").
313. Tate v. State, 864 So. 2d 44, 54 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2003). Tate cited other recent Florida
cases approving LWOP sentences imposed on young offenders, including Blackshear v. State, 771
So. 2d 1199, 1200-02 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2000) (approving three consecutive life sentences
imposed for three robberies committed when Blackshear was thirteen years of age and noting that
"[s]entences imposed on juveniles of life imprisonment are not uncommon in Florida Courts") and
Phillips v. State, 807 So. 2d 713, 717-18 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2002) (approving LWOP sentence
imposed on fourteen-year-old convicted of murder and rejecting the idea that an LWOP sentence for
first-degree murder could ever be so "grossly disproportionate" as to require a finding of
unconstitutionality). Tate, 864 So. 2d at 54-55.
314. 502 S.E.2d 819 (N.C. 1998).
315. See id. at 827-28; see also Paul G. Morrissey, Note, Do the Adult Crime, Do the Adult
Time: Due Process and Cruel and Unusual Implications for a 13- Year-Old Sex Offender Sentenced
to Life Imprisonment in State v. Green, 44 VILL. L. REV. 707, 738 (1999) ("Green's young age does
not lend itself to a per se ruling of unconstitutionality. Once a juvenile of any age is transferred to
superior court, charged with a violation of state law and convicted, the juvenile must be 'handled in
every respect as an adult."' (footnote omitted)).
316. See Green, 502 S.E.2d at 831 (finding that because at least 18 other states permit waiver
of offenders thirteen or younger to criminal court, the North Carolina practice did not violate
"evolving standards of decency").
317. Id. at 832.
318. See id. at 833. The court emphasized judicial deference to legislative policy
determinations and the "reasonableness" of the legislative conclusion that "the adult justice system,
with its primary goals of incapacitation and retribution, is the appropriate place for violent youthful
offenders, such as defendant." Id.
319. 200 F.3d 1279 (10th Cir. 1999).
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thirteen years of age.32° State courts routinely approve sentences of
life-with or without possibility of parole-or for extremely long
periods of time imposed on thirteen-, fourteen-, or fifteen-year-old
youths, whether those youths were convicted of murder or other
crimes.32' Few courts ever invalidate lengthy sentences imposed on
young offenders for being disproportional.322
320. See id. at 1285 (rejecting, on habeas appeal of state conviction, argument that imposing
consecutive sentences for crimes committed as a thirteen-year-old constituted cruel and unusual
punishment).
321. See, e.g., People v. Moya, 899 P.2d 212, 219-20 (Colo. Ct. App. 1994) (holding that
sentence of life imprisonment with possibility of parole after forty years was not cruel and unusual
punishment when imposed on juvenile convicted of robbery and murder); Brennan v. State, 754 So.
2d 1, 5 (Fla. 1999) (vacating death penalty imposed on sixteen-year-old convicted of murder and
reducing sentence to life imprisonment without a possibility of parole); State v. Broadhead, 814
P.2d 401 (Idaho 1991) (overruled on other grounds) (affirming life sentence with fixed minimum of
fifteen years imposed on fourteen-year-old convicted of murdering his father); State v. Shanahan,
994 P.2d 1059, 1061-63 & n.l (Idaho Ct. App. 1999) (holding that life sentence for murder imposed
on fifteen-year-old did not constitute cruel and unusual punishment); State v. Mitchell, 577 N.W.2d
481, 488-91 (Minn. 1998) (holding that mandatory life imprisonment for fifteen-year-old convicted
of first-degree murder was not cruel and unusual punishment); State v. Ira, 43 P.3d 359 (N.M. Ct.
App. 2002) (approving sentence of ninety-one years imposed on fifteen-year-old for rape); State v.
Jensen, 579 N.W.2d 613, 623-25 (S.D. 1998) (holding that life imprisonment without possibility of
parole for fourteen-year-old convicted of murder is not cruel and unusual punishment); State v.
Massey, 803 P.2d 340, 348 (Wash. Ct. App. 1990) (approving mandatory LWOP sentence imposed
on youth convicted of committing murder at thirteen years of age).
322. Examples to the contrary include Workman v. Commonwealth, 429 S.W.2d 374 (Ky.
1968) (holding that life sentence for fourteen-year-old convicted of rape violated Eighth
Amendment) and Naovarath v. State, 779 P.2d 944 (Nev. 1989) (finding that a LWOP sentence
imposed on thirteen-year-old convicted of murder constitutes cruel and unusual punishment, but
granting only limited right to be considered for parole eligibility at some point). The Court in
Naovarath did not necessarily endorse a categorical prohibition and emphasized the youth's mental
and emotional disabilities as well:
To say that a thirteen-year-old deserves a fifty or sixty year long sentence, imprisonment
until he dies, is a grave judgment indeed if not Draconian. To the make judgment that a
thirteen-year-old must be punished with this severity and that he can never be reformed,
is the kind ofjudgment that, if it can be made at all, must be made rarely and only on the
surest and soundest of grounds.
Id. at 947.
A few courts also have ordered youths' lengthy sentences reduced because of their age or
immaturity. See, e.g., People v. Dillon, 668 P.2d 697, 726-27 (Cal. 1983) (reducing life sentence
imposed on seventeen-year-old convicted of felony murder because he "was an unusually immature
youth"). In People v. Miller, 781 N.E.2d 300 (111. 2002), the Illinois Supreme Court confronted the
proportionality of an LWOP sentencing statute applied to a fifteen-year-old accessory to a multiple-
murder. The Court held that "a mandatory sentence of natural life in prison with no possibility of
parole grossly distorts the factual realities of the case and does not accurately represent defendant's
personal culpability such that it shocks the moral sense of the community." Id. at 308. In finding the
statute unconstitutional as applied, the Court emphasized that the fifteen-year-old youth had less
than one-minute to decide to stand as a lookout during a shooting committed by two other youths,
and emphasized that the youth was a passive participant who never touched or fired a gun. See id at
309.
2003]
HOFSTRA LAWREVIEW
A. Youthfulness as a Mitigating Factor in Sentencing
The Constitution does not require state legislatures to recognize or
courts to implement a principle of youthfulness as a mitigating factor in
sentencing except for the death penalty. The Court never has read the
Eighth Amendment to preclude imposition of an LWOP sentence on a
twelve-year-old. However, regardless of what the Constitution requires,
state legislators and courts should explicitly adopt and apply such a
principle as part of a fair and just youth sentencing policy. As a matter of
crime policy, youths' developmentally diminished responsibility and
limited adjudicative competence render them less culpable than adult
offenders; as a matter of youth policy, adolescence is a period of rapid
growth and transition, and youths are "works in progress" who have not
yet become the people they will be as adults.323 Youths learn by doing,
make mistakes as a*by-product of gaining experience, and need
protection from the worst consequences of their immature judgment.32 4
Youths have a different developmental trajectory from mentally retarded
offenders, and with normal maturation they eventually can learn to act
responsibly.
A youth and crime policy must manage the risks that youths pose to
themselves and to others, and reduce the harm that the justice system
inflicts on them as they make the transition to adulthood. A policy to
preserve young people's life chances for the future when they will be
able to make more responsible choices must protect them from the full
penal consequences of their present poor decisions. It holds them
accountable because they are somewhat culpable and yet mitigates the
severity of sentences because their choices entail less blameworthiness
than do those of adults.325
323. See Arredondo, supra note 195, at 14 ("Other than infancy, no stage in human
development results in such rapid or dramatic change as adolescence.").
324. Professor Franklin Zimring long has argued that adolescence is a time of semi-autonomy,
a "learner's permit" on the road to adulthood, and that young people require special dispensations in
order to learn to be responsible adults. See, e.g., ZIMRING, supra note 134, at 89-96 (arguing that
adolescents require a "learner's permit" to become responsible); Zimring, supra note 1, at 283 ("At
the heart of this process is a notion of adolescence as a period of 'learning by doing' in which the
only way competence in decision making can be achieved is by making decisions and making
mistakes.").
325. See, e.g., Scott, supra note 152, at 309 (arguing that adolescents' choices "reflect
immaturity and inexperience and are driven by developmental factors that will change in predictable
and systemic ways. A legal response that holds young offenders accountable, while recognizing that
they are less culpable than their adult counterparts, serves the purposes of criminal punishment
without violating the underlying principle of proportionality.").
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Penal proportionality dictates shorter sentences for youth because
of diminished responsibility. While criminal law presumes autonomous
choices by free-willed actors, adolescents have not yet acquired
experience, self-control, and maturity of judgment to validate such a
presumption. Even if a youth is criminally responsible for causing a
particular harm, the law should not treat her choices as the moral
equivalents of an adult's and impose the. same sentence.326 Political
sound-bites---"Adult crime, adult time," or "Old enough to do the crime,
old enough to do the time"-provide simplistic answers to complex
moral and legal questions.
Youths' normal tendency to make poor decisions reveals less about
their subjective character and blameworthiness than do the criminal
choices that adults make.327 Youth is a time of experimentation and
exploration, and youths' character remains somewhat unformed and
malleable.328 Like other forms of risky behavior, most adolescent
criminality is transitional and normal, and does not indicate a serious
commitment to a criminal career.329 Penal policy should recognize the
rapidity and volatility of development during adolescence and avoid
draconian sanctions.33°
326. See ZIMRING, supra note 283, at 144 ("[W]henever a young offender's need for
protection, education, and skill development can be accommodated without frustrating community
security, there is a government obligation to do so."); Feld, supra note 2, at 99; Scott & Grisso,
supra note 142, at 182 ("Subjecting thirteen-year-old offenders to the same criminal punishment
that is imposed on adults offends the principles that define the boundaries of criminal
responsibility.").
327. See Scott & Steinberg, supra note 1, at 801 ("Youthful involvement in crime is often a
part of this [developmental] process, and, as such, it reflects the values and preferences of a
transitory stage, rather than those of an individual with a settled identity."). An adolescent's
criminal act may not be as indicative of "bad moral character" as an adult's because youths, "whose
identity is in flux and character unformed, are less culpable than typical adult criminals." Id. at 825.
328. See Laurence Steinberg & Robert G. Schwartz, Developmental Psychology Goes to Court,
in YOUTH ON TRIAL: A DEVELOPMENTAL PERSPECTIVE ON JUVENILE JUSTICE 9, 23 (Thomas Grisso
& Robert G. Schwartz eds., 2000) (arguing that adolescence "is an inherently transitional time
during which there are rapid and dramatic changes in physical, intellectual, emotional, and social
capabilities," as well as "a period of tremendous malleability, during which experiences in the
family, peer group, school, and other settings have a great deal of influence over the course of
development").
329. Franklin E. Zimring argues that most youthful criminality is a relatively normal
adolescent phenomenon that youths will outgrow without the necessity of major intervention;
formal social control may cause more harm than good. See Zimring, supra note 1, at 284; see also
Terrie E. Moffitt, Adolescence-Limited and Life-Course-Persistent Antisocial Behavior: A
Developmental Taxonomy, 100 PSYCHOL. REV. 674, 675-77 (1993) (arguing that most youthful
offending is "adolescent limited," that most delinquents mature into law-abiding adults, and only a
relatively small group become life-course-persistent offenders).
330. See Zimring, supra note 1, at 283-84 ("[D]rastic countermeasures that inhibit the natural
transition to adulthood may cause more harm than they are worth... . Those who regard youth
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A protective youth policy would avoid life destructive
consequences and provide young people with "room to reform."
33 1
Youth is a period of "semi-autonomy," exploration, and risk taking and
teenagers require a "learner's permit" to learn to make responsible
choices without suffering fully for the consequences of their mistakes.
The ability to make responsible choices is learned behavior and
adolescence is the period during which youths learn to control their
impulses and to exercise self-control.332 Unlike the defendants in Atkins,
juveniles can learn to be responsible, and youth and crime policy should
provide them with that opportunity.
A youth sentencing policy would impose shorter sentences than for
older offenders simply because of juveniles' immaturity and diminished
culpability. Youths' diminished responsibility has broader sentencing
policy implications than just prohibiting their execution. Although the
Court's proportionality analyses focus on the death penalty, the principle
of youthful reduced culpability should mitigate the severity of all
penalties-capital, LWOP, mandatory minimum, and sentence lengths.
Formal mitigation of punishment based on youthfulness applies equally
to capital and noncapital sentences and recognizes reduced culpability
without excusing criminal conduct.333
Adolescents as a class characteristically make poorer choices than
do adults because of normal physical, neurobiological, psychological,
and developmental processes. As the Supreme Court repeatedly has
recognized,
youth is more than a chronological fact. It is a time and condition of
life when a person may be most susceptible to influence and to
psychological damage. Our history is replete with laws and judicial
crime as a transitional phenomenon see problems of deviance resolving themselves without drastic
intervention and are prone to doubt the efficacy of high-risk interventions on utilitarian grounds.").
331. See ZIMRING, supra note 320, at 81-83; Zimring, supra note 1, at 283-84.
332. See Zimring, supra note 1, at 279 ("[S]elf-control is a habit of behavior developed over a
period of time-a habit dependent on the experience of successfully exercising self-control. This
particular type of maturity, like so many others, takes practice.").
333. See id. at 278 (arguing that "even after a youth passes the minimum threshold of
competence that leads to a finding of capacity to commit crime, the barely competent youth is not as
culpable and therefore not as deserving of a full measure of punishment as a fully qualified adult
offender"); Scott & Grisso, supra note 142, at 174 (arguing that youthfulness does not excuse
criminal liability, but "the evidence disputes the conclusion that most delinquents are
indistinguishable from adults in any way that is relevant to culpability, and supports the creation of
two distinct culpability categories-although, of course, there will be outlyers [sic] in both groups.
In short, the predispositions and behavioral characteristics that are associated with the
developmental stage of adolescence support a policy of reduced culpability for this category of
offenders.").
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recognition that minors, especially in their earlier years, generally are
less mature and responsible than adults. Particularly "during the
formative years of childhood and adolescence, minors often lack the
experience, perspective, and judgment" expected of adults.334
A sentencing policy that recognizes this simple, developmental truism
would protect young people from the full consequences of their bad
decisions.335
B. Youthfulness as an Individualized or Categorical Mitigating Factor:
The Virtue of Bright-lines
Atkins, Thompson, and Stanford hinged, in part, on whether judges
and juries should decide questions of culpability and mitigation on an
individual or categorical basis. Sentencing laws typically eschew
categorical bright-lines and consider questions of mitigation
individually, and, in non-capital cases, trial judges, rather than juries,
typically make sentencing decisions.336 For example, courts ordinarily
evaluate youthfulness not simply in chronological terms, but as part of a
broader inquiry into maturity, culpability, and blameworthiness. 337
334. Thompson v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 815, 834 (1988) (citation omitted) (quoting Eddings v.
Oklahoma 455 U.S. 104, 115-16 (1982)).
335. See Scott, supra note 134, at 1656 ("[I]f the values that drive risky choices are associated
with youth, and predictably will change with maturity, then our paternalistic inclination is to protect
the young decisionmaker... from his or her bad judgment."); see also ZIMRING, supra note 134, at
96; ZIMRING, supra note 320, at 142-45.
336. See, e.g., Stanford v. Kentucky, 492 U.S. 361, 377-78 (1989) (Scalia, J.) (arguing that
because at least some sixteen- and seventeen-year-old offenders were sufficiently culpable or
capable of being deterred, the death penalty should not be categorically banned for all of them).
337. See, e.g., Eddings v. Oklahoma 455 U.S. 104, 116 (1982) (defining youthful age to
include more than chronological age and requiring evaluation of "the background and mental and
emotional development of a youthful defendant"); Graham v. Collins, 950 F.2d 1009, 1030 & n.25
(5th Cir. 1992), affd 506 U.S. 461, (1993) (finding youthful mitigation even for a twenty-two-year-
old defendant and noting that chronological age provides an indicator of maturity and stated
observing that "inexperience with resultant diminished judgment and self-control" are salient
mitigating factors); Giles v. State, 549 S.W.2d 479, 483 (Ark. 1977) (recognizing particular
importance of chronological age in determining youthfulness, stating that although "chronological
age does not necessarily control in the jury's determination whether a defendant's youth is a
mitigating circumstance, nevertheless, it is certainly an important factor," but further stating that
"[a]ny hard and fast rule as to age would tend to defeat the ends of justice, so the term youth must
be considered as relative and this factor weighed in the light of varying conditions and
circumstances"); Hurst v. State, 819 So.2d 689, 698 (Fla. 2002) (concluding that in order "to give a
non-minor defendant's age significant weight as a mitigating circumstance, the defendant's age
must be linked with some other characteristic of the defendant or the crime, such as significant
emotional immaturity or mental problems"); Foster v. State, 778 So.2d 906, 920 (Fla. 2000) (stating
that there is no bright-line, chronological rule for applying youthfulness as a mitigating factor, and
the inquiry "entails an analysis of factors which, when placed against the chronological age of the
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However, in Bryant v. State,338 the Court of Appeals of Maryland
concluded that while non-chronological factors are relevant to an adult
capital defendant's degree of maturity and experience,
the closer his or her chronological age is to the eighteen year old
baseline... [the more] such factor alone tends to support the
establishment of immaturity and inexperience and, hence, triggers the
need to consider youthful age as a mitigator. Thus, youthful age as a
mitigating circumstance is determined, in the first instance, by the
chronological age of the defendant, abiding evidence of atypical or
unusual maturity and experience that bears on the weight to be
accorded that mitigator in the ultimate weighing.
339
While other factors may provide evidence of maturity and experience,
the closer a youth is to the minimum age of adult responsibility, the
greater the weight the court should assign to it as a mitigating factor.34 °
The crucial question is whether to treat youths' developmental
disabilities categorically or to try to gauge culpability individually. Both
reliability and efficiency dictate treating youthfulness categorically.
Optimally, legal line-drawing classifies all members of a class who
possess a certain characteristic on one side and those without that
characteristics on the other. Given human variability and measurement
error, every classification necessarily involves some risk of treating
similar cases dissimilarly. Death penalty decisions, for example, attempt
to distinguish defendants who are less culpable from those who do
deserve to receive the death penalty.341 Stanford regarded age as an
imperfect indicator of diminished criminal responsibility, and allowed
states and juries to individualize culpability assessments and to identify
defendant, might reveal a much more immature individual than the age might have initially
indicated"); State v. Bey, 610 A.2d 814, 842 (N.J. 1992) (finding that determinations of youthful
age require consideration of both chronological age and other indicators of maturity, but stating that
"juries should give greater weight to a defendant's chronological age").
338. 824 A.2d 60 (Md. 2003).
339. Id. at 84-85.
340. See id. at 87 ("The youthful age mitigating circumstance is intended to mitigate the
punishment of persons eighteen years of age and above, but who still lack the maturity of adults.").
341. See, e.g., Ford v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 399, 409 (1986) (barring execution of insane
defendant in part because there is serious question as to "the retributive value of executing a person
who has no comprehension of why he has been singled out and stripped of his fundamental right to
life"); Enmund v. Florida, 458 U.S. 782, 797 (1982) (barring execution of felony-murderer who
does not "kill, attempt to kill, or intend that a killing take place or that lethal force will be
employed"); Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584, 598 (1977) (plurality opinion) (White, J.) (adopting
bright-line barring execution for rape because, even though it is a heinous crime deserving serious
punishment, "the death penalty.., is an excessive penalty for the rapist who, as such, does not take
human life").
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those few juveniles who were as blameworthy as death-eligible adults. 342
In this instance, however, a bright-line rule based on age is preferable to
a system of guided discretion because in balancing the risks of error, a
rule that erroneously spares the life of an occasional, potentially culpable
adolescent still will produce less aggregate injustice than a discretionary
system that improperly finds more undeserving youths death-eligible.
Penal proportionality requires a rough equivalency between a
defendant's culpability and the punishment imposed.343 Adolescents'
reduced criminal responsibility represents a normative valuation about
deserved punishment rather than a technical legal judgment about
whether a particular youth possessed the mens rea defined in the
criminal statute. 34 4 Despite the judicial and legislative preference to
individualize, a sentencing policy that integrates youthfulness, reduced
culpability, and penal proportionality should provide all younger
offenders with categorical reductions of adult sentences.345 Treating
youthfulness as a formal mitigating factor represents a social, moral, and
criminal policy judgment about diminished culpability rather than an
individualized clinical or psychiatric evaluation and asserts that no
342. See supra notes 85-94 and accompanying text.
343. See supra notes 1-3 and accompanying text; see also, e.g., Enmund, 458 U.S. at 825
(O'Connor, J., dissenting) ("[P]roportionality requires a nexus between the punishment imposed and
the defendant's blameworthiness .... ").
344. Scott and Steinberg, argue that in contemporary criminal law theory, penal proportionality
may reflect either the quality of an actor's choice or what that choice indicates about the actor's
moral character. The former focuses on the blameworthiness of the quality of choices made, while
the latter focuses on what that choice indicates about the actor's bad character. See Scott &
Steinberg, supra note 1, at 801-02; see also R. A. Duff, Choice, Character, and Criminal Liability,
12 LAW & PHIL. 345, 367-68 (1993); MICHAEL MOORE, Choice, Character, and Excuse, in
PLACING BLAME 548, 574-92 (1997). Scott and Steinberg further contend that under either
formulation-immaturity of judgment or the unformed character of young offenders-juveniles
should receive mitigated sentences compared with adults offenders:
Excuse and mitigation are available to two kinds of wrongdoers: those who are very
different from ordinary people (because of endogenous incapacity such as mental
disorder), and those who are ordinary people whose acts were responses to extraordinary
circumstances or were aberrant in light of their past reputations and conduct. Young
offenders in a real sense belong in both groups. Adolescent decisionmaking capacity is
diminished as compared to adults due to psycho-social immaturity. At the same time, the
scientific evidence suggests that most young lawbreakers are "ordinary" persons (and
quite different from typical adult criminals) in that normal developmental forces drive
their criminal conduct.
Scott & Steinberg, supra note 1, at 802 (footnotes omitted).
345. See Scott & Steinberg, supra note 1, at 801 ("Because these developmental factors
influence their criminal choices, young wrongdoers are less blameworthy than adults under
conventional criminal law conceptions of mitigation.").
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adolescent deserves to be executed or sentenced as severely as an
adult.
346
There are two reasons to prefer bright-lines to discretionary
judgments and to treat youthfulness as a categorical mitigating factor.
The first is the inability reliably and efficiently to identify "maturity"
and adult-like culpability among offending youths.34 7 The second is the
inevitable tendency to subordinate abstract considerations of
youthfulness to the reality of a horrific crime.348 Procedural safeguards
and individualized assessments are inadequate to achieve either
objective. Of course, youthful development is highly variable and a few
youths may be mature and blameworthy prior to becoming eighteen
years of age while many others will not have attained maturity even as
young adults.349 The question is whether clinical tools or objective
346. See, e.g., Fagan, Juveniles and Capital Punishment, supra note 48, at 242 (arguing that
adolescence, per se, is a mitigating status because youths' developmental deficits "are not the
deficits of an atypical adolescent but are 'normal' developmental processes common to all
adolescents. To the degree that there is variation among adolescents, whether offenders or not, these
differences are predictable and subject to a variety of contextual, circumstantial, and intra-individual
factors. In this jurisprudence, the crimes of adolescents are a function of immaturity, compared to
the crimes of adults, which are the acts of morally responsible, yet possibly cognitively and
emotionally deficient, actors.").
347. See Stanford v. Kentucky, 492 U.S. 371, 396-99 (1989) (Brennan, J., dissenting). Brennan
argued that while "[t]here may be exceptional individuals who mature more quickly than their peers,
and who might be considered fully responsible for their actions prior to the age of 18," id. at 396,
transfer and sentencing policies that take account of"an individual youth's culpability" and consider
it among other aggravating and mitigating factors inadequately take account of the juvenile
offender's lack of responsibility: "Immaturity that constitutionally should operate as a bar to a
disproportionate death sentence does not guarantee that a minor will not be transferred for trial to
the adult court system." Id. at 397.
348. Although Stanford relied on juvenile court screening procedures and prosecutorial and
jury sentencing discretion to identify those juvenile offenders with adult-like culpability, see id. at
375 (Scalia, J.), such screening seldom occurs. See supra notes 91-92 and accompanying text.
Moreover, the details of a heinous crime inevitably will subordinate any individualized
considerations of youthfulness:
A jury is free to weigh a juvenile offender's youth and lack of full responsibility against
the heinousness of the crime and other aggravating factors-and, finding the aggravating
factors weightier, to sentence even the most immature of 16- or 17-year olds to be killed.
By no stretch of the imagination, then, are the transfer and sentencing decisions designed
to isolate those juvenile offenders who are exceptionally mature and responsible, and
who thus stand out from their peers as a class.
It is thus unsurprising that individualized consideration at transfer and sentencing
has not in fact ensured that juvenile offenders lacking an adult's culpability are not
sentenced to die.
Stanford, 492 U.S. at 397-98 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
349. See Fagan, supra note 48, at 209 (noting that "the age at which adolescents realize the
developmental competencies that constitute culpability will vary: a significant number of juveniles
will be immature and lacking in the developmental attributes of culpability well before age eighteen,
and some may still lack these competencies after age eighteen: a few may have attained full
[Vol. 32:463
IMPLICATIONS OF ATKINS
indicators exists with which to distinguish young offenders with
culpability equivalent to that of the most culpable adults from the much
larger subset of young offenders lacking such culpability. Because the
vast majority of youths below age eighteen lack the culpability of adults,
efforts to identify those few who may be fully responsible will founder
on the inherent difficulties of defining, much less measuring, immaturity
and will introduce a systematic bias that will redound to the
disadvantage of the many less-blameworthy youths.35° A bright-line
approach avoids the greater risk of error inherent in discretionary
culpability assessments.35' Categorical treatment of all youths that
approximately corresponds to their developmental characteristics
reduces the risk of error of punishing the less culpable as severely as if
they were responsible adults.352 Although some offenders older than age
eighteen also may lack the criminal responsibility we ascribe to adults,
age eighteen provides a natural legal divide because so many other
competence-related rules already draw the line there.
Youthful mitigation represents a legal construct and a normative
judgment about deserved punishment that does not correspond with any
psychiatric diagnosis or developmental analogue about which an expert
maturity by the age threshold of sixteen set by the U.S. Supreme Court in Stanford v. Kentucky, but
most will not." (footnote omitted)).
350. See, e.g., id. at 248 (arguing that "[t]he difficulties and statistical error rates in measuring
immaturity for juveniles invite complexity in the consistent application of the law"). Fagan contends
that
[e]ven when individualized assessments are conducted using modem scientific and
clinical tools, the risks of error due to measurement and diagnostic limitations suggest
that it is neither reliable nor efficient for each court to assess the competency of each
juvenile individually. The precise conditions of immaturity, incapacity, and
incompetency are difficult to consistently and fairly express in a capital sentencing
context. Further, cognitive and volitional immaturity might be easily concealed by
demeanor or physical appearance and, more importantly, obscured by the gruesome
details of a murder and its emotional impact on the victim's family.
Id. at 253 (footnote omitted); see also Weeks, supra note 8, at 479 (noting that if the Court requires
individualized culpability assessments it raises difficult definitional questions: "What is the
'normal' adult level of culpability? How do we measure it?").
351. Scott & Steinberg, supra note 1, at 836-37 ("[W]e currently lack the diagnostic tools to
evaluate psycho-social maturity reliably on an individualized basis or to distinguish young career
criminals from ordinary adolescents who, as adults, will repudiate their reckless experimentation.
Litigating maturity on a case-by-case basis is likely to be an error-prone undertaking, with the
outcomes determined by factors other than immaturity." (footnote omitted)).
352. See, e.g., Scott, supra note 76, at 561 (arguing that "a categorical approach that treats
individuals below a designated age as legal minors for most purposes works well, despite some
inevitable distortion of the developmental capacities of young persons, as long as that age
corresponds roughly to some threshold of developmental readiness to assume the responsibilities
and privileges of adulthood").
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could usefully testify.353 Unlike the insanity defense which exculpates
because a mental disease impairs reason and self-control,354 youthfulness
as a mitigating factor does not require the sentencing authority to decide
whether antecedent forces, such as a mental illness, caused the youth's
behavior. Rather, it conclusively presumes that young people's criminal
choices are inherently constrained and differ qualitatively from those of
adults.
The Supreme Court in Atkins categorically barred executing
defendants with mental retardation, but then remitted to the states the
most difficult tasks of developing the clinical indicators and procedures
with which to identify those defendants whom its rule protected. By
contrast, a categorical mitigation of sentences for youthfulness requires
only a birth certificate to prove age and eligibility for mitigation. A
"youth discount" provides fractional reductions of sentences based on
age-as-a-proxy-for culpability.355 It provides a reasonable and objective
basis for mitigation that avoids the conceptual and administrative
difficulties of more subjective and individualized defenses-diminished
responsibility, 356 "rotten social background,, 357 "social toxin," 358 and
353. Cf Fagan, supra note 48, at 247 ("[l]ndividualized assessments leave triers of fact at the
mercy of imperfect diagnostic assessments to determine which adolescents are 'mature' and which
are not."); Scott & Steinberg, supra note 1, at 836-37.
354. See, e.g., HERBERT FINGARETTE, THE MEANING OF CRIMINAL INSANITY 19-28 (1972)
(emphasizing the centrality of mental disease to every formulation of the insanity defense);
GOLDSTEIN, supra note 133, at 9 (1967) ("The insanity defense ... defines the extent to which men
accused of crime may be relieved of criminal responsibility by virtue of mental disease.").
355. See Hoffman, supra note 79, at 233 (describing age as an imperfect proxy for a complex
of factors, "includ[ing] maturity, judgment, responsibility, and the capability to assess the possible
consequences of one's conduct," that constitute culpability).
356. The administrative experiences with the insanity and diminished responsibility defenses in
the criminal law teach that efforts to individualize culpability assessments necessarily founder on
clinical subjectivity, differences among experts about symptomology, the inability of juries or
judges rationally and consistently to assess culpability, and uncertainty about the penal purposes
being advanced by the inquiry. See, e.g., GOLDSTEIN, supra note 133, at 211-26; Peter Arenella, The
Diminished Capacity and Diminished Responsibility Defenses: Two Children of a Doomed
Marriage, 77 COLUM. L. REV. 827, 830-31 (1977); Morse, supra note 140, at 55 (concluding that
the "law should focus on whether defendants actually formed a mens rea rather than on whether
they had the capacity to form it, and both ultimate conclusions and diagnoses should be
prohibited"); Stephen J. Morse, Excusing and the New Excuse Defenses. A Legal and Conceptual
Review, 23 CRIME & JUST. 329, 370-71 (1998) (analyzing "new syndrome" claims and placing them
within existing criminal law doctrines of excusing conditions). Although "diminished
responsibility" doctrines attempt to link a sane defendant's mental abnormality with some reduced
degree of criminal responsibility, efforts to evaluate subjective culpability result in inconsistent,
confusing, and arbitrary applications. Diminished responsibility allows the defendant to introduce
psychological evidence about why he was less responsible than an ordinary person as a formal
mitigation of punishment, although it is unclear to what legal formula that evidence corresponds.
Arenella, supra at 835-36; Morse, supra note 140, at 9-13.
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"social adversity" 359-that assert external determinants or deficiencies of
character excuse or mitigate the degree of criminal liability.
Shorter sentences recognize that young offenders' choices differ
qualitatively from those of adults and enable them to survive their
serious mistakes with a semblance of life chances intact.360 They also
recognize that the same-length sentences impose a greater "penal bite"
on younger offenders than they do on their older counterparts. 361 A
formal mitigation of punishment based on youthfulness avoids inflicting
disproportionately harsh penalties on less culpable offenders without
excusing their criminal conduct.
357. See generally Richard Delgado, "Rotten Social Background": Should the Criminal Law
Recognize a Defense of Severe Environmental Deprivation?, 3 LAW & INEQ. 9, 15 (1985) (arguing
that someone reared in a "rotten social background" characterized by grinding poverty, minimal
parental or familial support, exposure to violence and abuse, tutelage in crime by older youths "on
the street" cannot make the same moral choices as those born in more advantageous circumstances
and should not be held to the same degree of criminal responsibility).
358. See; Patricia J. Falk, Novel Theories of Criminal Defense Based upon the Toxicity of the
Social Environment: Urban Psychosis, Television Intoxication, and Black Rage, 74 N.C. L. REV.
731, 810-11 (1996) (concluding that the law must evolve to accept "social toxin" defenses). All
these subjective, individualized defenses are problematic and polarizing. See, e.g. Joshua Dressier,
Reflections on Excusing Wrongdoers: Moral Theory, New Excuses and the Model Penal Code, 19
RUTGERS L.J. 671, 674, 689-92 (1988) (arguing that "'compassionate' over-excusing can have a
morally and psychologically undesirable effect on wrongdoers").
359. See, e.g., MICHAEL TONRY, MALIGN NEGLECT-RACE, CRIME AND PUNISHMENT IN
AMERICA 141 (1995) (arguing that recognizing a "social adversity" defense denigrates those
offenders by implying that "those people are not responsible adults whose moral choices matter").
Recognizing people's moral autonomy also assigns responsibility to their willed actions, and a
"social adversity" defense that removes that link also would deny the actor's autonomy. See id.
Tonry argues that recognizing "social adversity" as a mitigation or excuse to criminal liability
would stigmatize all members of the disadvantaged class to whom the defense might be available,
remove disincentives to engage in crime, and undermine the objectivity and deterrent functions of
criminal law. See id. at 146-47.
360. See ZIMRING, supra note 134, at 89-96; Franklin E. Zimring, Background Paper, in
CONFRONTING YOUTH CRIME: REPORT OF THE TWENTIETH CENTURY FUND TASK FORCE ON
SENTENCING POLICY TOWARD YOUNG OFFENDERS 27,66-69 (1978); Zimring, supra note 1, at 283.
361. See Andrew von Hirsch, Proportionate Sentences for Juveniles: How Different than for
Adults?, 3 PUNISHMENT & SOC'Y 221, 227 (2001) (arguing that "[a] given penalty is said to be
more onerous when suffered by a child than by an adult. Young people, assertedly, are
psychologically less resilient, and the punishments they suffer interfere more with opportunities for
education and personal development."(citation omitted)); see also Arredondo, supra note 195, at 19
(arguing that "[b]ecause of differences in the experience of time, any given duration of sanction will
be experienced subjectively as longer by younger children"); Jeffrey Fagan, This Will Hurt Me
More Than It Hurts You: Social and Legal Consequences of Criminalizing Delinquency, 16 NOTRE
DAME J.L. ETHICS & PUB. POL'Y 1, 21-22 (2002) (describing substantive quality of punishment
adolescents experience in adult incarceration as far harsher than the sanctions they experience as
delinquents); Feld, supra note 2, at 112-13 (contending that "youths experience objectively equal
punishment subjectively as more severe").
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Youthfulness constitutes a categorical form of diminished
responsibility because young people as a group make choices that differ
qualitatively from those of adults. States should adopt an explicit "youth
discount" in sentencing based on the idea of a sliding scale of criminal
responsibility. 362 The research evidence is strongest that the maturity of
judgment and adjudicative competence of the youngest adolescents is
qualitatively lower than that of typical adult offenders. As a result, a
fourteen-year-old offender might receive a sentence that was twenty-five
percent of the length of the adult penalty, a sixteen-year-old defendant
would receive one that was half as long as an adult sentence, and an
eighteen-year-old adult would receive the full penalty as presently
occurs. The particulars of the "discount rate" reflect youth and crime
policy judgments about the extent to which adolescents differ from
adults socially and developmentally, and to what degree those factors
deserve categorical mitigated consideration. The deeper discounts for
younger offenders correspond to their greater developmental limitations
and their more limited opportunities to learn to exercise self-control.
363
Because reduced culpability provides the rationale for youthful
mitigation, younger adolescents bear less responsibility and deserve
proportionally shorter sentences than older youths.
V. CONCLUSION
The deficits in adaptive social skills that defined mental retardation
in Atkins-reduced abilities to understand and use information, to
engage in logical reasoning, to control impulses, and to resist peer
362. Feld, supra note 2, at 118-21. See also Scott & Steinberg, supra note 1, at 837 ("[A]
systematic sentencing discount for young offenders in adult court[] might satisfy the demands of
proportionality."); Tanenhaus & Drizin, supra note 231, at 697-98 ("We endorse Feld's proposals
[for a youth discount] because they respect the notion that juveniles are developmentally different
than adults and that these differences make juveniles both less culpable for their crimes and less
deserving of the harsh sanctions, which now must be imposed on serious and violent adult
offenders."); von Hirsch, supra note 361, at 226 (arguing for categorical penalty reductions based
on juveniles' reduced culpability: "While actual appreciation of consequences varies highly among
youths of the same age, the degree of appreciation we should demand depends on age: we may
rightly expect more comprehension and self-control from the 17-year-old than a 14-year-old, so that
the 17-year-old's penalty reduction should be smaller. Assessing culpability on the basis of
individualized determinations of a youth's degree of moral development would be neither feasible
nor desirable."); Zimring, supra note 1, at 288 (arguing that the penal law of youth crime should
develop "a sliding scale of responsibility based on both judgment and the practical experience of
impulse management and peer control").
363. Zimring, supra note 1, at 288 ("[Aldolescents learn their way toward adult levels of
responsibility gradually. This notion is also consistent with ... long periods of diminished
responsibility that incrementally approach adult standards in the late teens . . . [and with] less-than-
adult punishments that gradually approach adult levels during the late teen years.").
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pressures-are features of normal adolescents. Because adolescents
manifest reduced criminal responsibility as a result of normal
developmental processes, the Court should use Roper v. Simmons to
revisit Stanford and correct its error. Both empirically and normatively,
the two categories of offenders are legally and morally indistinguishable,
and the Court should endorse a categorical prohibition on executing
juveniles.
Reconsidering the applicability of the death penalty for juveniles
provides an opportunity to think more comprehensively about adolescent
criminal responsibility and adjudicative competence. Once the Court
recognizes that adolescents possess less criminal culpability than do
ordinary adult offenders simply because they are young and immature,
then no reason exists to restrict this principle to only capital sentences.
Although the Court has resisted extending constitutional proportionality
principles to noncapital sentencing out of concerns for federalism and
deference to legislative autonomy, state courts and legislatures should
formally recognize youthfulness as a categorical mitigating factor in all
criminal sentencing statutes. The quality of youths' judgments differs
qualitatively from that of adults' and bears directly on their degree of
criminal responsibility. Youths have a very different developmental
trajectory than defendants with mental retardation and are better able to
learn from their mistakes and to learn to act more responsibly in the
future. In addition, a successful transition to adulthood requires youths to
learn to be responsible even though they sometimes will make serious
errors of judgment. Sound youth policy and crime policy support
formally recognizing youthfulness as a mitigating factor in sentencing.
Finally, states should set a minimum age of eligibility for criminal
prosecution at no less than fifteen or sixteen years of age. The
substantial body of developmental research on adolescent immaturity
and adjudicative competence indicates that most fourteen- to sixteen-
year-old youths are substantially impaired relative to adults and lack
adjudicative competence. Trying and sentencing such youths as adults
increases the likelihood of erroneous convictions and undermines the
legitimacy of the criminal justice system. Ultimately, public officials and
policy makers have to recognize that the same principle that prevails in
every other legal domain also applies to youths who commit crimes-
kids are different.
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